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PHILOSOPHY

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF BERTRAND RUSSELL

EARL RUSSELL, O.M., F.R.S.

Frontispiece

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
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PHILOSOPHY

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RUSSELL'S PHILOSOPHICAL DEVELOPMENT

ANTHONY QUINTON

THE story that is told in Lord Russell's recent book *My Philosophical Development* (Allen and Unwin, 18s.) is one that has been told before, by him and by others, but this particular presentation of it stands out by reason of its comprehensiveness and its authority. It is a rather austere intellectual autobiography, sticking firmly to the topic announced in its title, and the non-philosophical aspects of the author's character and interests take as modest a place in it as Collingwood's do in his not altogether dissimilar *Autobiography*. What makes a comparison of these two intellectual self-portraits so tempting is the almost diametrical opposition of their authors. Russell is an aristocrat, an influential public figure too lively and multifarious to be contained for long in a university, a communicator who writes to be understood and believed, a mathematician still despite many years away from mathematics, a moral and political radical, an atheist and a lifelong defender of science as the most solid and enduring achievement of the human intellect. Collingwood was a scholarship boy, the son of an unsuccessful literary man, a pure example of the obscure and ineffectual don, who made out that he was too busy to answer criticism or to take part in college administration or university politics, an elaborately conscious stylist, almost as much a historian and an archaeologist as he was a philosopher, essentially a reactionary for all his autumnal flirtation with Marxism, a Christian (up to a point) and an embattled critic of the pretensions of science. Yet there are affinities at the deeper levels of personality. Both of them are astonishingly self-confident, fearless and unequivocally forthright about their beliefs, with a self-confidence, indeed, that often turns into arrogance. Both were propelled into philosophy by their dissatisfaction with the received intellectual foundations of a first-order discipline and, in particular; by their disgust with the incapacity of the philosophers they first encountered to say anything

useful or relevant to that discipline. It is not altogether surprising, then, that for all their differences they should both, looking back on their work, find in it a good deal more unity and coherence than most of their readers do and, more specifically, that they should both make the delightful discovery that their most famous early work contained far more truth than, in their long neglect of it, they had ever suspected.

It is natural that a philosopher, reflecting on a sequence of ideas that he has lived through more intimately than anyone, should see only gradual shifts of emphasis and interest where outsiders have claimed to discern basic changes of doctrine. Russell admits to only one major philosophical change of mind, dating it in the years 1899 and 1900 and describing it as the adoption of logical atomism and of the technique of Peano. In general, he says, philosophy has always been important to him as an instrument for the rational defence and justification of some extra-philosophical body of beliefs: first religion, then mathematics, finally science. In some engagingly characteristic selections from a diary he kept when he was sixteen he is to be seen jettisoning the immortality of the soul and the freedom of the will (the former for some unstated reason is taken to be inevitably borne down in the destruction of the latter) as incompatible with the existence of an omnipotent God. God was soon to follow the other members of the Kantian trinity into the abyss. Until shortly before the war of 1914 his main business was the articulation and defence of mathematics, in particular through the purifying elimination of unnecessary or metaphysical assumptions and of invalid logical trickery. By the time Wittgenstein appeared at Cambridge the whole gigantic structure had been hesitantly and in what he still considers an unsatisfactorily rough and ready manner steered past the jagged reef of the paradoxes. At this point Russell was convinced by Wittgenstein that the propositions of mathematics were simply tautologies and the whole great achievement of *Principia Mathematica* seems to have been deprived by this of interest and importance for him. So, from the end of the 1914 war, Russell's work in philosophy has been almost exclusively concerned with the justification of science. In 1903 he had said that induction, where it was not disguised deduction, was "a mere method of making plausible guesses". In his mature epistemology, two decades later, the body of scientific beliefs is taken, as a presupposition of the whole inquiry, to be broadly true on the whole and, at any rate, to be more likely to be true than any other comparable region of our beliefs, in particular than the results of philosophical speculation. If Wittgenstein's theory of logical truth, in appearing to Russell to prove the merely conceptual and vacuous character of mathematics, led him to change his subject-matter, he took with him to the new undertaking the

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same philosophical technique that had been so successful in the investigation of mathematics.

Taking it for granted that, broadly speaking, science and common sense are capable of being interpreted so as to be true in the main, the question arises: what are the minimum hypotheses from which this broad measure of truth will result? This is a technical question and it has no unique answer. A body of propositions, such as those of pure mathematics or theoretical physics, can be deduced from a certain apparatus of initial assumptions concerning initial undefined terms. Any reduction in the number of undefined terms and unproved premisses is an improvement since it diminishes the range of possible error and provides a smaller assemblage of hostages for the truth of the whole system. (*My Philosophical Development*, p. 219.)

The title of this book's last chapter aptly summarizes the major shift in question: Russell speaks of his retreat from Pythagoras. Once mathematics seemed to him a timeless, abstract structure which it was the philosopher's task to reveal in all its inhuman and apodeictic splendour. The discovery of its tautological nature showed it, in Russell's view, to be all too human; its claim to rigorous necessity was defeated by the shifts required to elude the paradoxes. In science, however, there was a body of beliefs that at least approximated to knowledge and, in its dependence for truth on the non-human world, to impersonality. With the technique of analysis the philosopher can at least work with the modest aim of reducing its deliverance to orders.

Russell acknowledges four main personal debts in philosophy. First to G. E. Moore for his liberation from idealism, for the view that fact was independent of our knowledge of it. Fact was not constructed by mind, as in the Kantian tradition, but present, more or less obscurely and uncertainly, to it. Secondly to Whitehead for Ockham's razor, "the supreme maxim of scientific philosophizing", that is to say for the technique of reductive analysis. Thirdly to William James for neutral monism and thus for liberation from the dualism that divides the world into acts of consciousness on the one hand and their non-mental objects on the other. Finally to Wittgenstein for the depressing revelation that all logical truth is tautological and for showing the crucial importance for philosophy of the relation of language and fact.

The general upshot, stated in his second chapter: "My Present View of the World", is in essentials the same as that expounded in the "Excursus into Metaphysics" which closes the *Philosophy of Logical Atomism*. The world is a vast assemblage of more or less homogeneous events, overlapping one another and causally related in various ways. Some, but very few, of these are data of experience and are so linked by memory-chains as to constitute minds. What Russell has called cosmic piety enforces the recognition of the very

small place of data amongst the totality of events. Arguments from physics, physiology and the common facts of sensible illusion require the admission that only the most abstract and structural features of unperceived events can be reliably inferred. The general acceptability of science entails that there are unperceived events, to form rational beliefs about them we have to rely on principles of non-demonstrative inference. The object of philosophy is to show how the character of the whole order of events can be derived from the rather meagre sample of its contents that, wrapped up with various subjective accretions, is directly revealed to us.

Russell's first organized philosophical refuge from the disturbance of his early theological doubts and his dissatisfaction with mathematics as taught for the Tripos of his day was the absolute idealism of Bradley. He reproduces some early writings in the Hegelian idiom in this book and unequivocally disowns them. But, as might be expected, they are distinctly ingenious and considerably more lucid than most writing in the same mode. Moore's revolt against idealism was effected through the analysis of perceptual experience as a relationship between a mental act of awareness and a non-mental, indeed often physical, object. Russell's critical divergence from Bradley was on the issue of relations. His initial point of attack was on the coherence theory of truth as presented by Joachim which he saw to be a special case, a particular application, of the doctrine of internal relations. For the coherence theory truth cannot lie in a relation between unintelligibly heterogeneous propositions and facts, it must be found in the unitary, internally related character of a systematic whole. Moore's epistemological realism, like Russell's correspondence theory, is a consequence of the rejection of the necessity of internal relatedness. In Russell's case there was an added support for the externality of relations that derived from mathematics. The notion of a series is essential to mathematics and series are logically generated by asymmetrical relations: "is the successor of", "is greater than" and so forth. But asymmetrical relations cannot be reduced to properties or attributes of the terms related, without the regressive assumption of a further asymmetrically relational fact. "George is older than John" only reduces to "there are ages x and y , such that George is x and John is y " with the addition of " x is greater than y ". The admission of the externality of relations, then, and with it the recognition that the world was, as it appeared, a real plurality of things, was required by the interpretation of mathematics as much as by Moore's perceptual realism and his own theory of truth. Russell describes the move as leaving the Hegelian hothouse for a Platonic jungle in which an indiscriminate plurality of disparate entities prowled. Even if subsequent analytic economies have reduced the multitude of species on view in his

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ontological zoo it has never ceased to contain a vast plurality of individual beasts.

If reflection on mathematics led to a pluralism that was at first excessively fecund it also provided the remedy, a technique of analysis which made possible the elimination of the more outlandish existences. The systematic derivation of mathematics from logic showed that numbers—whether complex, real, rational or natural—were “linguistic conveniences”. The same treatment was less convincingly applied to the classes in terms of which numbers were defined, classes being none too helpfully identified with the set of things satisfying a propositional function. The most influential assertion of a type of symbol's incompleteness, however, was the theory of descriptions. In the light of that theory the topics of discourse were divided into real and apparent subjects, the former referred to by logically proper names, the latter by descriptive phrases. The analysis of descriptions was originally introduced to cope with the troublesome but intrinsically not very engrossing class of non-existent subjects of discourse, with the fictional and the imaginary. In Russell's first articulate presentation of the theory of knowledge, in *The Problems of Philosophy* and in the second half of *Mysticism and Logic*, it was put to a more ambitious use. The distinction of proper name and description was seen here as the logical correlate of the traditional distinction between immediate and inferred knowledge. By asserting this connection Russell provided a point of entry for the analytic procedure of his mathematical investigations into the field of empirical knowledge.

It is usual to divide Russell's career as an epistemologist into three phases: first the highly qualified, Lockean, empiricism of *The Problems of Philosophy*, in which physical objects were inferred as the transcendental causes of sense-data and *a priori* knowledge was held to record the outcome of inspecting the timeless interrelations of subsistent universals; next the period of logical atomism strictly so called, running from *Our Knowledge of the External World* to the *Analysis of Mind*, in which material things were identified in almost phenomenalist fashion with the class of their appearances; and finally a period of progressive retreat from radical empiricism, beginning with the overtly causal theory of perception of the *Analysis of Matter* and continuing steadily to the mildly Kantian theory of non-demonstrative inference in *Human Knowledge*. Looking back on *The Problems of Philosophy*, Russell now finds less to disagree with than he had expected. “I no longer think that the laws of logic are laws of things; on the contrary, I now regard them as purely linguistic.” He sees the more refined entities of mathematical physics—points, instants and particles—as accessible to Whiteheadian analysis. He admits, too, by implication, that the matter

of physics cannot be left in the transcendental autonomy accorded to it by his first account of the subject and that it must be constructed out of some less inherently elusive stuff. He concedes that on first recognizing this he indulged in a brief flirtation with phenomenalism whose fruit was an article (chapter 8 of *Mysticism and Logic*) which sought "to exhibit the hypothetical entities that a given percipient does not perceive as structures composed entirely of elements that he does perceive". But in *Our Knowledge of the External World*, he rightly points out, two further classes of elements are admitted: the sense-data of others and sensibilia, that is "the appearances that things present in places where there are no minds to perceive them". A consistent phenomenalism, he holds, in agreement with its more penetrating defenders, must start from a solipsistic basis, the unobserved must be defined in terms of possible sense-data of *mine*. He is surely correct in saying that this has never been more than momentarily his own position.

Russell, in fact, has always been opposed to a strictly subjective point of view in the theory of knowledge. A more or less Cartesian critical procedure has always been controlled by the assumption of the general acceptability of science and, underlying that, by the cosmic piety that recognizes minds and their knowledge to occupy only a very small place in the universe. There are numerous and recurring testimonies to this fundamental theme. To start with he was faithful to the act-object distinction he had acquired from Moore long after Moore had seemingly lost interest in it as being of no service to the purposes of realism. In the *Problems*, Russell firmly distinguishes the act of sensation from the sense-datum itself, for even if sense-data cannot be identified with material things we do not have to conclude that they are mental. He dropped the act-object distinction only when, following James, he believed it possible to regard the experiential stuff of the world as both physical *and* mental in virtue of its relations to other experiential elements. On Russell's version of neutral monism it was the exceptional case for events to fall within minds, that is to be associated with nervous systems and to stand in mnemonic relations to previous events so associated. He accepted neutral monism, in other words, only when he could see a way of depriving it of any mentalistic flavour. The same preference for the physical comes out in the theory of sensibilia, for these, despite the hypothetical look of their verbal expression, are construed by him as being as fully actual as sense-data. It was the phenomenalist look of the world "sensibilia", no doubt, that led him in due course to drop it in favour of "events". A more extreme and provocative form his preference has taken has been the widely disputed view that sense-data, the events that are noticed or directly observed, are in the brain. The argument for this distressing

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conclusion is simply that the immediate causal antecedents of sense-data are indubitably in the brain and that the terms of a direct causal relation are spatially continuous. The assumption that completes the argument, of course, is that sense-data, as a type of events, are in the real world, in space, and so are physical as well as mental. His preference for the physical is recognized as an emotional bias in his comment on the celebrated passage by F. H. Ramsey: "My picture of the world is drawn in perspective, and not like a model to scale. The foreground is occupied by human beings and the stars are all as small as threepenny bits. I don't really believe in astronomy, except as a complicated description of part of the course of human and possibly animal sensation." When Russell says that this passage expresses precisely what he does *not* feel he is not supposing that it is to be taken literally. Ramsey does really believe in astronomy, a sentence or so earlier he has been admitting, while disdaining, the vastness of the heavens. But Russell plainly suspects that the literal sense of Ramsey's remarks is just what a subjective, phenomenalist philosopher should believe in all consistency. In the light of all this it is surely more correct to think of Russell as a hesitant materialist than as a none too thoroughgoing phenomenalist. It is characteristic that he always prefers to use scientific arguments derived from the physiology of perception and from the physics of the transmission of light and again from the profoundly non-perceptual picture of material things given by physics in order to establish the chief and traditional ground for his hesitation, the thesis that material objects are not directly perceived.

There is an interesting analogy between the course of Russell's thought about the theory of knowledge, about philosophical logic and about ethics. In each case, under the initial influence of Moore, he adopted an only very insecurely empirical brand of realism. In rejecting this first standpoint he has never gone as far in the opposite direction as he has seemed to in the light of the lines of development favoured by his successors. His final position has always been an uneasy compromise between Moore and his and Moore's more radical successors. Thus in the first decade of the century he held a Cartesian view of the distinctness of mind and matter and a Lockean view of perception; he held both individuals and universals to be real and mutually irreducible; and he believed moral propositions to convey information about a transcendent order of values in the manner of *Principia Ethica*. Like others at first, he was more affected by the phenomenalist implications of Moore's investigations into sense-data than he was by Moore's compensating doctrine of common sense. One side of his early logical realism (the theory of Moore's *Nature of Judgment*) was abandoned in the face of Wittgenstein's theory of logical truth; he no longer regarded *a priori* knowledge as descriptive

of the timeless realm of Platonic abstraction. With others again he was more impressed by Moore's refutation of ethical naturalism than by Moore's insistence on the objectivity of moral propositions. The natural termination of these developments was the positivism of the 1930s, which combined a phenomenalist epistemology with a nominalist philosophy of logic and a non-descriptive theory of ethics. Russell never went so far. Against phenomenalists he maintained the reality of unperceived events, against nominalists he maintained the reality of universals, against emotivists he maintained the relevance of human desire to moral propositions and in his theory of the goodness of "compossible" desires sketched the outlines of a fragile, tentative ethical objectivism. Now in each case, it seems to me, the part of his original opinion that he was led to abandon was really more congenial to him, more in line with the fundamental and dominating tendency of his thoughts, than the part he retained. Thus in the theory of knowledge he has really been much more concerned to save the reality, the independence from mind, of perceived fact than to establish the rigorously empirical credentials of his conception of the external world. In philosophical logic he has been reluctant, emotionally and intellectually, to reconcile himself to the view that necessary truth is formal. There are numerous signs of this dissatisfaction: his attempt to find an empirical foundation for the formal concepts of logic, his retention of universals, his implicit abandonment of the view that logic is the essence of philosophy, his emphasis on the continuity of philosophy and science. In ethics he has come as near to utilitarianism as he can without overt conflict with the anti-naturalist principle, the third dogma of modern empiricism. I am suggesting, in fact, that Russell is fundamentally a materialist, baffled by respect for Moore's neo-Cartesian sense-datum theory, a utilitarian, baffled by respect for Moore's doctrine of the logical autonomy of judgments of value, and, most important of all from the point of view of his influence on and reputation among contemporary philosophers, a logical realist, baffled by respect for Wittgenstein's theory of the analytic or tautological nature of necessary truth.

It is important that Russell's nominalism is only skin-deep, since those who accept the exclusive and exhaustive division of statements into the analytical and the empirical are committed by doing so to a certain view of philosophical method. They commonly and naturally draw the boundary between the two realms of discourse in such a way that philosophy is included with logic and mathematics amongst the *a priori* disciplines. In his early writings, ironically enough, Russell was more explicit about the connection of the three disciplines than anyone: in *Principia Mathematica* the identity of mathematics and logic was exhibited, in *Our Knowledge of the*

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External World (where he has more definite things to say about philosophical method than anywhere else) not only is it argued that logic and philosophy are identical ("every philosophical problem, when it is subjected to the necessary analysis and purification, is found either to be not really philosophical at all, or else to be, in the sense in which we are using the word, logical") but the view that *Principia Mathematica* is the paradigm of a properly constructed philosophical system is asserted.

We start from a body of common knowledge, which constitutes our data. On examination, the data are found to be complex, rather vague, and largely interdependent logically. By analysis we reduce them to propositions which are as nearly as possible simple and precise, and we arrange them in deductive chains, in which a certain number of initial propositions form a logical guarantee for all the rest. . . . The discovery of these premisses belongs to philosophy; but the work of deducing the body of common knowledge from them belongs to mathematics, if "mathematics" is interpreted in a somewhat liberal sense. (*Our Knowledge of the External World*, p. 214.)

Since that time Russell has never been so forthright and precise about the proper method of philosophy but it is plain that he would dissent in a number of ways from the realization of his early ideal to be found in, for example, Carnap's *Logische Aufbau der Welt*. He would reject its rigorously phenomenalist starting-point as insufficient, he would insist that principles of non-demonstrative inference are required to move from propositions embodying concepts of one level to propositions embodying concepts of a higher level, above all he would insist that the presuppositions of the whole undertaking could not be merely tautological but must be scientifically grounded.

What is odd about Russell's methodological position is that it was he, in *Principia Mathematica*, who gave the first and by far the largest and most impressive example of the method of logical analysis, and he who, in the years immediately following its publication, gave the principles of this procedure their first clear articulation. Yet since the apparent theoretical trivialization of his great achievement he has been silent or vague, at any rate generally unconcerned, about questions of method by comparison with his peers. His philosophical practice has been extraordinarily various, his philosophical enterprises have stood in no clear systematic relationship to one another; such comments about method as he has made have been rather off-hand repetitions of earlier formulations. Beyond the recommendation of a rather unspecified technique of analysis he has done little more than urge philosophers to concern themselves with the critical reinterpretation of science and common knowledge, to tackle problems piecemeal in the approved manner of the sciences and to adopt a standpoint of ethical neutrality. Compared with the place of

questions of method in the attention of Moore and Wittgenstein this is very little. Moore's practice was, from the earliest days, strikingly uniform and the nature of this practice, the problem of analysis, was one of his three principal philosophical interests. In Wittgenstein the nature of philosophy itself takes pride of place amongst philosophical problems and, as a far more successful interpreter and rationalizer of his own practice than Moore ever was, he has transmitted to a whole generation of philosophers, for better or worse, an unprecedentedly high degree of methodological self-consciousness.

Russell's unconcern with problems of method may help to explain two rather surprising facts: first the conflict between his own view of his philosophical career as solidly continuous and the more common opinion which got its most extreme expression in Broad's remark about Russell's producing a brand-new philosophy every few years and, secondly, the marked and mutual lack of sympathy between Russell and his natural heirs, the main body of present-day analytic philosophers. As to the matter of change of views: if Russell has not been so unwaveringly fixed in his opinions as Moore (most of whose final doctrines were clearly stated in his recently published lectures of 1910 and 1911), he has not undertaken the kind of radical transformation of his entire philosophical position that marks off the late from the early Wittgenstein either. Yet his views appear more fluid and inconsequent than Wittgenstein's because they are not subject to the integrating pressure of a precise idea of philosophical method. (I am ignoring here the unacceptable claim, made by and on behalf of Wittgenstein, that, in his later phase at any rate, he had no philosophical doctrines.) Changes of detailed opinion effected in order to bring those details into line with a persisting idea of method look like merely internal adjustments. Where there is no such idea of method the detail is all and any major change in it looks like a completely new start. In Russell's case the extent of change has been exaggerated largely for this reason but also because he has never bothered to emphasize the continuity of ideas underlying such changes in terminology as that from *sensibilia* to *events*, because he tends to express his convictions in a forceful and unqualified way, because he has always believed that philosophical problems should be tackled piecemeal anyway and, in practice, by any suitable procedure that lies to hand and, finally, because with the passage of time the main subjects of his concern have varied. In fact, most of the leading doctrines of the latest period of his thought, whether it is taken to start with the *Analysis of Matter* in 1927 or with *The Limits of Empiricism* in 1936 are fairly explicitly foreshadowed in *Our Knowledge of the External World*. That early masterpiece asserts that the experiences of others and also unperceived events must be

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acknowledged, that principles of non-demonstrative inference are required to support belief in them and from this it follows that the minimum ontology of science and common knowledge must contain trans-empirical elements. Since verification must be in terms of private, sensible occurrences this in its turn entails that not all our beliefs can be strictly verifiable. His positive theory of the verification of basic propositions in the *Inquiry* (the rather surprising view that to verify them we must observe the causal relation between the belief and the experience that verifies it) and the doctrine of non-demonstrative inference in *Human Knowledge* are additions rather than modifications, the filling of gaps that in the latter case at least were openly acknowledged in earlier writings.

When one considers the magnitude of Russell's philosophical achievement the prevailing estimate of his philosophical importance, amongst academic philosophers at any rate, seems curiously low. On the whole, while according the highest respect to his work in strictly formal logic, they regard his early epistemology as an interesting appendage to Moore and his later epistemology as without interest or relevance to the pressing concerns of the moment. Now in the first place such a view ignores the fact that not only did Russell take an absolutely central place in the creation of modern formal logic but that he is both the identifier and principal creator of modern philosophical logic. In chapter 2 of the *External World* he gave the name "philosophical logic" to the study of the forms of propositions and his own doctrine of logical atomism has been unquestionably the most substantial single contribution to it. The whole apparatus of logical classification in terms of which philosophical analysis is now conducted is largely owed to him, and no one has done more to give the problem of reference the place it now occupies. Besides these two varieties of logic he has made contributions of the first importance to the philosophy of mathematics, to the theory of perception, to the philosophy of mind and to the topics of causation and probability. He has been active, in a way that is only minor by his own standards, in ethics, the history of philosophy (and here, surely, his *Leibniz* is the most distinguished modern book about a philosopher) and in the philosophy of religion and politics. It so happens that two major blanks are two of the most prominent interests of his successors: the problems of necessity and other minds; but beside what he has produced these gaps bulk fairly small. When contrasted with Moore, with his extraordinarily narrow range of interests (the relation of sense-data to material things, of observable facts to judgments of value and of *analysans* and *analysandum*), his acute inflexibility, which kept him circling continuously round a small, fixed set of theoretical possibilities, and his general intellectual unadventurousness, Russell should surely cut a larger figure than he

commonly does. I suggest that the explanation of this disregard is a joint effect of the methodological impurity of Russell's practice and his general lack of interest in questions of method at the level of explicit theory, despite the fact that he more than anyone invented the characteristic method and, even more important perhaps, the characteristic tone of modern analytic philosophy. Curiously it was his own logical inquiries that made possible the development of that theory of the analytic nature of philosophical theories in the light of which his own insistence on the relevance of scientific evidence to philosophical problems and on the hypothetical character of his proposed solutions is so unfavourably viewed by his successors.

Russell, of course, vigorously reciprocates their disregard. In a long concluding chapter in the present book he reprints a number of detailed criticisms which are often petulant and sometimes weak. Of his successors, he writes: "I have been unable, in spite of serious efforts, to see any validity in their criticisms of me"; of Mr. Urmson: "I am unable to see any cogency whatever in the arguments that Mr. Urmson advances", and of Mr. Strawson: "I may say, to begin with, that I am totally unable to see any validity whatever in any of Mr. Strawson's arguments". Not *any* shred of validity in *any* of them? This blustering unfortunately blinds Russell to the extent to which the ideas he is criticizing are continuous with his own. For example, he attacks Mr. Warnock for pointing out that " \exists " or "there is" can introduce statements of markedly different logical character. Warnock argues against Quine that the ontological commitments of "there is a prime number between 5 and 11" and "there is a pear tree in the garden" cannot be construed in the same way because the truth of the two statements is established in quite different ways. In conflict with this Quine had maintained that the reference to classes was as ineliminable from the one as the reference to material objects was from the other. Now Russell asserts in the course of the discussion that both numbers and classes are "linguistic conveniences", whereas an indispensable part of Quine's case is that classes, at any rate, are not. Russell, in fact, has boldly rushed to the defence of a questionable interpretation of the symbolism of formal logic, in the course of defending which he reveals that this interpretation is in flat conflict with his own view of the type of statement in question. Does he really want to underwrite any interpretation of his logical symbolism against any criticism of the omniscient power of that symbolism to reveal philosophical truth, however much the interpretation in question conflicts with his own? Criticizing Strawson, he says that Strawson's theory simply confuses the problems of descriptions and egocentric words and that he has already dealt with egocentric words, although Strawson does not acknowledge the fact. He has certainly recognized that there *are* such words, but this, though important, is a

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platitute. What matters is the use that Strawson makes of it in *On Referring* to show how a sentence with a given meaning can be used in different circumstances to make different statements and to refer to different individuals. Many of these criticisms (though not all, by any means, there are some shrewd questions put to Professor Ryle) are polemical in the bad, merely disputatious, sense.

Russell's overall charge against his most recent successors is that they have turned away from trying to understand the world to a trivial concern "with the different ways in which silly people can say silly things". There is a serious point under this none too sensible observation. Post-Russellian philosophy has passed through two distinct verbalistic phases, the first of formal conventionalism in which it seemed to be the philosopher's task to promote arbitrary intellectual constructions controlled only by the criteria of consistency and systematic elegance, the second of grammatical authoritarianism in which it seemed enough for the philosopher to set out in the most refined detail the prevailing rules of ordinary discourse. That this phase is closing is clearly enough shown by the publication of books like Mr. Strawson's *Individuals* and Mr. Hampshire's *Thought and Action*. Beyond the mere description of a conceptual apparatus, actual or projected, lies the world in which it is to be employed and in which are to be sought and found the reasons or justification for the apparatus's taking the form it does. This view of the subject-matter of philosophy as being language at work in the world derives from the abhorred later Wittgenstein, most notable to Russell for his "suave evasion of paradoxes". Perhaps no modern philosopher was closer in sympathy to this new, concretely pragmatic, attitude to language, as against free construction or dutiful and unquestioning submission to accepted practice, than F. P. Ramsey. Much admired both by Russell and the present-day philosophers he so much deplores, Ramsey might, if he had lived, have prevented the rather sad and quite unnecessary hostility between them.

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A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE RUSSELLIAN THEORY OF DESCRIPTIONS

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THE theory of descriptions occupies a very prominent place in Russell's system of logic and indeed in his system of philosophy. Since the publication of the now classical paper "On Denoting" in *Mind* for 1905 the theory had been incorporated into *Principia Mathematica*, the first volume of which appeared in 1910. In 1918 Russell discussed descriptions in his lectures on the Philosophy of Logical Atomism, which subsequently were published in *The Monist* for 1919. A very lucid exposition of the main tenets of the doctrine is to be found in the *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* dating from the same year. Epistemological aspects of the theory of descriptions are examined in "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description", in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* for 1910-11, and also in Chapter V of *The Problems of Philosophy*, first published in 1912.¹

It is not an exaggeration to say that the theory of descriptions has become part and parcel of modern logic. Naturally, it has been criticized on different accounts, but the various arguments of the critics seem to have failed to move Russell from the position he took over fifty years ago.

I propose to re-examine Russell's theory of descriptions because it seems to me that it raises a few interesting problems which appear to have escaped the notice of its originator, let alone his critics.

As we all remember, Russell distinguishes two types of descriptions, definite descriptions and indefinite descriptions. An indefinite description is an expression of the form "a so-and-so", for instance, "a man", "a unicorn", "an inhabitant of London". A definite description is an expression of the form "the so-and-so" (in the singular), for instance, "the author of *Waverley*", "the author of *Slawkenburgius on Noses*", "the author of *The Maid's Tragedy*", "the present King of France", "the inhabitant of London". The problem is how these expressions are to be understood if used as parts of propositions, and the theory of descriptions claims to have found a solution to this problem. To put it in a different way, the theory of descriptions is supposed to give a satisfactory analysis of the meaning of the indefinite article "a" and the definite article "the" (in the singular).

According to Russell, no description, whether definite or indefinite, can be defined in isolation. This I take to mean that there are no

¹ The papers "On Denoting" and "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism" are now available in B. Russell, *Logic and Knowledge*, London, 1956.

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identities of the type " $a = b$ " where " a " is a description and " b " is an expression which can be regarded as a definiens of the description. We are assured, however, that it is possible to supply definitions of propositions in which descriptions occur. Such definitions take the form of definitional equivalences, and are called by Russell "definitions in use". In expounding his theory of descriptions Russell discusses a number of concrete definitions in use and then suggests a general definition for either type of descriptions.

As a rule, Russell begins his presentation of the theory of descriptions by considering indefinite descriptions first. He continues by suggesting a certain interpretation of propositions in which definite descriptions occur, and concludes by discussing descriptive functions. For reasons which will become apparent as we proceed, the order of the present inquiry will be different, and the problem of descriptive functions will be left out altogether. In fact the analysis of the well-known Russellian proposition

(1) the author of *Waverley* was Scotch

will serve us as the point of departure.¹

We readily agree with Russell that (1) is equivalent to the conjunction of the following three propositions:

- (1.1) at least one person wrote *Waverley*
- (1.2) at most one person wrote *Waverley*
- (1.3) whoever wrote *Waverley* was Scotch,

but this suggests to us conclusions different from those arrived at by Russell. Russell argues that in a sense propositions (1.1), (1.2) and (1.3), taken together, define what is meant by proposition (1). Indirectly, they define the meaning of the description "the author of *Waverley*", and in the last instance they throw light on the sense which we attach to the definite article "the". Now, we proceed with the analysis of (1) by observing that the equivalence between (1) and the conjunction of (1.1), (1.2), and (1.3) continues to hold if the latter propositions are re-phrased as follows:

- (1.1a) at least one person was the author of *Waverley*
- (1.2a) at most one person was the author of *Waverley*
- (1.3a) whoever was the author of *Waverley* was Scotch

As a next step we translate propositions (1.1a), (1.2a), and (1.3a) into logical idiom, and say that (1) is equivalent to the conjunction of three propositions which read thus:

- (1.1b) for some x — x was the author of *Waverley*

¹ See B. Russell, *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, London, 1919, pp. 177 f.

(1.2b) for all x and y —if x was the author of *Waverley* and y was the author of *Waverley* then x was y

(1.3b) for all x —if x was the author of *Waverley* then x was Scotch

Similarly, the proposition

(2) the present King of France is bald

can be said to be equivalent to the conjunction of the following three propositions:

(2.1) for some x — x is the present King of France

(2.2) for all x and y —if x is the present King of France and y is the present King of France then x is y

(2.3) for all x —if x is the present King of France then x is bald

Proposition (1) is true and it is not difficult to see that the conjunction of propositions (1.1b), (1.2b), and (1.3b) is also true. Proposition (2) turns out to be false because (2.1), which in ordinary language means that somebody is the present King of France, is obviously false.

Equivalences analogous to those established between (1) and the conjunction of (1.1b), (1.2b) and (1.3b), or between (2) and the conjunction of (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3) appear to hold if instead of definite descriptions we use noun-expressions such as "Socrates" or "Pegasus". Thus, for instance, the proposition

(3) Socrates is a philosopher

seems to be equivalent to the conjunction of the propositions which state that

(3.1) for some x — x is Socrates

(3.2) for all x and y —if x is Socrates and y is Socrates then x is y

(3.3) for all x —if x is Socrates then x is a philosopher

And, speaking quite generally,

(4) for all a and b — a is b if, and only if, (i) for some x — x is a , (ii) for all x and y —if x is a and y is a then x is y , and (iii) for all x —if x is a then x is b

Now, if this generalization is legitimate then it will have to be conceded that instead of characterizing the meaning of the definite article "the" it characterizes the meaning of the copula "is". We tentatively suggest that in a way still to be explained, this copula is implicit in the propositions which have led us to the generalization.

It will be noted that in (4) the copula "is" is in italics. This is meant to indicate that strictly speaking "is" does not occur in ordinary language. However, it may well be worth our while to introduce it into our language just for the sake of the present argument. As in the case of any other neologism we shall have to determine the semantics

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of "is", and in addition to that we shall have to agree on its syntax. It is with this task in view that we now turn to the question of noun-expressions in ordinary usage.

In our terminology a noun-expression is an expression which is suitable as the argument of the following proposition forming functors:

- (5) there exists exactly one object which is (a, an) . . .
- (6) there exist at least two objects each of which is (a, an) . . .

By replacing the dots in (5) or in (6) by a noun-expression we obtain a simple proposition.¹ Indefinite descriptions in the Russellian sense are not to be regarded as noun-expressions. The indefinite article in (5) and in (6) belongs to the functor. It has been bracketed because with some noun-expressions standing in the place of the dots it may have to be omitted to comply with the syntactical rules of ordinary English.

In accordance with our informal definition expressions like "Socrates", "Pegasus", "mermaid", "the mermaid", "philosopher", "the philosopher", "author of *Waverley*", "the author of *Waverley*", "present King of France", "the present King of France", "inhabitant of London", "the inhabitant of London", are all noun-expressions. It is to be noted that a number of adjectives qualify as noun-expressions in our sense. Expressions like "Scotch", "bald", "wise", "black", will suffice as examples.

As regards their syntax, noun-expressions can be divided into *simple* and *compound*. A simple noun-expression consists of one word only; a compound noun-expression consists of at least two words.

From the point of view of semantics noun-expressions can be divided into three groups.² First we have unshared noun-expressions like "Socrates", "author of *Waverley*", "the author of *Waverley*"; with an unshared noun-expression as the argument functor (5) forms a true proposition, which means that an unshared noun-expression designates exactly one object. Secondly, we have shared noun-expressions, e.g. "philosopher", "bald", "wise", "inhabitant of London"; with a shared noun-expression as the argument functor (6) forms a true proposition, which means that a shared noun-expression designates at least two objects. Finally, we have fictitious noun-expressions, e.g. "Pegasus", "mermaid", "present King of France",

¹ A similar "syntactical" definition of *noun-expression* is to be found in T. Kotarbiński, *Elementy teorii poznania, logiki formalnej i metodologii nauk* (Elements of Epistemology, Formal Logic and Methodology), Lwów, 1929, pp. 6 f.

² Concerning our classification of noun-expressions see T. Kotarbiński l.c.; see also J. H. Woodger, *Biology and Language*, Cambridge, 1952, p. 17 and "Science without Properties", *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 2 (1952), p. 196.

"the present King of France"; with a fictitious noun-expression as the argument functor (5) and functor (6) form a false proposition; this means that a fictitious noun-expression does not designate any object at all.

The syntactical rule for the copula "is" is very simple. An expression of the type "*a is b*" will be regarded as a correctly constructed proposition if in the places indicated by "*a*" and "*b*", noun-expressions occur.

The semantical rule for the copula "is" says that a proposition of the type "*a is b*" will be regarded as true if, and only if, the expression which stands in the place of "*a*" is an unshared noun-expression and if the only object designated by it happens to be designated by the noun-expression which stands in the place of "*b*".

It can easily be seen that among others the following propositions satisfy the demands of both the syntactical and the semantical rules for "is":

- (7) the author of *Waverley* is poet
- (8) author of *Waverley* is poet
- (9) author of *Waverley* is author of *Waverley*
- (10) Scott is Scott
- (11) the first letter in (7) is black

On the other hand propositions which say that

- (12) the present King of France is bald
- (13) mermaid is mermaid
- (14) the author of *The Maid's Tragedy* is English
- (15) inhabitant of London is cheerful
- (16) the author of *Waverley* is Welshman
- (17) black is the first letter in (7)

satisfy the demands of the syntactical rule only. Little reflection is needed to come to the conclusion that in one respect or another they violate the semantical rule.

Thus propositions (7)–(11) can be regarded as true while propositions (12)–(17) are meaningful but false.

If we abstract from the meaning of noun-expressions, we can say in general terms that

(18) for all *a* and *b*—*a is b* if, and only if, there exists exactly one object which is (*a*, an) *a* and if it is (*a*, an) *b*

Proposition (18) deserves our attention because it can be regarded as a definition of the copula "is" in terms of ordinary idiom. With the aid of (18) we can now verify proposition (4), which is a sort of self-definition of "is". All we have to do is to "translate" (4) into ordinary language on the lines suggested by (18) and then see whether or not

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we can detect any falsehoods in the translation. Our translation runs thus:

(4a) for all a and b —there exists exactly one object which is $(a, \text{an}) a$ and it is $(a, \text{an}) b$ if, and only if, (i) for some x —there exists exactly one object which is $(a, \text{an}) x$ and it is $(a, \text{an}) a$, (ii) for all x and y —if there exists exactly one object which is $(a, \text{an}) x$ and it is $(a, \text{an}) a$, and there exists exactly one object which is $(a, \text{an}) y$ and it is $(a, \text{an}) a$ then there exists exactly one object which is $(a, \text{an}) x$ and it is $(a, \text{an}) y$, and (iii) for all x —if there exists exactly one object which is $(a, \text{an}) x$ and it is $(a, \text{an}) a$ then there exists exactly one object which is $(a, \text{an}) x$ and it is $(a, \text{an}) b$.

At a first glance it is rather difficult to grasp the meaning of (4a), but when we have done the necessary parsing and analysed the equivalence into its constituents then we shall feel no qualms in agreeing that the proposition "there exists exactly one object which is $(a, \text{an}) a$ and it is $(a, \text{an}) b$ " does indeed imply (i), (ii) and (iii), and that in turn it is implied by the conjunction of (i), (ii) and (iii).

An objection is likely to be raised to the effect that propositions of the type " a is b " do not harmonize with the syntax of ordinary usage, and I will not argue that they do. I should like, however, to point out that the same can be said about the wording of our telegrams. Nevertheless, as carriers of information telegrams are quite efficient. So once we have accepted the syntactical conventions concerning the use of "*is*" together with the semantical rule which establishes its truth conditions, there is no reason why for the purpose of the present discussion, propositions of the type " a is b " should not become for us as meaningful as any other propositions containing a neologism.

Propositions of the type " a is b ", or rather their counterparts, are considerably less objectionable if introduced into a natural language which has no indefinite articles as, for instance, the case is with Polish. As a matter of fact, when in 1916 Leśniewski presented his theory of part and whole relations in the form of a deductive system, he used the Polish copula "*jest*" in the sense which we have been trying to attribute to "*is*". It is worth mentioning that in those days Leśniewski made use of no symbolic language, and formulated his deductive systems in terms of ordinary discourse. When later on he was asked to explain the sense which he attached to the copula, he said that he had been using it in the way in which it was used in everyday Polish.¹ This does not mean that the Polish copula "*jest*" does not present logicians with any problems at all, and Leśniewski's remark ought to be interpreted as indicating that he had picked

¹ See J. Łukasiewicz, "The Principle of Individuation", *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume XXVII*, 1953, pp. 77 f.

out what might be called the most representative meaning of the word, and adhered to it consistently. In 1920 Leśniewski decided to determine the meaning of the copula on the axiomatic basis. He found that proposition (4) was adequate for the purpose, and he adopted it as the only axiom of his logic of names, which he called Ontology. It is noteworthy that on the occasion of discussing this axiom in his "Über die Grundlagen der Ontologie" he thought it appropriate to make a reference to the Russellian analysis of (1) in the *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*. Clearly in Leśniewski's view whatever light this analysis might have thrown on definite descriptions it had done so by throwing some light on the meaning of "is".¹

Russell does not seem to realize that his analysis of (1) and (2) has any bearing on the copula. He regards these propositions as instances of the propositional function " ϕx ", and by doing so he lets the copula remain in the background. Consider, for example, propositions (2) and (3), which are "the present King of France is bald" and "Socrates is a philosopher" respectively. If we regard these propositions as instances of the function " ϕx " then we forsake the autonomous status of the copula. We let it merge with the adjective "bald", or with the indefinite description "a philosopher", to produce a sort of verb "is-bald", or "is-a-philosopher", in which it is left to play the role of a mere sign of inflexion. On the other hand, if we choose to regard propositions (2) and (3) as instances of the function " $\chi(xy)$ " then the copula "is" and the expression "is-a" acquire, as it were, the autonomous status of a logical constant. While these two different interpretations of the syntax of propositions exemplified by (2) or (3) are legitimate, the latter interpretation appears to be more illuminating and more fruitful.²

The equivalence between (1) and the conjunction of (1.1), (1.2) and (1.3) has led Russell to a generalization which differs from the one we arrived at when we established proposition (4). Russell replaces the conjunction of (1.1), (1.2) and (1.3) by proposition

(19) for some c —(for all x — x wrote *Waverley* if, and only if, x was the same person as c) and c was Scotch,

and finally he suggests a general proposition, which amounts to saying that

(20) for all ϕ and ψ — ψ of the term satisfying ϕx if, and only if, for some c —(i) there exists exactly one object which is (a, an) c ,

¹ See S. Leśniewski, "Über die Grundlagen der Ontologie", *Comptes rendus des séances de la Société des Sciences et des Lettres de Varsovie, Classe III*, XXIII Année, Warszawa, 1930, p. 1143.

² See C. Lejewski, "Proper Names", *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume XXXI*, 1957.

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- (ii) for all x — ϕ of x if, and only if, x is the same object as c , and
 (iii) ψ of c .

I have inserted proposition (i), which does not occur in the original Russellian version, in order to dispose of any doubts concerning the interpretation of the particular quantifier.¹

If we agree to equate the first "if, and only if" in (20) with " $= \dots$ Df.", then we shall be able to say that (20) is a definition in use in the Russellian sense. By defining the proposition " ψ of the term satisfying ϕx " it defines the description "the term satisfying ϕx ", or "the ϕ -er", and it does so in terms of identity since the proposition "there exists exactly one object which is (a, an) c " is equivalent to the proposition "for some x — x is the same object as c ".

One would expect that in order to qualify as a definition proposition (20) would have to hold for any value of " ϕ " and for any value of " ψ " without exception. This, however, is not the case, and it is Russell himself who produces counter-examples. Proposition (2) being false it is true to say that

(21) it is not true that the present King of France is bald.

Now, from (20) and (21) it follows that

(22) for some c — c is the present King of France,

which is obviously false.

In order to remedy the situation Russell suggests that we should distinguish between *primary* and *secondary* occurrences of descriptions.² Roughly speaking, the occurrence of a description in a proposition is primary if, and only if, no proper part of the proposition contains the description and is a proposition in its own right. In accordance with this definition, the occurrences of descriptions in (1), (2) and (3) are primary, whereas the occurrence of the description "the present King of France" in (21) is secondary because this description can be said to occur in the proposition "the present King of France is bald", which is a proper part of (21). Now, definition (20) is supposed to hold only for the definienda in which descriptions have primary occurrences.

It seems to be quite clear that Russell's doctrine of primary and secondary occurrences of descriptions introduces a restriction of the rule of substitution. We expect proposition (20) to hold for any " ψ "; in fact it holds so, provided the result of substituting a more specific predicate for " ψ " does not make the occurrence of the description

¹ On the subject of the interpretation of the quantifiers see C. Lejewski, "Logic and Existence", *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 5 (1954).

² See, for instance, B. Russell, *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, London, 1919, p. 179.

"the term satisfying ϕx " secondary. As far as I can judge restrictions of this type imposed on the rule of substitution have no intuitive justification, and to me the doctrine of primary and secondary occurrences of descriptions appears to be an *ad hoc* device introduced in order to save definition (20). If by applying the rule of substitution without restrictions imposed by the doctrine of primary and secondary occurrences a false proposition can be deduced from proposition (20) then, in my view, there is something wrong with proposition (20). As a definition in use it fails, and the cause of the failure lies in the fact that the expression " ψ of the term satisfying ϕx " is not suitable as a definiendum, being too general. There are many ways of reducing the generality of this expression. The simplest one consists in using the expression " a is the term satisfying ϕx " as the definiendum. The expression " a is the term satisfying ϕx " is a special case of the function " ψ of the term satisfying ϕx ". It is fairly obvious that whatever substitutions are made for the variable " a " in " a is the term satisfying ϕx ", the result will not involve a secondary occurrence of the description "the term satisfying ϕx ".

On replacing the expressions " ψ of the term satisfying ϕx " and " ψ of c " in (20) by " a is the term satisfying ϕx " and " a is c " respectively, and on putting the expression "for some d — d is the same object as c " instead of the expression "there exists exactly one object which is (a , an) c ", we get the following proposition:

(23) for all a and ϕ — a is the term satisfying ϕx if, and only if, for some c and d —(i) d is the same object as c , (ii) for all x — ϕ of x if, and only if, x is the same object as c , and (iii) a is c .

Now, if we define the concept of identity occurring in (23) by postulating that

(24) for all a and b — a is the same object as b if, and only if, (a is b and b is a)

then on the basis of (4) and (24) we can show without much difficulty that (23) is inferentially equivalent to

(25) for all a and ϕ — a is the term satisfying ϕx if, and only if, (i) a is a and (ii) for all x — ϕ of x if, and only if, x is a .

Proposition (25) satisfies all the requirements which in Leśniewski's system of logic have to be satisfied by what he used to call ontological definitions.¹ And, indeed, this proposition seems to comply with ordinary ideas about definitions. For if we want to define a noun-expression, we produce a proposition which says that a thing is so-and-so (or a so-and-so, or the so-and-so) if, and only if, such and such conditions are fulfilled.

¹ See C. Lejewski, "On Leśniewski's Ontology", *Ratio*, Vol. I, pp. 172 f.

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With the aid of (4), (24) and (25) we can go on to deduce that

(26) for all ϕ —the term satisfying ϕx is the term satisfying ϕx if, and only if, for some c — c is c and for all x — ϕ of x if, and only if, x is the same object as c .

In view of (18) proposition (26) can be loosely re-phrased as follows: "There exists exactly one object which is the term satisfying ϕx " is equivalent to "there exists exactly one object c such that ' ϕ of x ' is always equivalent to ' x is the same object as c '". It is clear that on being so re-phrased proposition (26) coincides with the Russellian analysis of the expression "the term satisfying ϕx exists". We do not, however, regard it as a definition in use of "the term satisfying ϕx " or of "exists". The former has been defined by means of (25) while the meaning of the latter can be determined by the following definition:

(27) for all, a —there exists exactly one object which is (a, an) a if, and only if, a is a .

The full significance of this definition becomes apparent if we consider it in the light of (4).

It would appear from what has been said that a definite description, i.e. an expression of the form "the so-and-so", should be regarded as being in fact of the form "the term satisfying ϕx " where " ϕx " has been assigned an appropriate value. If this is correct then it is also correct to say that a definite description is a function of a " ϕx ". The values of this function are all noun-expressions while the values of its argument are verbs or verb-expressions. The definite article in a definite description, interpreted in this way, is part of the functor just as, for instance, in expressions of the form "every a is b " the word "every" is part of the functor "every . . . is". If " ϕx " satisfies the conditions implicit in definition (25) then the corresponding description is an unshared noun-expression, otherwise it is a fictitious noun-expression. Thus, for instance, the definite description "the author of *Waverley*" designates exactly one individual whereas the descriptions "the author of *The Maid's Tragedy*" and "the present King of France" do not designate anything at all. Ordinary usage offers innumerable examples of definite descriptions which are derivatives of verbs (or propositional functions), and which lend themselves to the interpretation on the lines above discussed. It seems to me, however, that another use of expressions of the form "the so-and-so" has to be distinguished.¹

Consider the following examples:

(28) A collector of stamps and a collector of books went to an

¹ The analysis of propositions like "the whale is a mammal", is outside the scope of the present essay.

auction. *The collector of stamps* was anxious to bid for some philatelic rarities while *the collector of books* was hoping to get some first editions.

(29) A Mancunian was boasting in the presence of a Londoner that Manchester was the greatest city in England. Naturally, *the inhabitant of London* objected.

It is easy to think of conditions under which (28) and (29) would hold, but clearly the truth of (28) and (29) would not depend on there being exactly one man who collected stamps, and exactly one man who collected books, and exactly one man who lived in London. Thus the descriptions "the collector of stamps", "the collector of books" and "the inhabitant of London", as used in (28) and (29), have to be interpreted on somewhat different lines. They seem to be analogous to such expressions as "the book" and "the man" in

(30) the book has been damaged

(31) the man was foolish

Now, the expressions "the book" in (30) and "the man" in (31) seem to have the same syntactical structure as the expressions "this book" and "that man" in

(32) this book is interesting

(33) that man is tall

From the point of view of logical analysis, "this" and "that" can be treated as unshared noun-expressions.¹ They are ambiguous noun-expressions, just as Christian names or surnames are ambiguous, but their ambiguity can easily be eliminated by appropriate gestures which usually involve touching or pointing. In the expressions "the collector of stamps", "the collector of books", "the inhabitant of London", "the book", and "the man", as used in (28)–(31), the definite article also appears to be a sort of ambiguous unshared noun-expression, its ambiguity being eliminable by the context. In the usage exemplified by (28), (29), (30) and (31) the definite article together with the noun-expression that follows it, appears to form a product of two noun-expressions, mere juxtaposition playing the role of the functor. Expressions like "this book", "that man", "red flower", "round table", etc., can serve as examples of comparable products. The products "red flower" and "round table" are shared noun-expressions while the products involving the definite article or a demonstrative pronoun are as a rule unshared noun-expressions liable to be ambiguous. The noun-expression which follows the definite article in such products can be simple or compound. Now, a

¹ See C. Lejewski, "Proper Names", *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume XXXI*, 1957, pp. 250 f.

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great number of compound noun-expressions can be interpreted as being of the form "term satisfying ϕx " where " ϕx " has been assigned an appropriate value. An expression of that type can rightly be regarded as a derivative of an appropriate " ϕx ", and it can be defined in terms of the latter. The following proposition can serve as a general definition:

(34) for all a and ϕ — a is term satisfying ϕx if, and only if (a is a and ϕ of a).

It is clear from (34) that, depending on the value of " ϕx ", a noun-expression of the form "term satisfying ϕx " can be unshared, shared, or fictitious.

Definition (34) brings us to the problem of indefinite descriptions, i.e., to the problem of expressions of the form "a so-and-so". Russell regards them as being in fact of the form "a term satisfying ϕx " where " ϕx " has been assigned an appropriate value. In his view they should be interpreted in the light of the following definition

(35) the proposition of the form " ψ of a term satisfying ϕx " means the same as the corresponding proposition of the form "for some x — ϕ of x and ψ of x ".

Now, what does this definition define? In order to answer this question let us consider proposition

(36) Jones smokes

and proposition

(37) a man smokes

The verb "smokes" in (36) is a proposition-forming functor for one argument and the noun-expression "Jones" is that argument. As used in (36) the verb "smokes" is understood in such a way that from a proposition of the form " a smokes" one can validly infer that there exists exactly one a . In (37) the words " $a \dots$ smokes" can be regarded as a proposition-forming functor for one argument, the noun-expression "man" being that argument in the proposition under consideration. Clearly, the group of words " $a \dots$ smokes" differs in meaning from the verb "smokes" since from an expression of the form " a smokes" one cannot infer that there exists exactly one a . Although " $a \dots$ smokes" differs in meaning from "smokes", it can be defined in terms of the latter. Speaking generally, if we construe a proposition of the form " ψ of an a " as being in fact of the form " ψ^* of a " then we can define " ψ^* " provisionally as follows:

(38) for all a and ψ — ψ^* of a if, and only if, for some x — ψ of x and x is an a

(38) is a provisional definition of " ψ^* " because it contains the expression " x is an a ", which calls for analysis. Russell remarks that in expressions of this type the copula "is" expresses identity. On the other hand the indefinite article indicates that the particular quantifier is involved. Both these intuitions can be accommodated if we make use of our new copula " is ", and if we re-phrase " x is an a " as follows:

(39) for some y — x is the same object as y and y is a .

On the basis of (4) and (24) we can easily prove that (39) is equivalent to

(40) x is a .

In view of the above, our provisional definition of " ψ^* " can be replaced by the one which says that

(41) for all a and ψ — ψ^* of a if, and only if, for some x — ψ of x and x is a .

Now, let us substitute the expression "term satisfying ϕx " for " a " in (41). On doing so and on taking into account definition (34) we get

(42) for all ϕ and ψ — ψ^* of term satisfying ϕx if, and only if, for some x — x is x , ϕ of x , and ψ of x .

Proposition (42) constitutes our interpretation of the Russellian definition (35). The way in which it has been arrived at shows explicitly that the analysis of indefinite descriptions involves two things. First, it involves the use of a copula, which enables us to define the expression "term satisfying ϕx ". Secondly, it involves a distinction of two different senses in which a great number of verbs are used in ordinary discourse. It may be of interest to mention that the need for this distinction is more clearly apparent in those natural languages which have no indefinite articles.¹

In his treatment of descriptions Russell is greatly concerned to emphasize the difference between definite descriptions and proper names. He rightly points out that a proper name is a simple symbol while a definite description consists of several symbols. It appears, however, that for Russell this syntactical distinction, which becomes somewhat blurred by his suggestion that in some cases simple symbols should be regarded as abbreviated descriptions, is not sufficient. Thus, for instance, in *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism* he

¹ One must bear in mind that in some cases an expression of the form "a so-and-so" has the same logical import as the corresponding expression of the form "every so-and-so". Consider, for instance, the proposition which says that *a bird in hand is worth two in the bush*.

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argues that the meaning of "the author of *Waverley*" "is already determinate, i.e. there is nothing arbitrary or conventional about the meaning of that whole phrase, when the meanings of 'the', 'author', 'of', and '*Waverley*' have already been fixed. In that respect it differs from 'Scott', because when you have fixed the meaning of all the other words in the language, you have done nothing toward fixing the meaning of the name 'Scott' ".¹

I fail to see the difference. On the contrary, in that very respect a description does not seem to differ from a name. It is true that if the meaning of every word in a description—there are four such words in the description "the author of *Waverley*"—has been fixed, then the meaning of the whole description has been determined. It is also true that if one does not understand one of the words in a description, then one does not understand the whole description. Now, as far as I can see, the same holds of a name. If the meaning of every word in the name "Scott"—there is only one such word—has been fixed, i.e. if we know to whom it applies, then the meaning of the whole name is determinate. And if we do not know the meaning of a particular word in the name "Scott"—there is only one such word—then we do not know the meaning of the whole name. It is perhaps significant that this argument is not to be found in the *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*.

Another argument of Russell is intended to show that even the truth or falsehood of a proposition is sometimes changed when a name of an object is substituted for a description of the same object. Consider, for instance, the following two propositions:

- (43) George IV wished to know if Scott was the author of *Waverley*
- (44) George IV wished to know if Scott was Scott

Proposition (44) is the result of replacing a definite description of a person in (43) by a name of the same person; but while (43) is true, (44) is false. According to Russell this shows that a definite description is quite a different thing from a name.² I should be inclined to say that the difference in the truth value of (43) and (44) has nothing to do with the differences between definite descriptions and names. Proposition (44) may just as well be regarded as the result of replacing a true proposition in (43) by another true proposition. And the fact that this replacement involves the change of truth value indicates that the function "George IV wished to know if p " is an intensional function, which calls for de-intensionalization.

A third argument offered by Russell with a view to establishing that proper names are quite different things from definite

¹ See B. Russell, *Logic and Knowledge*, London, 1956, p. 244.

² See B. Russell, *ibid.*, pp. 246 f.

descriptions, involves inferences from the law of identity.¹ Consider the following propositions:

- (45) for all x — $x = x$
- (46) Scott = Scott
- (47) the author of *Waverley* = the author of *Waverley*
- (48) the present King of France = the present King of France

According to Russell propositions (45), (46) and (47) are true, while proposition (48) is false. He assures us that there is no mystery in this because the result of substituting a definite description for a variable in a propositional function is not a value of that function. This seems to imply that we can substitute proper names for the variables in (45), and by doing so infer, for instance, that Scott = Scott, but we must not substitute definite descriptions for the variables in (45) unless further premisses are available. These premisses must concern the existence of objects described by the descriptions. Thus (47) is validly inferred from (45) because the object described by "the author of *Waverley*" exists. Proposition (48) is false and cannot be validly inferred from (45) because "the present King of France" does not describe anybody. Clearly, this constitutes a restriction on the applicability of the rule of substitution.

In my view this restriction has no intuitive justification. Expressions "Scott", "the author of *Waverley*", "the present King of France", can be replaced by one another in any proposition without turning this proposition into a syntactical nonsense. This means that they belong to the same part of speech. Hence if (46) can be validly inferred from (45) in virtue of the rule of substitution then (47) and (48) can also be so inferred, and if the rule of substitution is universally valid, which we maintain it is, then either (48) is true or (45) is not a law.

As far as I can judge, the proper way of dealing with the mystery about inferences from the law of identity must consist in making up our minds what we are to understand by identity as this concept is by no means as unambiguous as we might think it to be. In some contexts it is used in the sense determined by definition (24). In other contexts it may have sense determined by the definition which says that

- (49) for all a and b — a is identical with b if, and only if, for all c — c is a if, and only if, c is b .

For the purpose of terminological clarity, let us agree that (24) and (49) define singular identity and weak identity respectively.² Now,

¹ See B. Russell, *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, London, 1919, pp. 175 f.

² In this connection see C. Lejewski, "On Leśniewski's Ontology", *Ratio*, Vol. I, p. 158.

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it can be proved that for some a —it is not true that a is the same object as a . This means that the proposition which says that

(50) for all a — a is the same object as a

is not a law. On the other hand definition (49) implies that

(51) for all a — a is identical with a .

In the light of the above, it is clear that if by identity we mean singular identity, then (45) is not a logical law, the rule of substitution cannot be applied to it, (46) and (47) are factually true, and (48) is factually false. If, however, we choose to interpret identity as weak identity, then (45) is a logical law, and in virtue of the rule of substitution, propositions (46), (47) and (48) follow from (45) as trivial truisms.

This brings to an end our re-examination of the Russellian theory of descriptions. We have seen that in the analysis of the proposition "the author of *Waverley* was Scotch" two problems are involved: the problem of the copula and the problem of defining the expression "the term satisfying x wrote *Waverley*". The important thing to realize is that the solution of the latter depends on the solution of the former. Thus, for instance, a correct definition of the expression "the term satisfying ϕx " can be given if we have a copula at our disposal. Among the definite descriptions to be found in ordinary usage at least two classes can be distinguished. To the one belong those definite descriptions which can be interpreted as being of the form "the term satisfying ϕx " where " ϕx " has been assigned a value. The other class contains definite descriptions each of which has to be interpreted as a product of two noun-expressions. Under this interpretation the definite article plays the role of an ambiguous proper name. The analysis of indefinite descriptions also presupposes the concept of a copula, and lastly this concept appears to have an important bearing on determining the various meanings of identity.

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RUSSELL'S MORAL THEORIES

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I

IF Bertrand Russell had lived in an earlier century, no one would have hesitated to call him a moral philosopher. In our more finicking age, some academics may want to say that, great as his achievements have been in other branches of philosophy, he is less a moral philosopher than a moralist. That is to say, he has consistently advocated ideals and expressed beliefs which have made him, along with Shaw and Wells, if not quite with Marx and Freud, one of the formative influences on the modern mind; but he has usually addressed these writings to the general public, and, although writing always with great force, clarity and skill, he has not always troubled his readers with the minutiae of philosophical argument. But this point should not be exaggerated. Even in his most popular works, Russell never loses sight of the philosophical problems in his concern for the political or psychological ones, and he certainly has views on meta-morals and meta-politics as well as on morals and politics. Indeed, his attempts to reconcile the two are highly illuminating; for they show one of the clearest minds of our time faced with one of the central problems of our time: how to justify passionately-held moral convictions when all the evidence seems to lead to moral scepticism. (To guard against misunderstanding, I should perhaps say that I do not mean religious scepticism. It is demonstrable, though it would be irrelevant here to demonstrate, that religious beliefs, whether justified or not, cannot provide an intellectually satisfying basis for morality.)

Russell's moral and political doctrines themselves are too well known to need more than a brief reference. I should put first his insistence on "the scientific outlook": "the doctrine . . . that it is undesirable to believe a proposition when there is no ground whatever for supposing it true".¹ No one has insisted more cogently on the need for weighing evidence, for following the argument whithersoever it leads, for suspending judgment whenever there is reasonable ground for doubt. These doctrines seem trite only when stated, not when applied; Russell is quite right in saying that "if accepted, they would absolutely revolutionize human life".² It is often said that that revolution has actually been proceeding since about the seventeenth century; and there are those to-day who argue that the time is ripe for a counter-revolution. Article One in Russell's creed is that,

¹ *Sceptical Essays*, 1928, p. 11.

² *Ibid.*, p. 13.

on the contrary, our troubles to-day are caused by the partial failure of the scientific revolution, not by its too complete success.

The nature of the transformation which Russell envisages (but does not expect) is quite clear, at least in its outlines. There is to be tolerance, sympathy and understanding. There is to be equality: the good life should be possible for all men; and Russell is quite clear that under the present social and economic system most men lead cramped and frustrating lives. Above all, there is to be freedom. "Government and law, in their very essence, consist of restrictions on freedom, and freedom is the greatest of political goods. . . . I do not say freedom is the greatest of *all* goods: the best things come from within—they are such things as creative art, and love, and thought."¹ Russell's ideal state, then, will help, rather than hinder, its citizens in cultivating these goods; and to this end there will be needed a mixture of socialism and anarchism. Socialism (or at least the abolition of capitalism) is necessary to free men from the tyranny of uncongenial work; but Russell saw, much sooner than most socialists, that socialism could be a real danger to freedom. "These results are not foreseen by Socialists, because they imagine that the Socialist State will be governed by men like those who now advocate it. This is, of course, a delusion. The rulers of the State then will bear as little resemblance to the present Socialists as the dignitaries of the Church after the time of Constantine bore to the Apostles. The men who advocate an unpopular reform are exceptional in disinterestedness and zeal for the public good; but those who hold power after the reform has been carried out are likely to belong, in the main, to the ambitious executive type which has, in all ages, possessed itself of the government of nations. And this type has never shown itself tolerant of opposition or friendly to freedom."² These were, in 1918, prophetic words. As safeguards against this danger, Russell proposes devolution, along the lines advocated by Guild Socialists and pluralists generally; special provisions for freedom of publication, to prevent the State from acquiring a monopoly of propaganda; and the device of "the vagabond wage", by which all citizens would be given a subsistence wage whether they worked or not. This would deprive the State (or any other employer) of its most powerful coercive weapon, the threat of starvation; and it would be unlikely to deplete the labour force much, since, Russell points out, most people with small independent incomes are glad enough to increase their income by working. At the same time, the way would be open for the artist or scholar who wished to devote himself to uneconomic pursuits. This seems reasonable enough; but in general Russell treats economic problems rather cavalierly. He

¹ *Roads to Freedom*, 2nd ed., 1919, p. 121.

² *Roads to Freedom*, p. 117.

is content to accept, without much examination, the view of Kropotkin and others that, if waste were eliminated, a very few hours' work a day would be enough to maintain us all at a high standard of living.

Now it is obvious that in all this Russell is committing himself to certain propositions: that love is better than hatred, that the good life for all is better than the good life for a few, that creative impulses are better than destructive ones, that one ought not to accept a belief because it is useful or comforting, but only because it is true. And the question that obviously presents itself is: What is the evidence for these propositions? By what rational arguments could one defend them against an aristocrat, an authoritarian, or a misanthropist? Is the belief that one should never rely on mere dogma itself a piece of mere dogma?

These are, of course, the problems that have always perplexed moral philosophers, especially those who have been imbued with the empirical spirit. And there are, roughly, three traditional ways of tackling the difficulty.

(1) All knowledge, it may be argued, must start somewhere. In science we start with the evidence of the senses. This means that there are certain "atomic propositions", known immediately, which no one seriously doubts. Now it is arguable that in morals, too, there are atomic propositions, known to us perhaps through a special moral sense. If this can be made out, the special difficulties of moral investigation vanish, and moral philosophy is no less empirical than science.

(2) Alternatively, it may be said that morality is not indeed concerned to establish objective facts, like science, but to discover rules or recipes for the gratification of human desires. This is, however, a sufficiently objective study, in much the way that medicine is objective. For the pursuit of health is simply the attempt to discover the physical conditions which men in general find agreeable. And, although what suits one man does not always suit another, these differences are not great enough to prevent us from regarding some physical conditions as desirable, and others as undesirable, for all men. The pursuit of happiness (or well-being, to use a less tendentious term) is not significantly different from the pursuit of health: there are some ways of life that suit human nature, and others that do not. This is itself an objective fact; and, just as the truths of medicine apply equally to the doctor and the Christian Scientist, so the truths of morals apply equally to those who acknowledge them and those who do not. So that, although morality is concerned with the gratification of desire, the rules which it lays down are objective and applicable to all men, and their study is an empirical one like any other.

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(3) Finally, it may be contended that morality is not objective in either of these ways and that moral statements simply express the wishes of the person uttering them, or possibly of the community to which he belongs. (There are of course many refinements of this view, as indeed of the other two, but this should do for the present purpose.)

Russell has, at various times, adopted each of these positions, in the order in which I have given them: the first and the third explicitly, the second by implication. In his early paper, "The Elements of Ethics",¹ he accepts without reserve Moore's account of morality: we know immediately that certain things are good, and the right action is the one that produces most good. "Good" itself is a non-natural quality, apprehended directly just as natural qualities are. But here and there he shows traces of uneasiness.

"In this, as in all philosophical inquiries," he writes, "after a preliminary analysis of complex data we proceed again to build up complex things from their simple constituents, starting from ideas which we understand, and from premisses which we know though we cannot prove them. The appearance of dogmatism in this procedure is deceptive, for the premisses are such as ordinary reasoning unconsciously assumes, and there is less real dogmatism in believing them after a critical scrutiny than in employing them implicitly without examination."²

This procedure works well enough if the object is to explore the implications of our ordinary judgments about the external world. It would seem less serviceable for the moralist concerned to urge unpopular reforms. Of course the reformer may be able to show that his conclusions follow if only the assumptions of the man in the street are taken to their logical conclusion; and many reformers have in fact made some such claim. Nevertheless, the assumptions made in ordinary reasoning about ethics are notoriously less uniform than those made in ordinary reasoning about perception or knowledge; and it is hard to see how the moralist is to escape dogmatism except at the cost of confining himself to the safest and most tepid of generalizations. Moore, it is true, did not do this; but his account of the good life was based on the unconscious assumptions, not of the man in the street, but of the Cambridge or Bloomsbury aesthete of 1904; it seemed dogmatic enough to many of his contemporaries. And, apart altogether from this, it seems unlikely that so thoroughgoing an empiricist as Russell could long be satisfied with the notion of non-natural qualities.

¹ Reprinted in *Philosophical Essays*, 1910.

² *Philosophical Essays*, p. 4.

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II

It is perhaps significant that "The Elements of Ethics" was written before the war of 1914-18; for Russell himself has often said that it was that war that first awakened his interest in social and political reforms. Accordingly we find his next writings more concerned with practice than with theory; and the theory that shines through seems to owe more to Freud, or perhaps even to Hobbes, than to Moore.

It is true that he begins *Principles of Social Reconstruction* by dividing human impulses into "two groups, the possessive and the creative, according as they aim at acquiring or retaining something that cannot be shared, or at bringing into the world some valuable thing, such as knowledge or art or goodwill." And he adds: "I consider the best life that which is most built on creative impulses, and the worst that which is most inspired by love of possession."¹ This is quite in accordance with Moore: some impulses just are good, and others just are bad. Moreover the list of good things (knowledge, art, goodwill), and the account of what makes an activity valuable (bringing good things into existence) are almost straight Moore.

Yet Russell was, in spite of Moore, worried by the assumption that an end can be rational or irrational in itself. "There is no objective reason to be given", he tells us, only a few pages after his Moorean beginning, "to show that one of these attitudes is essentially more rational than the other. If a man finds people repulsive, no argument can prove to him that they are not so. But both his own desires and other people's are much less likely to find satisfaction if he resembles Carlyle than if he resembles Walt Whitman."²

It is no longer enough, apparently, to say that goodwill has the non-natural quality of goodness. And, once this belief has been given up, there seems to be only one reason for choosing any course of action: that we want to. The obvious difficulty about this, however, is that desires conflict. Take one of Russell's own examples. "Those who believe that man is a rational animal", he writes, "will say that people boast in order that others may have a good opinion of them; but most of us can recall occasions when we have boasted in spite of knowing that we would be despised for it."³ But why is this irrational? Only on the assumption that one wants to be admired and does not want to be despised. One gets satisfaction from the admiration of one's friends; moreover, that admiration may have further consequences agreeable in themselves, such as invitations to dinner. All right. But boasting itself, apparently, is a source of satisfaction. Why, then, should the one satisfaction be preferred to

¹ *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, 1916, p. 5.

² *Ibid.*, p. 36.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

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the other? There seems to be no reason, unless one can be shown to be greater, or more lasting, than the other.

This line of thought leads straight to the hedonic calculus. It leads straight, too, to a distinction, which Russell duly makes, between a passing impulse and a settled purpose. But Russell does not draw the conclusion that one might expect. For so far the implication is clearly that purpose, as the source of greater and more lasting satisfaction, is to be preferred to impulse. The man who acts morally is, on this view, very much in the position of the industrious apprentice: he finds it worth while to repress some inclinations, such as a taste for idleness and dissipation (or for boasting), for the sake of later but greater rewards.

What Russell actually says, however, is that this subordination of impulse to desire is to be condemned.

"Almost all paid work is done from desire, not from impulse: the work itself is more or less irksome, but the payment for it is desired. The serious activities that fill a man's working hours are, except in a few fortunate individuals, governed mainly by purposes, not by impulses, towards those activities. In this hardly anyone sees an evil, because the place of impulse in a satisfactory existence is not recognized. . . . The complete control of impulse by will, which is sometimes preached by moralists, and often enforced by economic necessity, is not really desirable. A life governed by purposes and desires, to the exclusion of impulse, is a boring life; it exhausts vitality, and leaves a man, in the end, indifferent to the very purposes that he is trying to achieve."¹

Now this is not necessarily inconsistent with hedonism. The point may be, not that the hedonic calculus itself is at fault, but that the accountancy methods of the calculators are often mistaken. There are unsuspected items to be added on the debit side: sources of unhappiness that Bentham never dreamed of. They had been dreamed of since, of course, by Freud. Russell's emphasis on impulse in *Principles of Social Reconstruction* undoubtedly stems from Freud: if not directly, at least from the popular Freudianism of the period. The repression of impulse, it was argued, exacted too high a price, so that lives were warped and the spontaneous joy in living killed. The industrious apprentice himself came under fire: perhaps he had nothing much, after all, to show at the end of his life except stomach ulcers and a soured disposition.

None of this would affect the hedonic calculus as such: it is still assumed that desires really do conflict and that one must choose the most satisfying and repress the others. The difference of opinion is merely about which desires are the most satisfying. But it is possible to take a different line. It is possible to argue that the conflict of

¹ *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, pp. 17-18.

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desires is more apparent than real; or rather that, while the conflict is real enough, some of the desires are not. More intelligibly put, this amounts to a distinction between desires or impulses which are an innate part of "human nature" (the "real self") and those which are socially acquired.

Some such distinction was forced on the Freudians fairly early. Sexual desire, for example, is innate; but the feelings of horror and guilt often roused by sex are socially acquired. Eliminating such feelings, then, is not repression. On the contrary, it is a kind of liberation. We are to think of the "natural" man as having been cramped or warped by social conventions; the task is simply to remove the fetters. It should be emphasized that this is not so much Freud as popular Freudianism. But the point at the moment is that Russell seems at least partly inclined to adopt this view. As he develops it, there are interesting echoes, both of the eighteenth-century view that man is naturally good and corrupted by society and, rather surprisingly, of the Idealist view that moral rules are prescriptions for "realizing" the true self.

In the first place, he makes a good deal of the point that the repression of impulse is not merely tiring and destructive of vitality but also the source of "new impulses . . . of cruelty and destruction". These impulses, then, are socially acquired. The suggestion is that men will not behave aggressively unless their "natural" development has been thwarted. And, secondly, this leads Russell to say, quite in the manner of the Idealists, that men have "a central principle of growth, an instinctive urgency leading them in a certain direction, as trees seek the light".¹ It looks, then, as if the initial division into good (or creative) and bad (or possessive) impulses really rests on another: into natural impulses, which proceed from the principle of growth within, and artificial ones, which are produced when these natural impulses are cramped, checked and distorted.

Russell agrees with the men of the eighteenth century, and disagrees with the Idealists, in suggesting that social institutions are responsible for the cramping or distorting. It may be said of the Freudian Revolution (though somewhat misleadingly) that, like the Marxist one, it stood Idealism on its head. The Idealist view was, roughly, that "the real self" is what Freud came to call the super-ego: the moral sentiments of parents, teachers and society generally so far as these are taken over by the individual and made part of himself. The Freudians (though not, perhaps, Freud) declared that, on the contrary, it is the id that is the real self. Russell seems to share this view, at least to the extent of being suspicious of the super-ego. He tells us, for example, that we should not try to "mould" the young, but to "equip and strengthen" them "for the

¹ *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, p. 24.

ends which the child's own spirit is obscurely seeking". And he goes on: "Certain mental habits are commonly instilled by those who are engaged in educating: obedience and discipline, ruthlessness in the struggle for worldly success, contempt towards opposing groups, and an unquestioning credulity, a passive acceptance of the teacher's wisdom. All these habits are against life."¹ It is clear that, in Russell's opinion, a man is cramped, not merely by being prevented from taking a mistress, travelling abroad, sleeping in on a week-day, fishing in a privately owned stream, or taking up art and literature instead of going into an office, but also by having certain prejudices and habits of thought instilled into him. To follow the argument whithersoever it leads, to examine the opinions of others with complete tolerance and impartiality, is, apparently, part of what he means by "nourishing the growth within".

Now one may certainly doubt whether it is "natural", as the Idealists seemed to think, to submerge oneself selflessly in the ends of society. There were good grounds for arguing that society's rules about sexual indulgence imposed a considerable strain on human nature; and one could even write cogently, as Russell did, "in praise of idleness", and argue that the industrious apprentice, too, was doing violence to his "real self". But is it really more natural to be tolerant than to be intolerant, or to acquire the habit of careful and critical thinking than to accept uncritically the dicta of authority?

The truth is that it is not really possible to maintain that the sort of world that Russell wants to see can be obtained merely by giving free rein to the id. It is very doubtful, indeed, whether this policy will even lead to the happiness of the individual, or whether Freud himself ever advocated it. "The poor ego", Freud tells us, "has to serve three harsh masters, and has to do its best to reconcile the claims and demands of all three. The three tyrants are the external world, the super-ego and the id."² The id, so far from being the source of all freedom, is, it seems, itself a tyrant. The point is that the "pleasure-principle", which alone governs the id, needs to be modified by the "reality-principle". Left to itself, impulse drives blindly towards its ends without taking account of those factors in the outside world (including the existence of other men with impulses of their own) which make those ends unattainable. The external world, too, is a tyrant, no doubt, but one not to be denied. The tendency of the id to believe only what it wants to believe is to be resisted, if only in its own interests.

Now Russell recognizes this. "Instinct," he says towards the end of *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, "is the source of vitality . . . but instinct by itself leaves us powerless to control the forces of

¹ *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, p. 155.

² *New Introductory Lectures in Psycho-analysis*, 1933, p. 103.

nature, either in ourselves or in our physical environment, and keeps us in bondage to the same unthinking impulse by which the trees grow."¹ So it now appears that to allow "the natural principle of growth" to have its way is, after all, to be in bondage, not to be free. For the way to control the forces of nature is, at least in part, to adapt ourselves to them. If we are to gratify our impulses it must be in ways which do not attempt to flout the laws of physics (or physiology, including, for example, digestion). A rational morality will certainly need to take account of this.

Moreover, it seems to follow that a rational morality will also take account of the super-ego. For the external world, let us repeat, includes other human beings, whose likes and dislikes affect us quite as inexorably as the laws of physics; so that we are also forced to gratify our impulses only in the ways that our fellow-men will tolerate. And the super-ego, at least in part, embodies the demands which other men, in their own interests, are bound to make upon us.

Only in part, it is true. The super-ego may often enforce irrational taboos, based on false beliefs about nature, including human nature. Nevertheless, a rational man will certainly take account of the super-ego, so far as it merely represents the demands which the reality-principle makes upon the pleasure-principle. For other men are certainly real.

So far I have argued that, in *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, Russell at least dallies with the view that the way of life he believes in is the one which the id will adopt once it is freed from the corrupting influences of superstition and indoctrination. But, for all his lauding of "impulses", his "principle of growth within" is not quite Freud's id. Sometimes at least he seems to be putting forward the more moderate view that his version of the good life is the one that will result if the demands of the id are modified by nothing but the demands of reality. This gives us ample ground for rejecting superstition; and indoctrination, too, so far as it is unsupported by valid argument. Moreover, it provides justification for the scientific outlook, and the open, enquiring attitude of mind, which is necessary if we are to know what the reality-principle really does enjoin upon us.

A rational morality will, on this view, take the maximum possible satisfaction of desire as its aim. It will recognize the need to suppress some impulses: when they conflict with too many others, or when the nature of the external world (including the demands of other men) makes their realization impossible; but it will also recognize, more fully than the earlier utilitarians did, that the suppression of impulse is a very potent source of misery. And for that reason the alleged demands of the external world must be scrutinized very carefully. Many of the alleged facts which have been advanced in

¹ *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, p. 209.

the past as reasons for repressing impulse can be shown not to be facts at all. And many of the restrictions imposed by other men can be shown to be quite unnecessary for the happiness of those men.

All this fits in well enough, up to a point, with Russell's beliefs: with his advocacy of tolerance and freedom, his impatience with asceticism considered as an end in itself. Certainly it is much more in accordance with his whole-hearted belief in reason than the other view we have been considering. But it is doubtful if he is really prepared to accept all its implications. For one of Russell's fundamental beliefs is that we ought to desire the good life for others as well as for ourselves; and the view we are considering does not really justify this belief. The tolerance and freedom it justifies is, after all, tolerance and freedom for oneself, not necessarily for other people. It is true that we must, in accordance with the reality principle, pay attention to other men's search for happiness as well as our own; but only so far as they will make things unpleasant for us if we don't. For the only rational ground we have found for action is still the satisfaction of desire: our own desire, not anyone else's.

We are, in short, back with Hobbes. We might, indeed, call this theory Freudian Hobbism. And the Hobbist belief that most people have found most objectionable is precisely this one: that there is no good reason to consider other people's happiness unless it affects our own. It is, of course, arguable that Hobbes is right about this; and it may even be said that Freud's discoveries about the super-ego explain why we are so reluctant to believe that he is right. For the super-ego is essentially a means by which the demands of society are impressed upon us so that they become "internalized", part of ourselves. This means that we feel guilty if we entertain any beliefs likely to undermine their influence; for it is the super-ego which, in Freud's system, plays the important role of censor. It is easy to see, then, why it should censor the view that the happiness of other men is not important in its own right. Nevertheless, if we are to submit the dictates of the super-ego to rational criticism, it is hard to see what reason there can be for considering the interests of other men except that advanced by Hobbes.

But whether Hobbes is right or not is hardly the point. The point is that Russell does not think he is. Towards the end of *Principles of Social Reconstruction* he introduces us to a rather curious mental entity which he calls "Spirit". He has been talking about the clash between "instinct" and "mind". To leave instinct unchecked, it will be remembered, is after all to be in bondage; and the function of mind is to "liberate us from this bondage, by the power of impersonal thought, which enables us to judge critically the purely biological purposes towards which instinct more or less blindly tends".¹

¹ *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, p. 209.

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Unfortunately, mind exacts a high price for its liberating services. "Mind", we are told, "in its dealings with instinct is *merely* critical: so far as instinct is concerned, the unchecked activity of the mind is apt to be destructive and generate cynicism."¹ The choice, then, would seem to be between blindly pursuing the ends instinct sets before us and refusing to be a mere tool in the hands of natural impulses. If we choose the first alternative we are happy but deluded: we find ourselves, for example, cherishing such patently false beliefs as that the girl next door is the most beautiful in the world, or that the country we happen to have been born in is far superior to any other. If we choose the second, our eyes are opened but there is nothing much worth looking at: we are left quite passionless, and, consequently, aimless.

"Spirit" comes in to release us from this dilemma. Spirit enables us to preserve intact the emotions that spring from instinct and at the same time "makes them impervious to mental criticism". How does it do this? Quite easily, it seems: all it needs to do is to "universalize" these emotions.

"The man who has the life of the spirit within him," Russell says, "views the love of man and woman, both in himself and in others, quite differently. . . . He sees, in his moments of insight, that in all human beings there is something deserving of love, something mysterious."¹

But will this satisfy "mind"? "Mind" may well object that "spirit" (or Russell) has shifted his ground. The original false belief was that Angelina is more beautiful, etc., than other women: "spirit" renders this impervious to criticism by substituting the belief that Angelina is worthy to be loved. But Edwin might believe this, rationally enough, without subscribing to the further belief that all other women are worthy to be loved too. It is true that, so far as Angelina is no more beautiful, intelligent, good-tempered, etc., than other women, it may be argued that she cannot be worthy to be loved unless they are equally so. But this argument rests on certain highly dubious assumptions. It is assumed that emotions are fitting or rational only if called forth by certain qualities and that, if other objects possess the same qualities, it is irrational not to feel the same emotions for them. But these are assumptions which "mind", if thoroughly imbued with the empirical spirit, may well question. For what is meant by saying that some qualities are *to be loved*, or worthy of love, and others to be hated? We can attach meaning to these expressions if we interpret them on Hobbist lines: a quality is to be loved if it is important for our own happiness. And, if this is what is meant, then Edwin (or his instinct, with the full approval of his mind) can retort that Angelina is important to his happiness in a way that other women are not.

¹ *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, p. 219.

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It is clear, however, that this is precisely what Russell does not mean. For, he tells us, "the life of the spirit centres round impersonal feeling, as the life of the mind centres round impersonal thought. . . . It is possible to feel the same interest in the joys and sorrows of others as in our own, to love and hate independently of all relation to ourselves, to care about the destiny of man and the development of the universe without a thought that we are personally involved".¹

It is clear, I think, that Russell is clinging here to the conviction, which most of us want to urge against Hobbes, that the happiness of other men is desirable for its own sake. I think it is clear, too, that he has not found any rational ground for this conviction other than the Moorean one we had supposed him to be rejecting. For what he is saying really amounts to this: that the attitude recommended by spirit just is good, and is impervious to the criticism of mind just because mind recognizes this. It is significant that, in one of the passages quoted, he contrasts blind subservience to the ends of Nature with being a willing minister to the impersonal desires that one *sees to be good*.

I have discussed *Principles of Social Reconstruction* at length, because I think that it shows very clearly the different and inconsistent moral theories that Russell was struggling with at this period. It shows this the more clearly because moral theory is in the background; the book is mainly concerned with social and political problems. Consequently the theoretical inconsistencies were allowed to appear, whereas if the book had been explicitly devoted to moral theory Russell would presumably have done something to eliminate them. He was to do this later. But the inconsistencies are illuminating, because they are those of which most of us are guilty when we come to *use* moral concepts, however neatly we may tidy them up when we are merely talking about them. It is worth while, then, seeing clearly what the opposing positions are. There is first of all the conviction, which most of us have, that some ways of behaving just are good and others bad. There is, secondly, the uneasy suspicion that this may be a mere dogma, which anyone with a scientific outlook is bound to question, especially since people do genuinely disagree about which ways of behaving are good and which bad. This leads one to take the safer line that, finally, the only justification for doing anything is that one wants to do it. But this is not really very helpful, since the problem is often to choose between conflicting desires. But perhaps some of these desires may turn out not to be real ones? This comforting hypothesis seems to be supported by the Freudian discovery that, on the one hand, we have many desires of which we are unconscious, and that, on the other, many purposes

¹ *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, p. 207.

we think we have are the products of convention and leave us unsatisfied when we have attained them. The conclusion is drawn that it is safer to trust instinct, from which these unconscious desires spring, than conventional notions of what we ought to do. But then it appears that to follow instinct is, as Spinoza pointed out, to be in bondage to the passions: in particular, we are led to cherish beliefs which are demonstrably false. Instinct, then, needs to be corrected by reason, if only in its own interests. But reason, it seems, can do nothing but dampen enthusiasm, leaving us cynical and aimless. What we need are passions of which reason can approve. But it is the function of reason to pass on the truth or falsity of propositions: so that if reason approves of some passions or purposes this must mean that we apprehend the truth or falsity of propositions of the form: *This emotion is fitting* or *This end is good*. We are back, then, where we started; and the cycle of argument and counter-argument begins once more.

III

In the other books on social and political problems written about this time, Russell's underlying moral theory does not develop very much. In *The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism* (1920) he seems to abandon his never very wholehearted belief that men would be tolerant, affectionate and full of zeal for disinterested learning if only their impulses were not repressed by a tyrannical social system. In that book he lists four fundamental passions, which (apart from the instinctive desires for food, sex and shelter) dominate human nature. They are acquisitiveness, vanity, rivalry and love of power; and the prime error of Marxist theory, he tells us, is that it concentrates on the first to the exclusion of the other three. All of these, presumably, would rank among the "possessive", or bad, impulses; so that the "creative" impulses from which he hoped so much in *Principles of Social Reconstruction* appear to have vanished entirely. In that book he had said: "I consider . . . the worst [life] that which is most inspired by love of possession";¹ so that it is a little startling to find him now writing: "The progress or retrogression of the world depends, broadly speaking, upon the balance between acquisitiveness and rivalry. The former makes for progress, the latter for retrogression."² It is true that he is speaking here of material progress; the point is that, as scientific discoveries "provide improved methods of production, these may be employed either to increase the general share of goods, or to set apart more of the labour power of the community for the business of killing its rivals".

¹ *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, p. 5.

² *Practice and Theory of Bolshevism*, p. 131.

But he can hardly be using "progress" wholly in this sense when he declares: "One who believes, as I do, that the free intellect is the chief engine of human progress, cannot but be fundamentally opposed to Bolshevism, as much as to the Church of Rome."¹

Russell's view of the good life has not changed: he objects to the Soviet régime mainly because it stifles free inquiry and fosters bigotry and a rigid orthodoxy. But he now sees little sign that "the love of mental adventure" or the "creative instincts" are among the basic forces in human nature. He may have been confirmed in this more pessimistic view by the way in which Freudianism was developing. Freud himself was beginning to elaborate the hypothesis that the impulse to hate was as fundamental as the impulse to love; that the primary tendencies of the id included the death-wish, with its accompanying desire for destruction and aggression. If this is accepted it seems to dispose finally of the view that the good life can be attained by liberating the id from the repression of society. On the other hand, it provides an added reason for being suspicious of the super-ego; for the super-ego, Freud tells us, is influenced, not merely by the reality-principle, but also by the sadistic and masochistic tendencies that rise from the id. But, once it is admitted that the id is not dominated solely by the pleasure-principle, doubt is cast on the whole basis of Freudian Hobbism. The contention was that the rational way of life consists in following the pleasure-principle, as modified (of necessity) by the reality-principle. But this does not involve the assumption that pleasure is, in the Moorean sense, good, but simply that pleasure is the goal at which human beings do, as a matter of fact, aim. But it now appears that it is only one of the things at which they aim; the other is death and destruction. "The meaning of the evolution of culture", Freud writes, "is no longer a riddle to us. It must present to us the struggle between Eros and Death, between the instincts of life and the instincts of destruction, as it works itself out in the human species."² But why prefer one of these to the other, unless one is (in the Moorean sense) good and the other evil?

Yet the objections to Moore remain. When he comes to write *Power*, in 1938, we find Russell repeating emphatically that Reason cannot determine the ends of life. The whole passage is worth quoting:

"It is customary nowadays to decry Reason as a force in human affairs, yet the rise of science is an overwhelming argument on the other side. The men of science proved to intelligent laymen that a certain kind of intellectual outlook ministers to military prowess and wealth; these ends were so ardently desired that the new

¹ *Practice and Theory of Bolshevism*, p. 114.

² *Civilisation and its Discontents*, 1930, p. 103.

intellectual outlook overcame that of the Middle Ages, in spite of the force of tradition and the revenues of the Church and the sentiments associated with Catholic theology. The world ceased to believe that Joshua caused the sun to stand still, because Copernican astronomy was useful in navigation; it abandoned Aristotle's physics, because Galileo's theory of falling bodies made it possible to calculate the trajectory of a cannon-ball; it rejected the story of the flood, because geology is useful in mining, and so on. . . .

"From this example, something may be learned as to the power of Reason in general. In the case of Science, Reason prevailed over prejudice because it provided means of realizing existing purposes, and because the proof that it did so was overwhelming. Those who maintain that Reason has no power in human affairs overlook these two conditions. If, in the name of Reason, you summon a man to alter his fundamental purposes—to pursue, say, the general happiness rather than his own power—you will fail, and you will deserve to fail, since Reason alone cannot determine the ends of life. . . . But if you can prove, by evidence which is convincing to every sane man who takes the trouble to examine it, that you possess a means of facilitating the satisfaction of existing desires, you may hope, with a certain degree of confidence, that men will ultimately believe what you say."¹

By this time, it is clear, Russell no longer believes either that some ends are good in themselves, and so recommended by Reason alone, or that the ends which men actually pursue (or would pursue, if they followed Reason in the sense of allowing the pleasure-principle to be modified by nothing but the reality-principle) are those which he himself advocates. Moore and Freudian Hobbism have both failed him. It is not surprising then, to find him turning to the third method of reconciling empiricism with morality—subjectivism. In *Power* he outlines a subjectivist ethic, quite explicitly. In doing so he merely repeats, and expands a little, the chapter on "Science and Ethics" in the little volume called *Religion and Science*² which he had published in 1935. There is a further statement of this position in *Human Society in Ethics and Politics*; but the chapter in *Religion and Science* is probably his clearest and most forceful exposition of it.

Moral beliefs, Russell now tells us, are essentially expressions of desire. But it is important to distinguish between two different kinds of desire: purely personal ones, like my desire for a glass of wine with my dinner, and impersonal ones, like my desire for a peaceful world in which men will refrain from dropping bombs on one another. The point about impersonal desires is that we want something for others as well as for ourselves; moreover, we want others to want it. The Tolstoyan, for example, wants other men (and himself as well,

¹ *Power*, 1938, pp. 142-3.

² Home University Library, 1935.

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of course) to want to be kindly and peaceable; the Nietzschean wants himself and others to pursue a life of strenuous heroism. This is just a matter of personal preference: the Tolstoyan happens to prefer to live in one kind of world, the Nietzschean in another. There is no objective reason for preferring one to the other; no reason, that is to say, for calling one better than the other except that one happens to prefer it. In precisely the same way, there is no reason, except one's own preference, for saying that it is better to drink wine than beer. It is true that we do not regard our taste in drinks as a matter of morality; but this is because a desire for wine or beer is a personal desire. We reserve the category "moral" for impersonal desires; but there is no other important difference.

It has commonly been thought that this is an ethical theory which destroys morality. If people are convinced that the difference between good and evil is a mere matter of taste, it is argued, they will lose all incentive to do good (which is often hard) and to avoid evil (which is tempting and easy). Russell argues, with considerable cogency, against this contention. If I desire something, I have every incentive to pursue it; ultimately, indeed, no other incentive is possible. Morality may, in a sense, be a matter of taste; but people are, after all, eager enough to gratify their tastes. This is true, he might have pointed out, even of purely personal desires. If I want wine with my dinner rather than beer, I may join a campaign to compel restaurants to provide it at a reasonable price, vote in favour of a European Common Market, and turn a deaf ear to the arguments of the Hopgrowers' Association and the Brewers' Federation. If you prefer beer to wine, I may find you opposing me in these controversies. Personal tastes, that is to say, will lead each of us to join movements, propound social policies, extol some proposals and denounce others. The same is true, to an even greater extent, of impersonal desires. If I want the kind of world in which men live comfortably and at peace with their neighbours, I will advocate one kind of social policy; if you want a world made fit for Nietzschean heroes to live in, you will advocate a different kind of policy. Neither of us, then, will sink into the mood of cynical indifference which, according to the critics, necessarily accompanies a subjectivist ethic. It is true, Russell adds, that neither of us will think the other wicked and sinful; one's opponent is seen as simply someone whose impersonal desires are different from one's own, not as a monster of corruption. Subjectivism, then, makes for tolerance; but not for any lack of moral zeal. And this is, of course, a gain rather than a loss.

Subjectivism is a highly important, and in many ways a highly attractive, moral theory. There is obviously no space here to discuss it at all fully. But I should like to make three comments on Russell's version of it.

(1) Is it true that subjectivism makes for tolerance? There is no room, Russell tells us, for "sin" in the subjectivist vocabulary. But why not? True, the sinner has lost his bad eminence and become simply a person whose tastes are different from mine. But why should that lead me to tolerate him? On the subjectivist view, to say that something is good means that it is in accordance with my impersonal desires; and to say that something is evil means that it is opposed to my impersonal desires. My opponent, then, is a wilful seeker of evil and so, one would think, sinful. If we persist in feeling that it is not after all very sinful merely to have aims opposed to our own, doesn't this mean that we are not really subjectivists? Objectivists, no doubt, believe that we ought not to condemn anyone merely because his desires differ from ours, but only because his desires are bad. But, on the subjectivist view, to say that desires are "bad" is just to say that they are "different from mine".

Well, then, it may be argued, it follows that the subjectivist does not condemn anyone; for he believes that desires are never bad in the objectivist sense, but only in the sense of "different from mine". It is true that this subjectivist sense of "bad" carries with it some of the implications of the objectivist sense: e.g. "to be avoided", "to be opposed". (Not to recognize this is to be exposed to Moore's strictures on the naturalistic fallacy.) But it does not carry with it one further implication: "to be condemned". The subjectivist condemns no one; he merely opposes, firmly but with good humour, policies which don't happen to chime with his own.

This may be true, as a psychological generalization about subjectivists. They may all be tolerant and charitable in their treatment of opponents. But there is no reason why they should be: tolerance does not follow, as Russell seems to think it does, as a logical consequence of their ethical theory. It can be made to follow only if we accept the premiss: "We ought not to condemn anyone merely because his desires differ from ours, but only because his desires are bad." Then it might be added: But no desires are bad (in this sense); therefore no one is to be condemned. But there seems no special reason why a subjectivist should accept the first premiss. It is doubtful, indeed, whether that premiss is consistent with subjectivism at all.

(2) Russell, then, is mistaken in supposing that tolerance necessarily follows from subjectivism. But there is, I think, a more fundamental, though quite inconclusive, objection to his position. There can be no doubt that his subjectivism stems, ultimately, from his firm belief in "the scientific outlook". We apply the scientific attitude to our moral and political beliefs as well as to our beliefs about the external world, and we find that there is no sound reason for accepting one set of moral beliefs rather than another. Or, at least,

there is no sound reason for regarding any set of moral beliefs as objectively valid, in the sense that our belief that water flows downhill is objectively valid. Now, what follows from this? Why, that we ought not to regard any set of moral beliefs as objectively valid. But does it? Only if we make a prior assumption, viz. that one ought not to accept any proposition unless the evidence appears to support it. And, if no moral propositions are objectively valid, this one is not.

There are, no doubt, several possible replies to this objection. Russell might simply reply that he is not concerned to draw the conclusion that one ought not to regard moral beliefs as objectively valid. As a philosopher, he is not concerned to tell his readers what they ought to do, but what is the case. It is the case that moral beliefs are not objectively valid; but if his readers choose to ignore this disturbing truth and continue to nourish comforting fictions, that is purely their own concern.

This is, I say, a possible reply. I am not sure how relevant it is that, in Russell's mouth, the reply is not very convincing. For, in fact, much of his writing is concerned with a quite passionate advocacy of "the scientific outlook": facing the facts, following the argument whithersoever it leads, and so on. Certainly most readers will carry away the conviction that this is, in some sense, what they ought to do.

But, of course (and here we have a second possible reply) it is part of Russell's case that subjectivism is quite compatible with advocacy. Russell himself, it may be said, happens to prefer a world in which people do follow the argument whithersoever it leads, at whatever cost to their own comfort. Naturally, he tries to persuade other people to adopt this attitude.

But how, on this view, can he hope to persuade them, since there is no objective principle whose truth may be brought home to them? All that Russell can do is to play on a belief that they themselves already hold. If they do not already hold it, there is no earthly reason (and still less any transcendental reason) why they should, except that Russell would like them to.

Now it probably is true that most people do believe, to a greater or less degree, in following the argument whithersoever it leads. It is also true, I think, that, except in the comparatively small minority with the academic temperament, this is one of the very weakest of human passions. To give one illustration, there are very many people who, convinced that a belief in God is comforting, conducive to good actions, and incapable of causing any harm, simply cannot understand anyone who passionately attacks this belief for no other reason than that he believes it to be false. Russell himself, it will be remembered, says that people were brought to accept the teachings of

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scientists only because of their practical utility. It is highly doubtful, however, whether a belief in subjectivism has any practical utility. Russell says it makes men tolerant, but most men probably do not want to be made tolerant. And there seems little doubt that, in the game of trying to persuade others to adopt one's own impersonal desires, it is a great advantage to believe that one's own desires (but not one's opponent's) are eternal and immutable verities. It may be said, in general, that a grasp of the truth about any state of affairs, however unpalatable, always helps one to cope with that state of affairs; but this is not always true, and it may be doubted whether it is ever true about the nature of moral beliefs.

What follows from this is not merely that Russell, and subjectivists generally, have little chance of winning adherents, and that any they may win will belong to the small class of academics in whom the disinterested desire for truth has become hypertrophied. This is probably true anyway and to that extent confirms Russell's views. What also follows from the subjectivist position is that there is no sound reason why other people should accept subjectivism, even if it is true.

This objection is certainly not conclusive. It is no more than a special case of an objection which Russell himself considers and perhaps refutes: that a belief in subjectivism undermines moral zeal. The earlier Russell, no doubt, believed that everyone had a duty to follow the argument wheresoever it led, and to suspend judgment where the evidence was inconclusive; he certainly thought these things good in themselves. It is from these beliefs, applied to ethics, that his subjectivism springs. The later Russell no doubt believes merely that he happens to have an abnormally keen desire to follow the argument whithersoever it leads, and that this is an impersonal desire—he wants others to want it too. There is, however, no reason why those others, if they do not already share this desire, should try to acquire it. In a sense his subjectivism has kicked away the ladder by which it climbed; but this does not really matter, since it does not need the ladder for support. All the same, the paradox is, I think, worth noticing.

(3) The final comment I want to make is of a rather different kind. Consider the following passage from *Power*:

"The great ethical innovators have not been men who *knew* more than others; they have been men who *desired* more, or, to be more accurate, men whose desires were more impersonal and of larger scope than those of average men. . . .

"All great moralists, from Buddha and the Stoics down to recent times, treated the good as something to be, if possible, enjoyed by all men equally. They did not think of themselves as princes or Jews or Greeks; they thought of themselves merely as human beings.

Their ethic had always a two-fold source: on the one hand, they valued certain elements in their own lives; on the other hand, sympathy made them desire for others what they desired for themselves. . . . Sympathy is in some degree instinctive; a child may be made unhappy by another child's cry. But limitations of sympathy are also natural. The cat has no sympathy for the mouse. . . . Where there is limitation of sympathy there is a corresponding limitation in the concept of the good: the good becomes something to be enjoyed only by the magnanimous man, or only by the superman, or the Aryan, or the proletarian, or the Christadelphian. All these are cat-and-mouse ethics. . . . Such creeds, inevitably, appeal only to the cat, not to the mouse; they are imposed on the mouse by naked power."¹

So far the point might be simply that the proponents of cat-and-mouse ethics cannot expect to have as many adherents as those moralists whose sympathies are universal: "great" in "the great ethical innovators" may simply mean "most influential". But there is little doubt that Russell means more than this; that he wants to condemn narrowness of sympathy, and hence cat-and-mouse ethics, as such. Speaking of the great religions, he says: "Their founders were men whose sympathy was universal, and who were felt, on this account, to be possessed of a wisdom surpassing that of temporary and passionate despots. The result was not all that the founders could have wished. . . . Nevertheless, the principle of universal sympathy conquered first one province, then another. It is the analogue, in the realm of feeling, of impersonal curiosity in the realm of intellect; both alike are essential elements in mental growth."²

And a little later he says, still more definitely: "Whatever our *politics* may be, there can be no valid argument for an undemocratic *ethic*. I mean by an undemocratic ethic one which singles out a certain portion of mankind and says: 'these men are to enjoy the good things, and the rest are merely to minister to them'."³

The use of the expression "valid argument" here, and, rather less clearly, of "mental growth" in the earlier passage, suggest that Russell still regards "democratic" ethical systems as intrinsically better, in some objective sense, than undemocratic ones. This seems clearly inconsistent with his subjectivism.

It will be noticed, moreover, that the "principle of universal sympathy" which he speaks of here is identical with the "spirit" which, in *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, is to reconcile instinct with reason. Further, there is a close resemblance between the qualities of "the great ethical innovators" and the *defining characteristics* of moral principles. A moral principle is, properly understood, the expression of an impersonal desire: i.e. something one

¹ Op. cit., pp. 238-9.

² p. 260.

³ p. 282.

desires for others as well as for oneself. Now it is clear that Russell approves of breadth of sympathy and disapproves of cat-and-mouse ethics; and he seems to think of this approval and the accompanying disapproval as more than a personal idiosyncrasy. Earlier, it will be remembered, he had said that the impersonal desires of "spirit" were the only ones Reason (or "Mind") could approve of. Now he has come to believe that Reason cannot approve of any desire more than any other; but he is reluctant to relinquish these earlier beliefs. Consequently he resorts, as other contemporary moral philosophers in the same difficulty have resorted, to the device of a loaded definition. Only impersonal desires are to be called "moral". Russell thinks of men as genuinely wanting others to have the type of good life which they want for themselves. This does not necessarily exclude cat-and-mouse ethics, since a man might want to spend his life abasing himself before the superman; or he might be genuinely convinced that he would want to do this, if he did not have the good luck to be a superman himself. But the man who genuinely wants to make exceptions in his own favour is ruled out, simply by definition. And to rule him out in this way is, in effect, to assume the objective validity of a basic principle: that one ought not to make exceptions in one's own favour.

It is fairly easy to pick holes in any of the three main ethical theories which Russell has, in the course of his development, put forward. It is much harder to find a more satisfactory theory to put in their place. The importance of Russell is that he is not only exceptionally clear-headed, but also exceptionally candid. And any candid person who tackles seriously the problem of finding a philosophical basis for his moral beliefs will, I think, find himself doing what Russell did: inclining to each of these three theories in turn, and in the end finding that none of them is wholly acceptable, but also that it is difficult to dispense with any of them. (Russell does appear, in the end, to be satisfied with subjectivism; but we have seen that his subjectivism incorporates—illegitimately—elements of the two earlier theories.) This is, I think, the central problem that confronts moral philosophers in our time. If Russell has not been able to solve it, at least it is illuminating to see what happens when a mind of the calibre of his grapples with the problem.

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LEIBNIZ'S METHOD AND THE BASIS OF HIS METAPHYSICS

A. H. JOHNSON

THE monumental works of Bertrand Russell and Louis Couturat have set a firm pattern of interpretation which many follow in their approach to the Philosophy of Leibniz. In the *Preface* to the second edition of *The Philosophy of Leibniz*, Russell reaffirms his contention that "Leibniz's philosophy was almost entirely derived from his logic". He welcomes the support provided in Couturat's *La Logique de Leibniz*. Russell remarks "No candid reader—can doubt that Leibniz's metaphysic was derived by him from the subject-predicate logic. This appears, for example, from the paper 'Primae Veritates' where all the main doctrines of the *Monadology* are deduced, with terse logical rigor from the premises; 'Always therefore the predicate or consequent adheres in the subject or antecedent, and in this fact consists the nature of truth in general—But this is true in every affirmative truth, universal or singular, necessary or contingent'." Referring further to Couturat, he points out that in his book the "Principle of Sufficient Reason" and "The Identity of Indiscernibles" are "expressly deduced—from the analytic character of all true propositions".¹ In short, Russell is contending that in formulating his metaphysics Leibniz (1) used the rigorous methods of deductive logic and (2) employed "models" drawn from logic to construct his "picture of reality", i.e. his metaphysics.

An examination of "Primae Veritates" indicates the inaccuracy of this the Russell-Couturat interpretation. Starting with a general statement of the *Principle of Identity*, Leibniz then brings into focus the principle of the inclusion of predicate in subject, and its important implications. Next *The Principle of Sufficient Reason* is deduced. In dealing with *The Identity of Indiscernibles* Leibniz does not restrict himself to pure logic. He appeals to the details of factual experience: "Never are two eggs, two leaves, two blades of grass—to be found exactly similar". This procedure of including reference to empirical data is followed in considering the principle *Every created Individual Substance exerts physical action and passion on all others*. He states: "This is confirmed by our experience of nature for we observe——." The principle *There is no actual determinate figure in things* is supported by an appeal to the fact that "none can satisfy the infinity of impressions". Another departure from reliance on deduction from *The Principle of Identity* is introduced in the form of a reference to the

¹ Bertrand Russell, *The Philosophy of Leibniz*, Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, Second Edition, 1948, p.v.

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action of God. In other words, basic principles are supported not only by rigorous deduction from *The Principle of Identity* but also by reference to divine initiative. The unity of soul and body is dealt with in this fashion.¹

It would thus appear that Leibniz was not as thoroughgoing a rationalist as Russell's interpretation would indicate. Before proceeding to an examination of the other phase of his interpretation, namely that Leibniz's metaphysics is based on logic (*Russell says "almost entirely", yet in the details of his argument he tends to omit the "almost"*) it might be wise to show, in more detail, the degree to which Leibniz relies on a rationalistic method of thought, and the extent to which he supplements, and in some cases *replaces* it, by empirical methods.

Much emphasis has been placed, by those who try to interpret Leibniz in exclusively logical terms, on his statement that "All contingent propositions—have *a priori* proofs". This is interpreted as blotting out the distinction between necessary and contingent truths. A careful examination of Leibniz's text indicates that this conclusion is not justified. Leibniz is merely saying that in the case of contingent truths, as in the case of truths of reason, the predicate is contained in the subject. Hence there is a *a priori* basis for truth in each case. Thus contingent truths are certain but they are not necessary (i.e. truths of reason) because alternative possibilities do not involve contradiction. As Leibniz puts it, contingent propositions "do not have demonstrations of necessity, since these reasons are only founded on the *principle of contingency*—on what is or appears best among several equally possible things".²

It is well known that Leibniz was interested in the formulation of a "Universal Characteristic" employing mathematical symbols and methods in terms of which problems could be analysed, and solutions reached in accordance with strict rules of deduction. In this fashion many sources of error could be overcome. In connection with this project, he made some very optimistic statements concerning abstract rationalistic methods of thought. For example, writing to Herzog Johann Friedrich in October 1671 he states, "I have—demonstrated that the earth moves, and that the vacuum does not exist. This I have shown not through experiments, for they do nothing, but by geometrical demonstration". In the same vein, writing to Ferrault

¹ L. E. Loemker, *Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1956, pp. 413, 415, 417.

² P. P. Wiener, *Leibniz Selections*, Charles Scribners Sons, New York, 1951, pp. 94-5. Hereafter this book will be referred to as Wiener. Almost all subsequent quotations from Leibniz writings will be drawn from Wiener's excellent selection. His book provides ready access to material which otherwise is not easily available to most students of philosophy.

LEIBNIZ'S METHOD

in 1676 he says: "All the phenomena of gravitation, magnetism, electricity, and light are explicable by the resolution of a few problems of pure geometry—whatever we will be able to say about these things, henceforth, will be only a matter of calculation and geometry".¹

Leibniz stresses the fact that in the realm of geometry, accuracy can be obtained because it is possible to test (by reference to definitions, axioms and other propositions) not only conclusions of a line of argument but also its various stages. In other fields, such as physics, metaphysics and ethics, error and disagreement run rampant because the exact methods of geometry are not employed. "The only way to rectify our reasonings is to make them as tangible as those of the Mathematicians." Experiments in physics may refute a conclusion but they do not indicate the source of its error. Experiments are of even less use in ethics and metaphysics. Leibniz reports that he has applied the geometrical method to theology, clearing up many confusions by clear definition and careful deductive procedure.²

However, the *apparent* thoroughgoing rationalism is not exactly what it seems. Leibniz regards logical and mathematical concepts and principles as *instruments* to be used "in directing our reason to take advantage of facts given either by the senses or by reports of others or by the inner light". For example, numbers are symbols which reveal the "powers of things". "Once the characteristic numbers are established for most concepts, mankind will then possess a new instrument which will enhance the capabilities of the mind."³

It is necessary to recognize that there is a strong empirical element in Leibniz's thought. An article in *Journal des Savants* (June 19, 1691) is typical of this phase of his activity. In discussing the Cartesian concept of matter, he points out that mathematical modes of thought, i.e. a reference to extension, can not do justice to the observed fact of natural inertia. He then remarks that the

¹ Wiener, pp. xxi-ii.

² Wiener, p. 51 (The Art of Discovery, 1686), and p. 59 (On True Method in Philosophy and Theology, 1686).

³ Wiener, p. 49 (On True Method in Philosophy and Theology, 1686), p. 17, (Towards a Universal Characteristic, 1677). Loemker, in *Philosophical Papers*, points out that "Leibniz shared the Aristotelian and Scholastic conviction that logic is a tool of thought—and that it must be grounded in the universal, self-differentiating harmony which is reflected imperfectly in individual substances. His logical studies aimed to provide the instruments by which man can grasp the structure of being in his own symbolic formulas" (p. 40). In somewhat similar fashion, Schrecker (*Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. VIII, No. 1, p. 109) states: "The very essence of mathematics was indeed metaphysically founded. And therefore mathematics, in spite of its formal character, was not merely a formal but a real science—representing—
independent reality beyond the human mind."

implications of Descartes' position are "entirely *irreconcilable with experiments*". In stressing the need to take seriously the experimental observation of the dynamic aspects of nature, Leibniz is not denying the legitimate applicability of a mathematical view of nature. His point is the "principles of Mechanics, that is the first laws of motion, have a more sublime origin than those furnished by pure Mathematics".¹

In view of Leibniz's rationalistic tendencies, and his theory of innate ideas, it may seem strange to find him emphasizing sensory observation and experiments. But a careful examination of his general discussion of sense and reason indicates that the empirical element is not necessarily a strange interloper. It is true that he stresses the inadequacies of sense experience. In a telling phrase he remarks that we use the external senses as a blind man uses his stick (Letter to Queen Charlotte of Prussia, 1702). It becomes obvious that something is there, but we can not become aware of its true nature. Further, the senses cannot reveal to us (a) what ought to be, or (b) the necessary truths of mathematics. A large number of experiments, or repeated sense experiences cannot validate a principle in mechanics or in any other field. Such experiences only provide examples. Leibniz argues that since we do have necessary and universal truths in science they must be internal, found in the mind, not developed as the result of external stimulation. He finds support for this theory in Plato and contemporary biology. It is made plausible by the analogy of the block of marble with its innate structure. Leibniz is careful to indicate that these necessary truths (ideas) are innate in a special sense of the term. They are not always perceived. They are there as inclinations, dispositions, habits or natural capacities.²

However, even this theory of innate ideas does not rule out the importance of sense experience in general, and experimentation in particular. Even in the midst of the most lofty adulation for the necessary truths of reason he makes rather startling admissions concerning the importance of sense experience: "I agree, nevertheless, that *in the present state* that the external senses are necessary to us for thinking, and that if we had none we could not think.—The senses furnish us the matter for reasoning, and we never have thought so abstract that something from the sense is not mingled therewith; but reasoning requires something else in addition to what is from the sense." In a similar vein he states that "without the senses we would never take it into our heads to think of them" (i.e. necessary truths or the principles on which they depend). Further, "the success of experiments serves also as confirmation to the reason, very much as

¹ Wiener, pp. 101-2 (Whether the Essence of a Body Consists in Extension, 1691).

² See Wiener, pp. 369-70 (*New Essays*, 1704).

proofs serve in arithmetic for better avoiding of errors of reckoning when the reasoning is long".¹

Leibniz's so-called rationalism is set in its proper context in a letter written to De Volder in 1699. Discussing the inadequacies of Descartes' view of matter (a favourite theme) he remarked: "The two grounds to which I always refer in such reflections are these, namely, success in experiment and considerations of a rational order." Here surely is no disparagement of experiment. It thus becomes evident that during this later period of his life, Leibniz was less inclined than previously to claim certainty, for the human mind (including his own), even concerning the fundamental principles of mathematics or mechanics. Referring to the principle "No event takes place by a leap" (Continuity), he says in a rather tentative fashion: "Though what I say may not be supported here by strict demonstration, it may meanwhile be submitted to you for consideration as a clear hypothesis which is quite consistent with itself and in closest agreement with phenomena."² At this point it is well to remember that in stating the "*Principle of Sufficient Reason*" (*Monadology*, Section 32) Leibniz made it perfectly clear that he regarded human powers of reason as definitely limited. We must not confuse God's complete knowledge with the very limited scope of human knowledge. Thus he states "*The principle of sufficient reason*, by virtue of which we consider that no fact can be real or existing and no proposition can be true unless there is sufficient reason, why it should be thus and not otherwise, *even though in most cases these reasons can not be known to us*".

Further indication of the relaxation of Leibniz's rationalism is the appearance of a somewhat pragmatic strain in his thought. "If then this impossibility (the Cartesian view of matter) were not also actually proven, we could still be content with creating concepts which would agree with experience, which are practically useful, and which solve its difficulties and as a result of which the way is open to higher grounds."³ In other words he is offering a useful hypothesis which receives considerable support from experience. This does not mean that Leibniz is a thoroughgoing Pragmatist. Usefulness does not constitute truth. Rather he is saying that one does not demand absolute certainty and necessary truth before accepting a proposition.

In general, it would appear that there are both rational and

¹ Wiener, p. 364 (On the Supersensible Element in Human Knowledge, 1702) and pp. 370-1 (*New Essays*, 1702) (emphasis added).

² Wiener, p. 160 (On Substance as an Active Force Rather Than Mere Extension, 1699), and p. 157 (On Substance as an Active Force Rather Than Mere Extension, 1699).

³ Wiener, p. 177 (Letter to De Volder, 1702). See also L. E. Loemker, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. VII, No. 4, p. 408, and Vol. XVI, No. 1, p. 33.

empirical elements in Leibniz's method of thought. Earlier in his career the rational factors were more prominent. Toward the end of his career the emphasis was reversed.¹

Early in life he hoped to realize the *possibility* of a purely rationalistic approach to all problems. As time passed he realized with increasing clarity that this ideal had not been achieved. He admitted his reliance "*in the present state*" on empirical methods and even stressed their importance. Many interpreters of Leibniz, including Russell, have apparently mistaken the "youthful dream" for the method which Leibniz actually followed in much of his philosophic activity. The extent to which Leibniz relied on observation and experiment in formulating his metaphysics will be considered in the following paragraphs.

Before turning to this phase of the topic, it is well to recall Russell's admission, in his "Preface", that his study of Leibniz was based on a very restricted sample of Leibniz's work. It is significant to note that the documents which Russell *did not* take into consideration are those in which the empirical elements are most obviously stressed. It is true that in those days Leibnizian material

¹ It will have been noted that quotations from the writings of Leibniz, used in this discussion, have been identified in terms of source, and *dated* (whenever possible). This was done in order to facilitate a comparison of earlier and later Leibnizian comments. The contention that with the passage of time a shift in emphasis from rational to empirical occurred in Leibniz's thought is accepted by L. E. Loemker who cogently remarks that "with the failure of Leibniz's logical construction of metaphysics it is the empirical pattern of his philosophy which comes into prominence.—His critics have not generally appreciated the magnitude of the change in emphasis which Leibniz's thought underwent in the 1690's.—It is not too much to say that questions of essence are now subordinated to the investigation of well ordered phenomena and their essential and existential structures". ("Leibniz's Judgments of Fact", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. VII, No. 4, p. 408.)

On the other hand Wiener's interpretation is couched in somewhat different words: "Leibniz constantly strove to *reconcile* the *a priori* elements of demonstrative reasoning with the more empirical side of scientific method." In Wiener's judgment this attempt at *reconciliation* was not successful. "There was, then, a significant *oscillation* in Leibniz's writings between his *a priori* system of irreducible real definitions and the experimental aspect of his program for the use of logic as an instrument of discovery, and invention." (*Leibniz: Selections* (Scribners, New York, 1951, pp. xxiii and xxvi.) (Emphasis added.)

In any case, both Loemker and Wiener would agree with R. L. Saw (*Leibniz*, Penguin Books, p. 20) who points out the very fundamental fact that "An interpretation of the system of Leibniz as a purely logical one would not have satisfied Leibniz himself. He states 'let no one be afraid that the contemplation of signs will lead us away from things. On the contrary it will guide us to the innermost nature of things'. Again he says 'Truths do not depend upon names and are not arbitrary as some of our new philosophers think' " (*Discourse on Metaphysics*, Section 24).

was not readily available for examination. However, as was indicated at the beginning of this study, Russell and Couturat seem to have overlooked the empirical factors in the "Primae Veritates" essay which they offered as support for their "logical" (rationalistic) approach to Leibniz.

II

There were many influences which affected Leibniz as he formulated his theory of monads. Early in his career he had accepted the traditional atomic theory but soon rejected it. He was dissatisfied with the view of nature developed by Descartes. He was greatly impressed by the possibilities inherent in mathematico-logico types of thought yet he recognized serious limitations. The new complex world of biological observation aroused his intense interest. He spent much time looking within his own mind. The traditional problems of theology were of compelling importance to him. He manifested deep respect for the ideas of some of the great thinkers of the past. In view of these various, and sometimes conflicting, factors it is very difficult to obtain a *perfectly clear* picture of the background out of which his theory of monads developed. However, it is possible to substantiate the conclusion stated above: He did not rely chiefly on logical models in constructing his theory of monads.

A letter to Father Bouvet (written in 1697) casts considerable light on Leibniz's state of mind. He says: "I find the philosophy of the ancients solid and that we must use the philosophy of the moderns not to destroy but to enrich that of the ancients." In this context he supports the Aristotelian and Scholastic concept of substantial form or entelechy against the Cartesian attempt to explain matter purely in terms of extension. The concept of form (since it implies force) is much more adequate in view of modern developments in mechanics. Further, a study of force in corporeal elements encourages a consideration of spiritual causes. In another of his numerous letters to friends and confidants (Remond de Montmore, 1715) he remarks: "I have always been very pleased—with the *Morals* of Plato and to some extent with his *Metaphysics*." Specifically, Leibniz agrees with Plato that there are eternal moral standards [Ideas (Forms) such as Good, Justice, Courage]. He also agrees with Plato's stress on the ontological status of "The Good" and God's concern with it during His creative activities. In general, he accepts Plato's stress on final causes and the famous denunciation (in the *Phaedo*) of reliance on purely physical (efficient) causes. He also accepts the Platonic doctrine of recollection in so far as it emphasizes the principle that nothing can be taught us unless there is something in the mind as idea. However, Leibniz contends that Plato's theory of recollection

must be purged of the notion of pre-existence (as will be recalled Leibniz is strongly opposed to the theory of transmigration of souls) and the implication that the soul once knew what it now knows. The Augustinian emphasis on the Divine Will and, in general, the venerable theological problems of the relation of God's omnipotence to human freedom, are of continuing importance to Leibniz. He is also anxious to provide adequate proof for the existence of God. He takes into consideration those insights which stress the paternal aspects of the Divine creator.¹

Leibniz was strongly opposed to the two main theories of the material world then current. There was, first, the theory connected with the name of Gassendi (and Hobbes, Huygens, Newton) and secondly that theory formulated by Descartes. The atomic theory of Gassendi was criticized on the grounds (to mention a few of the main objections) that inert solid atoms can not do full justice to the obvious dynamic aspects of matter. Further, they involve the difficulty that matter is apparently divisible and yet atoms are indivisible. Finally, atoms can not account for the variety and rich complexity of God's universe. The Cartesian theory of matter was wide open to the objection that by reducing matter to extension, the dynamic aspect of matter is neglected. Also the pressure involved in resistance can not be explained adequately in geometrical terms. Further, there is no mathematical explanation of the unity of a monad. Also the fact that bodies differing in mass may have the same volume indicates the inadequacy of a purely geometrical approach to matter. Extension is a characteristic of something. That "something" is not specified by Descartes. As in the case of the atomic theory, Leibniz contends that Descartes' theory of matter was unable to account for the richness and variety of material differentiations. Shape, size, spatial position, even when supplemented by motion, can not account adequately for individuality. Leibniz also noted a theological difficulty in Descartes' position. The body of Christ is essentially extension and the wafer in the Eucharist is also extension—a different extension since the two are distinguishable. These two different extensions can not be one and the same as the doctrine of the Eucharist claims.²

One of the most important "models" used by Leibniz in formulating his theory of monads, was the human mind. A careful examination of his own inner mental life formed the basis of his distinction between three main types of finite monads. This distinction was made in terms of clarity, distinctness and adequacy of experience. There

¹ See Wiener, p. 529 (*The Principles of Nature and Grace*, 1714); and, *Discourse on Metaphysics*, Sections 26, 30, 36.

² See Wiener, p. 107-8 (*New System of Nature*, 1695), and p. 63 (*On True Method in Philosophy and Theology*, 1686).

are *simple* monads, those characterized by unconsciousness, *soul* monads capable of feeling (sensation and memory) and *spirits* (rational souls) in whose experience abstract thinking occurs. Leibniz describes the inner life of monads in obviously psychological terms: perception, apperception and appetition. Each centre of mental energy is portrayed as a dynamic unity of distinguishable aspects. However, the monad is not a mere sum of discrete fragments.¹

Another phase of his discussion of the individual realities (monads) relies heavily on the traditional concept of substance and the logical *Principle of Identity*. The concept of substance contends that all substances are essentially independent of all others. Monads are interpreted in accordance with this concept. (This is an extreme application of the *Principle of Identity*.) In order to account for the sequence of experiences which monads undergo, Leibniz contends that the entire initiative for this development is internal. The analogy here is that of a logical subject from which a vast number of predicates can be deduced. Incidentally this theory of internal, rather than external, source of development was further supported by contemporary developments in biology. These stressed a theory of pre-formation and unfolding from within. Each monad is regarded as a unique individual. There can be no genuine duplication of monads, or what is composed of them for that matter (*Identity of Indiscernibles*). In order to account for the apparent interaction of what are, by definition, absolutely separate and non-interacting substances, Leibniz invokes the almighty power of God. This supreme monad is called upon to perform the continuing miracle of pre-established harmony.²

The monads (other than God) are assigned a status in accordance with traditional Christian concepts. They are the creation of God, continued in existence and completely controlled by Him in the interests of the "best possible". This involves a subordination of the world of nature to the requirements of the "world of grace".³

The Leibnizian concept of the universe as an infinite, continuous, series obviously reflects his mathematical interests. In particular, he was impressed by the notion of a functional law which in its applications results in an infinite continuous series of particular "values". Similarly, the concept of an individual possibility, mathematically interpreted, implies an infinite series of successive experiences. Here again is his emphasis on harmony which reflects his aesthetic interests. The "infinite series" phase of his theory of monads was further supported by biology. Thus he states "It

¹ See Wiener, pp. 107; 522-6 (New System of Nature, 1695); (The Principles of Nature and Grace, 1714).

² See *Monadology*.

³ See *Monadology*, Section 87.

happens to be the case that we do not find a single natural event which belies this great Principle (continuity)—all the events that we do know exactly justify the principle perfectly”.¹

Leibniz's discussion of monads, of course, involves a number of basic logical principles. He emphasizes *contradiction* and *sufficient reason*. Others have been noted, for example, *identity*, *continuity*, *the identity of indiscernibles*. However, the fact that he uses these logical principles does not imply that he constructed his theory of monads entirely on the basis of such data. Or, to express it otherwise, he did not use a *purely* logical model or analogy in setting up his theory of monads. Even the brief and incomplete preceding sketch of his reliance on physical, biological, psychological, aesthetic and religious experience should demonstrate that he did not derive his philosophy “almost entirely” from his logic (and mathematics). Indeed, there is evidence to show that even while Leibniz was still in his early twenties he accepted a theory of monads. This of course was the period when he was “on the brink” of impressive progress in logic and mathematics. Further, all phases of his thought, including logic and mathematics, may well be interpreted as expressions of an underlying, basic principle: that of “universal harmony”.²

There is “terse logical rigor” in pure deductive form in Leibniz. There is also much reliance on sense observation, contemporary experimentation and the wisdom of the past.³ Russell contends that

¹ Wiener, p. 186 (On the Principle of Continuity, 1702), and see L. E. Loemker, Leibniz, *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, p. 50, and E. Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, Beacon Press (Paperback), Boston, 1955, p. 122.

² See Georges Friedmann, *Leibniz et Spinoza*, Librairie Gallimard, Paris, 1946, pp. 22-3.

³ This fact has been recognized and appreciated in varying degrees by a number of Leibniz's critics. For example, H. W. B. Joseph (*Lectures on the Philosophy of Leibniz*, Oxford, 1949, p. 1) “Though he (Leibniz) taught that mathematical principles should be used in the explanation of nature—yet he also offended the scientific mind by saying that at bottom they were insufficient, and appealing to final causes and substantial forms.” Similarly E. Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, Beacon Press (Paperback) Boston, 1955, p. 29): Leibniz's monad “is no arithmetical, no merely numerical unit, but a dynamic one.—Each monad is a living center of energy”. With customary insight Loemker expresses the situation clearly and in considerable detail. “As Leibniz fully recognized, this work can not establish a panlogism (he is referring to ‘Primaes Veritates’), and even less a metaphysics of plurality, and change, for it professes to be only a derivation of his fundamental principles from the laws of identity and reason.” Loemker points out further that “it is also true that for a few years from 1679 to 1687—he proposed what he called an ‘argument’ from logical principle to his theory of individual substance. It was not an argument, however, but the arbitrary imposition of a logical doctrine upon a metaphysical one. Nor was it carried over into his mature thought”. (*Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. VII, No. 4, pp. 398, 401. See also pp. 402-8.) More specifically, Loemker refers to the influence of

there were two philosophies formulated by Leibniz: *first*, a "good", logical, one—as interpreted by Russell; *second*, all the rest of Leibniz's writings, which Russell tosses into the ash bin of "bad", to be used to curry favour and keep out of trouble.¹ A careful reading of Leibniz's works makes it very difficult to take seriously Russell's all too simple dichotomy.

Leibniz lived during a period of intense crisis. Dynamic individualism, in Church and State, threatened to reduce the life of Europe to chaos. There was a desperate need to achieve a harmony which would not destroy the fruitful forces of individualism. Leibniz set himself to formulate a comprehensive philosophy which would serve as the intellectual foundation for a new age which would facilitate fulfilment of the best dreams of scientists and practical men, saints and sages. Leibniz did not philosophize in a logical vacuum.

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Leibniz's studies in physics and psychology and summarizes his interpretation in the following fashion: "Leibniz's philosophy is affected at different periods by the particular special studies in which he is engaged. Of this, the outstanding example is the fading of the logical interests from the first place in his thoughts—and its replacement by the physical studies of the 1690's.—Beginning with the *Specimen Dynamicum* the universal harmony is pushed into the background and force to the center, the law of individuality becomes abstract and formal, and the actual dynamic process the concrete and real. The claims of demonstration are weakened and the hypothetical nature of his philosophy emphasized. The eternal chain of being gives way, in emphasis, to the temporal order of progress, so that in his last philosophical statements the Platonic doctrine of ideas on which his thought is always based is not explicit, logic is subordinated to epistemology, while psychology, biology and history are in the foreground." (Leibniz, *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, pp. 22–3.) See also the valuable sketch of Leibniz's early philosophical position and the influences which affected him, in particular some phases of Renaissance thought—in *Leibniz et Spinoza* by G. Friedmann, Chapter 1 (Librairie Gallimard, Paris, 1946).

¹ See B. Russell, *The Philosophy of Leibniz*, Second Edition (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1937), p. vi.

NEW BOOKS

John Stuart Mill. By BERTRAND RUSSELL. British Academy Lecture, 1955 (Oxford University Press.)

I

J. S. Mill deserved the eminence he enjoyed in his own day, not by reason of his intellect, but by his intellectual virtues, his moral elevation and his just estimate of the ends of life. This is Lord Russell's view in his British Academy lecture delivered in January 1955 and recently published in the *Proceedings*. (It has also been included in the recent collection of papers entitled *Portraits from Memory*.) Lord Russell considers each of Mill's major works, places it in its historical context and attempts to assess its value for the present-day reader. No one is better fitted than he is to undertake this assessment: his conclusions are based on a deep concern for, and a long and active interest in, all the main causes of Mill's life: logic, freedom and political organization, feminism, and popular education. And there is of course a personal connection in the close friendship and political association between Mill and Lord and Lady Amberley. Russell's conclusions are in all cases highly characteristic. He considers (for example) that the world would be a better place if State education had never been inaugurated. Mill of course was totally opposed to State-provided and organized schools: but he "never realized that, so far as elementary education was concerned, the only important alternative to the State is the Church, which he would hardly have preferred". Again, Russell considers that the emancipation of women is part of a vast social change which exalts industry over farming, the factory over the nursery, and power over subsistence. "I think the world has swung too far in this direction and will not return to sanity until the biological aspects of human life are again remembered."

In discussing *On Liberty*, Russell remarks that on the whole there is much less liberty in the world now than there was a hundred years ago. In Mill's day Communism was a liberal movement opposed to the powers of the State: the danger it introduced (in Mill's view) was not world-conflict but world-stagnation. Today "we should feel a joyful ecstasy if we could hope for anything as comfortable as stagnation". Mill completely failed to foresee the increasing power of great organizations. Against them, the individual is hopeless: "only organizations can combat organizations" and the best that can be hoped for is a balance of rival powers, neither of them absolute, and each compelled in a crisis to pay some attention to public opinion. Russell goes on to ask how Mill might have written the *Liberty* if he had been living today: and considers the censorship of literature, the treatment of homosexuals, the tyranny of officials, and the problem of mass education. Russell concludes that the *Liberty* increases in value as the world travels farther and farther from its teaching.

2

In his references to Mill's life and character Lord Russell stresses the tensions and conflicts that have so often been noticed. He says: "Morals and intellect were perpetually at war in his thought, morals being incarnate in Mrs. Taylor and intellect in his father. If the one was too soft, the other was too harsh." This account seems to me questionable: the conflict is here

over-simplified if not mis-represented. Halévy alleges that there were in Mill "hints of an original nature, which was sentimental and almost religious, and which was not made for the purely intellectual and abstract system imposed on it since childhood". This is nearer the mark: it seems to me that it was Sterling and the Coleridgeans and Carlyle who encouraged this side in Mill: and that (on the whole) Mrs. Taylor discouraged it. I do not see how anyone who reads Mrs. Taylor's letters can possibly call her, in any sense of the word, *soft*. See especially her views on children and marriage, her attitude towards her husband and towards Comte.

There are two matters of fact in Lord Russell's lecture which call for comment. One is his remark about Mill and Darwin: the other his account of Mrs. Taylor's influence on the second edition of the *Principles of Political Economy*.

It is surprising "that in his *Three Essays on Religion*, written very late in life, [Mill] does not reject the argument from design based upon the adaptation of plants and animals to their environment, or discuss Darwin's explanation of this adaptation".

The truth is that the first two of these Essays were not written very late in life, but during the years 1850-1858 (along with *On Liberty*)—as Helen Taylor pointed out in her Preface. Mill would certainly have referred to the works of Darwin and Maine (she says) "had their works been published before these were written". It does remain odd, however, that Mill should have planned to publish the Essay on *Nature* in 1873 without any substantial revision. The last Essay, on *Theism*, was indeed written late in life and was "the last considerable work which he completed" (1868-70). But in this essay there is in fact a discussion of the very point Lord Russell mentions: the bearing of Darwin's doctrine of "the survival of the fittest" upon "the marks of design in Nature" (pp. 172-4). Mill states that Darwin's theory seems improbable at first; but is "not so absurd as it looks"; and is supported by many analogues in experience. If it were true (which is a point that is at present uncertain) it would greatly attenuate the evidence for the doctrine of Creation.

In the letters, we find that Mill read *The Origin of Species* within a year of its appearance: he comments on it briefly in a letter to Bain (*Letters*, ed. Hugh Elliot, 1910, Vol. I, p. 236): and again many years later defended it against certain objections made by another correspondent (Vol. II, p. 181, 1869). It is interesting to note that the comment in both these letters and in the *Essay on Theism* is very much the same: and leaves one wondering whether Mill, who was already nearly 54 years of age when he read *The Origin of Species*, ever seriously returned to it.

Concerning *The Principles of Political Economy*, Russell says that there is a substantial difference between the first edition (1848) and the second edition (1849). In the first edition, he says, "socialism was criticized from the point of view of the orthodox tradition"; but "this shocked Mrs. Taylor, and she induced Mill to make very considerable modifications when a new edition was called for". Lord Russell takes as his authority Mr. Michael Packe's recent biography which (in his view) "has said most of what needs to be said about the difference between these two editions". Mr. Packe has also "at last enabled us to see Mrs. Taylor in an impartial light, and to understand the sources of her influence on Mill". Russell also remarks that the "later editions" of the *Political Economy* are still very critical of socialism, and quotes a passage which was added to the celebrated chapter on "The Futurity of the Labouring Classes" in the third edition (1852).

If we turn to Mr. Packe's biography, we find that he is concerned to argue

that Mrs. Taylor had a great influence on the original writing of the book in 1847 as well as on changes made in the second and third editions.

"Harriet, in her enforced retirement at Walton, was taking a keen interest in [Mill's] progress. The *Logic* had slipped into print without her intervention, but that was never to be the case again. Every line received her scrutiny" (page 306).

That Mrs. Taylor helped in the original writing of the *Political Economy* is almost certainly true, but surely the evidence of her line-by-line scrutiny refers to the revisions incorporated in the second edition. The authoritative work on this subject is Professor Hayek's *J. S. Mill and Harriet Taylor* 1951, to which Mr. Packe refers. Professor Hayek gives one letter relating to 1847, in which Mrs. Taylor says that she is "just now much occupied with the book". We have (according to Professor Hayek) "practically no documentary evidence of the part which Mrs. Taylor took in the composition of the first edition of the work". Mr. Packe also cites (from the same source) some of the evidence concerning the *revisions* of the first edition. Mr. Hayek's chapter shows that Mill was obliged to cut out statements and even paragraphs which now seemed to Mrs. Taylor too harshly critical of socialism. These changes, and still more, the tone of the correspondence on Mill's side, are a good measure of the strength of her influence. Nevertheless, the chapter on property as it appears in the second edition is still as a whole very cautious and sometimes very severe in its attitude towards Communism and Socialism on the current French models: Mrs. Taylor can hardly be said at this stage to have changed the main bearing of the argument. One has to look carefully at what is left in as well as at what is taken out. In the first edition, p. 250, Mill says that life in a socialist community "would settle itself in one invariable round". Mrs. Taylor objected and, under strong protest, Mill gave way and deleted the remark. But he is here only re-stating a point already made: and the earlier statement that life under Socialism "would sink into a monotonous routine" is still to be found on page 255 of the *second* edition. Mrs. Taylor's opinions were more fully expressed in the edition of 1852. At this time, as in the original writing, the work seems to have been done by discussion rather than by correspondence, and Mr. Hayek cannot show us in detail the arguments that took place.

As a matter of fact, the *Political Economy* is the only one of Mill's major works of which a critical edition has been made. And the differences between the first three editions were traced by the editor, Sir William Ashley, in 1909. It is obvious that the really big changes were made in the writing of the third edition. Mill himself said so, both in the prefaces to the second and third editions, and many years later in the *Autobiography*. In the preface to the second edition he merely says that he has enlarged the chapter on Socialism, partly in order to remove misunderstandings of his criticisms. But in 1852, he announces that the chapter has been almost entirely rewritten (which is quite true) and says that the only important objection to socialism now put forward is the unprepared state of mankind in general and of the labouring classes in particular. In the *Autobiography* (written many years after Harriet's death) Mill suggests that they were both converted to socialism (at some unspecified date in the '40s) and that they put forward their opinions "less clearly and fully in the first edition, rather more so in the second, and quite unequivocally in the third". While the *Autobiography* very much emphasizes Harriet's influence, it possibly makes rather too much of the conversion to socialism. The changes between the first and third editions were very marked, but even in the third edition there is nothing resembling an unequivocal

defence of socialism. And as Ashley points out, Mill's later essays on Socialism (written in 1869) "indicate a reversion on Mill's part to an attitude resembling more closely perhaps his state of mind in 1848 than that in 1852".

KARL BRITTON.

Retreat from Truth. By G. R. G. MURE. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958. Pp. viii + 255. Price 31s. 6d.)

The Warden of Merton, known for his scholarly studies of Aristotle and Hegel, here turns to English philosophy in its distinctively twentieth-century forms, to complain, argue and appeal. He has watched metaphysics brought into impatient contempt, and has doubtless felt acutely what may fairly be called the virtual excommunication of metaphysicians. To the claim of the ruling caste to be not a school among other schools of philosophers but the only philosophers, he retorts that they are not philosophers at all. If this seems a harsh saying, he could plead that he is only giving tit for tat, and that the other side has made it impossible for the meek to inherit the earth.

The current school vaunts its empiricism. Mure's most general critical contention is that empiricism is a way of thinking that remains bound to an outlook so basically practical or "economic" that it fails to reach the level of philosophy. Its lines of thought about knowing and things are directed by an implicit supposition that the world is a scene to move about in, to manipulate for our various natural satisfactions. In natural science, which classifies and predicts in order to be able to control, the practical attitude has a frank and appropriately devised expression. Any discipline that claims to be other than scientific must obviously have another attitude and other methods.

This general criticism is followed by a review, in a roughly historical order, of the ways in which, in the present century, English empiricism has narrowed and shallowed its field of inquiry—a story of the dropping of metaphysical problems and the framing of other questions and techniques that are to be called philosophical because they are still different from those of other branches of academic study. The chief points of the review may be summarized, at the usual cost of drastic simplification, as follows. (1) Russell's logical atomism, dissolving everything into pure particulars, excluded any metaphysical order beyond, and thereby in effect left no room for material truth. The problem was then reduced to one of "meaning", resulting in a sort of "linguistic phenomenalism". (2) In his *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein proceeded along the route of solipsism—one that always awaits the determined empiricist—to a pure objectivism or realism, the self being conceived no longer as a part of the apprehended world but merely as the boundary of this. He then redefined philosophy, deprived of its old tasks, as a technique of elucidation; but added the admonition that his own elucidations, when understood, would be found to be meaningless. (3) Logical positivism, bringing against Russell and Wittgenstein the point of view of the Viennese Circle, reduced meaning to what could be verified by sense-data. The identification of the pure sense-data, the indubitable elements, was, however, found to be a very problematic affair, so that Ayer came to re-interpret the adoption of the theory as "a decision to use a technical language". (4) Another device for getting rid of metaphysical assertions was to explain them away as due to the confusions that arise from the use of conventional verbal language. The confusions, it was claimed, could be exposed and avoided by adherence to the formal grammar and syntax of the new symbolic logic. According to this logic, all complex propositions are truth-functions of their simple propositions; but

this principle turned out to be incapable of anything like proof. (5) Then the formal logical tests were discarded, and with them the notion of atomic certainties. Statements in ordinary living speech were said to have each its own logic, and the meanings of expressions were declared to be their actual use. There is no logically ideal language, and the notion of truth as correspondence with reality is to be rejected as metaphysical. All that remains is to formulate the accepted usages of words in their various contexts, the philosopher having no title to correct them.

The general assumption of empiricism is that the firm starting-point is an individual mind faced with its own individual world. The difficulty is then to give a tolerable explanation of how any such mind could know other minds and a common world. Concluding to a pure positivism without either objective realities or a subject is not to solve the problem but to ignore it.

So much for the "retreat from truth". The last third of the book outlines the way to truth—idealism as it left the hands of Bosanquet, with a few touches from Croce. Like the rest of the book it is written with distinction. As a *confessio fidei* it will appeal to those who (like me) respect the "neo-Hegelians" because they took all experience as their province instead of giving an unquestionable prerogative to sensation, and discovered other ways of thinking besides analysis, induction, formal deduction, and exclusion. A liberation comparable with the one which they brought seems to some of us to be both philosophically and educationally desirable. But is the author's call to return to that very system seasonable? We have something to receive—if only a very strong astringent—from the recent empiricists. I am sorry that these assume so cavalierly that they have nothing at all to receive from Kant and Hegel and those that followed from them.

T. E. JESSOP.

Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Volumes VII and VIII. Edited by ARTHUR W. BURKS. (Harvard University Press, 1958. Price 63s. per volume.)

With these two volumes, Volume VII devoted to "Science and Philosophy" and Volume VIII to reviews, correspondence and bibliography, the official definitive edition of Peirce's philosophical writings is complete.

It is a strange commentary, not so much upon Harvard University and its press, as upon our commercial civilization as a whole, that it has taken eighty-six years for the finest piece of philosophical writing in these volumes (Peirce's long review of Fraser's *Berkeley*) to appear printed in book form, and that it has taken some forty-five years since Peirce died for this edition of his works to be completed. But glory as well as truth is the daughter of time, and Harvard University has eventually treated Peirce's writings with as much due honour as it treated Peirce the man with prudish and priggish distaste during his prickly lifetime. These last two volumes are no mere pendants to the earlier six: on the contrary, they contain some of the very best writings in the now complete *Collected Papers*. Professor Burks has certainly maintained the wonderfully high standard of scholarship set by Professors Hartshorne and Weiss some twenty years ago.

Volume VII contains specimens of Peirce's work in "Physics" and "Psychology", and much longer sections on "Scientific Method" and the "Philosophy of Mind". The most interesting new material is found in the sections on "Scientific Method". In particular there is here a long (and as usual slightly rambling) paper of 1902 upon "The Logic of Drawing History from

Ancient Documents". This gives us *in extenso* the view of historical interpretation which underlies Peirce's remarkable criticism of Hume's "Essay on Miracles", recently published for the first time in Professor Philip P. Wiener's anthology of *Values in a Universe of Chance*. Broadly, Peirce accuses scientifically-minded nineteenth-century historians, especially those of a sceptical temper, of misapplying the method of "balancing likelihoods" in the attempt to assess the trustworthiness of any piece of historical evidence. The use of this method fails the historian, Peirce claims, because he can never be certain that different conflicting pieces of evidence about a given event are logically independent. Peirce doesn't develop this point as well as he should, but he is certainly on to something here. He then proceeds to outline his own view of how historians should attempt to assess any piece of written evidence. His account is extraordinarily like that recently expounded with great force, rigour and convincing detail by Professor Popper under the name of the "hypothetico-deductive" method. Nothing in Peirce's paper on the "Logic of History", however, comes quite so near to Popper's teaching as a sentence in the Hume Essay where he writes: "At last, however, a hypothesis will have been provisionally adopted, on probation; and now, the effort ought to be to search out the most unlikely necessary consequence of it that can be thought of, and that is among those that are readily capable of being brought to test of experiment." Peirce then suggests that to assess a piece of historical evidence always involves accepting and testing a hypothesis about the intentions of the author of the evidence: the most natural hypothesis usually being that the author at least believed that he had something important to tell, although of course other hypotheses may have to be accepted. Peirce went on to illustrate this thesis by three examples. The first (which is the only one Professor Burks is able to quote) is the question of the authenticity, as well as the generally admitted confusion, of the writings traditionally ascribed to Aristotle. Peirce makes out a very good case for accepting the account of their history that is given by Strabo in Book 13 of his *Geography*. Peirce's other examples, relating to the order of Plato's dialogues and to the habits of the Pythagoreans, appear to have been too diffuse to quote.

Volume VIII is of even greater interest. The reviews and letters are well chosen, but most important of all we have here the first complete reprinting of Peirce's great review of Fraser's *Berkeley*. (When I wrote my *Peirce and Pragmatism* I had to copy this review out in longhand from the British Museum's only copy of the *North American Review* of October 1871.) It is not often that one can say of a piece of philosophical writing that no contemporary—no one working in the life span of its author—could conceivably have produced anything coming near to it in respect of intellectual and literary excellence. But in this case, this high claim seems fully justified. In respect of philosophical originality and insight, of historical and literary scholarship, and indeed of sheer literary brilliance, who else of Peirce's philosophical contemporaries could have produced anything like it? These pages have had to wait eighty-six years to appear in book form, and by now no doubt Peirce's interpretation of "Scotistic" Realism is entirely outmoded—the bits of Scotus he refers to may well be spurious, But this doesn't matter in the least. The main thing is that Peirce in 1871 was probably the only Anglo-Saxon thinker in existence who had the remotest idea of what "Scotistic" Realism had been about. Now that this wonderful essay is available to students of philosophy, perhaps we may hope that by 1971 there will be other active philosophers who possess some inkling of what that great doctrine means.

Of the letters, those to William James are outstanding for their freshness and vigour; and those to Lady Welby are important for the light they throw

on Peirce's classification of signs. But what a pity that Professor Burks could not have included Peirce's last letter to that former Maid of Honour to Queen Victoria! For it contains two sentences that may be counted as Peirce's own epitaph to himself and that show this arrogant crank to have been a far greater man than any of his prim, prissy, academic enemies could have believed—or perhaps could ever even have understood. He wrote to Lady Welby: "I came within an ace of teaching men something to their profit. But certain misfortunes have prevented my keeping up to the times." This is the man to whose thoughts Professor Burks has now completed a splendid monument, to be prized not least for the inclusion in Volume VIII of his wonderfully careful and apparently complete bibliography of Peirce's writings.

Peirce's philosophical writings are now collected. But apparently there is still much Peircean material to be divulged to the public, presumably in the form of an authorized intellectual biography. There is a great need for such a work, which could be illuminating, informative and, I understand, "sensational" as well.

W. B. GALLIE.

Practical Reason and Morality. By A. R. C. DUNCAN. (Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1957. Pp. 182. Price 18s.)

In this scholarly and very interesting book on Kant's *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* (in the author's translation—*Foundations for the Metaphysics of Morals*) Professor Duncan proposes a new or, at least, unfashionable interpretation of it. If one were to do justice to the argument, one would have to write a monograph—or a rather long essay—considering most of his points. But it is, I hope, possible to give a fair idea of the main contents of the book under review and then to offer a criticism.

Duncan distinguishes between three possible interpretations of the *Foundations* which he calls respectively the "metaphysical", the "ethical" and the "critical". According to the first, Kant's aim was "to provide grounds for the belief in freedom" (p. 55); according to the second he was attempting, at least in outline, "an examination of the purely *a priori* aspect of morality" (p. 177) including the discovery of "a moral principle which would be used as a rule of conduct" (p. 181); while, according to the third, or critical, interpretation his purpose was to show that "morality involves a problem of *a priori* synthesis" and offer a critical solution of that problem (p. 182). Professor Duncan's main thesis, as I understand it, is that the critical interpretation is the only correct one; that the other two, in particular the ethical, lead to serious misunderstanding, both of the *Foundations* as a whole and of many of its details.

The task of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he points out, was to show how theoretical synthetic *a priori* judgments are possible, and—since on Kant's view such judgments are presupposed in mathematics and physics—to discuss the epistemological presuppositions of physics. The task of the *Foundations*, he argues, is an analogous one. It is to show how practical synthetic *a priori* judgments—categorical imperatives—are possible, and thus to discuss the presuppositions of ethics. Just as it would be a mistake to confuse a treatise on the philosophical presuppositions of physics with a treatise on physics, so it would be a mistake to confuse a treatise on the philosophical presuppositions of ethics with an ethical treatise. Just as Kant in the *Prolegomena* was concerned with the questions "How is pure mathematics possible?" and "How is pure natural science possible?" so he is in the *Foundations* concerned with the question "How is pure ethics possible?" In the author's

words Kant's problem concerns "a relation which will hold on every occasion on which a moral law determines a will to action, and may therefore quite properly be termed a problem about a formal element in morality" (p. 51). It is not concerned with the discovery of specific duties—although Kant, as he admits, sometimes speaks as if part of the problem were just this.

Professor Duncan argues that if commentators were to accept this critical interpretation, the arguments against Kant's alleged ethical formalism would become pointless. If on the other hand the ethical interpretation were correct, and Kant had in fact intended the *Foundations* as a work on ethics rather than on the possibility of pure ethics, one would be forced "to admit that Kant's argument breaks down miserably at what ought to be the most important point, the account of how the principle can be applied in practice" (p. 181).

According to Duncan we must distinguish sharply between the critique of natural science and morality on the one hand and their systems on the other—the critique not being concerned with the discovery of any principle of the system but solely with the problem of explaining its possibility. Any confusion of the critical and the systematic task must in particular lead to a complete misunderstanding of the *Foundations*.

Yet surely according to Kant the task of the critique of pure reason is first to discover the fundamental theoretical principles—and this in their completeness—and then to explain their possibility. This is quite clear from the two introductions to the first *Critique* and from its whole structure. It does not seem to me that Kant had changed his mind on the twofold critical task when he wrote the *Foundations*. I hasten to add that while neither his monograph nor another reading of the *Foundations* has convinced me that Professor Duncan is right, I should like to recommend everybody interested in Kant's philosophy to acquaint himself with the position here advocated, and carefully examine the arguments adduced. There can be no questioning either the author's philosophical or scholarly competence.

Even if his interpretation is not accepted, Professor Duncan has raised the important question of the relation between critique and system in the critical philosophy; possibly even shown the need for a modification of it in order to do justice to this relation. But such questions lie beyond the scope of the book, which is intended as an interpretation of the *Foundations* rather than a Kantian essay inspired by it.

S. KÖRNER.

The Moral Point of View. By KURT BAIER. (Cornell U.P. and O.U.P. London, 1958. Pp. xii + 326. Price 32s.)

This book is to be welcomed as the most thorough presentation so far available of the type of ethical theory pioneered by Professor Toulmin. It is clearly and persuasively written, so much so that it might lead the novice to underestimate the difficulties and complexities of the subject. A considerable merit of the book is that it offers, besides discussions of the logical and epistemological status of our moral beliefs, a reasonably detailed sketch of their content.

The principal alternative ethical theories are (avowedly) somewhat summarily dismissed in chapter 1. Chapter 2 treats value judgments in general. They are compared with factual comparisons and rankings and it is contended that, *given* criteria and standards, value judgments and factual claims are on a par as regards verification. But they serve different purposes. Factual claims purport to describe something, value judgments to offer rational

guidance. Hence, whereas in the case of factual claims a change of criteria is of no consequence, in the case of value judgments it is, for as a result different advice is given. Consequently, with value judgments but not with factual claims, as well as the problem of verification, we have the additional problem of validating the criteria—a point which, as Baier observes (p. 76), is too often overlooked by those who treat "ordinary usage" as authoritative. Generally and roughly speaking, criteria are validated by reference to the purpose of the things, etc. evaluated.

Turning from evaluation in general to practical reasoning in particular we learn (chap. 3) that the fundamental question is "What shall I (ought I to) do?" This is held to be equivalent to "What is the best thing I can do?" or "What course of action is supported by the best reasons?" To get the answer we have to deliberate, to which there are two stages: (1) surveying the facts and listing the relevant considerations pro and con—here we apply our "consideration-making beliefs", otherwise called "rules of reason" (p. 94), and (2) weighing the considerations—we have beliefs about the superiority of one sort of reason over another, "rules of superiority" (p. 99). Chapters 4 and 5 discuss with examples individual and social rules of reason.

Chapter 7: Our moral convictions comprise consideration-making beliefs (cf. Ross's *prima facie* duties, though the epistemological dress is different—p. 171) and, *pace* Ross, rules of superiority. Baier contends that there is no reason to reject the common belief that moral convictions may be true or false, and that there is a procedure for testing them—namely, that they are true "if they can be seen to be required or acceptable from the moral point of view" (p. 184). The moral point of view is the topic of chapter 8 (there is some shrewd and constructive criticism of Kant here and in chapter 9, §2, and Baier's language is in places reminiscent of Adam Smith's). It is characterized by a formal and a material condition. The formal condition for having adopted it is that a man must treat moral rules as principles meant for everybody, as opposed to rules of thumb or rules meant only for some favoured group: the material condition is that the rules must be for the good of everyone alike. Interesting distinctions, upon which it is impossible adequately to comment here, are drawn between primary and secondary moral rules and between absolute and social morality. It is maintained that there is no *a priori* reason why there should be but one true (social) morality (p. 181).

Chapter 10 argues that morality presupposes society, chapter 11 that we are moral, if we are, because we have been so trained, and chapter 12 purports to tell us why we should adopt the moral point of view. The reason is, as Hobbes held, that "Moralities are systems of principles whose acceptance by everyone as overruling the dictates of self-interest is in the interest of everyone alike. . . . Hobbes is also right in saying that the application of this system of rules is in accordance with reason only in social conditions" (p. 314). If we further ask why we should follow reason itself the answer is either that the question is "tautological" or, if significant, one to which the answer is obviously "Yes, because it pays" (p. 319). Unfortunately the earlier part of chapter 12 which is supposed to prove certain consideration-making beliefs and rules of superiority is marred by the "proofs" being presented as based upon the principle—surely a howler—that "Premises of an argument are true if the argument is valid and the conclusion true"! (p. 299).

The incidental discussions of "objective" and "subjective" duty (chap. 6, §1) and duties to oneself (chap. 9) are excellent.

I have noticed two misprints: on p. 150, line 1, read "plaintiff"; and on p. 287, line 17, read "polar".

R. F. ATKINSON.

Ethics and the Moral Life. By BERNARD MAYO. (London, Macmillan, 1958. Pp. 238. Price 21s.)

It is fortunate that the present dominance of "linguistic" philosophy has not discouraged the publication of numerous books which treat ethics in a properly ethical fashion, even if it may have rendered still-born many metaphysical systems. Among these books the present must be included as one of the ablest and most stimulating, but when I have said this I must add that I have put it down with a certain feeling of disappointment because of a lack of thoroughness and clearness in working out the author's views.

Like most philosophical writers on ethics today in this country, Mr. Mayo aims at a compromise between what may be roughly called objectivism and subjectivism. He argues reasonably that our ability to judge between different moral views does not necessarily imply that we have an idea of an "absolute standard", for we can compare two things directly without using a standard and even if we do use one there need not be anything absolute about it (pp. 39-40). But is the statement that one course is better than another ever objectively true? The author jumps far too readily from the denial of an idea of absolute perfection to the position that "all criteria of truth, validity, moral rightness and so on, are functions of the degree of agreement among classes of human beings" (p. 55). He has shown that our judgments in ethics might be capable of objective truth without our having an idea of the absolutely best, but not that they are objective only in the sense of being in accord with the tests human beings actually adopt. Despite his repudiation of "subjectivism" he neither allows for the claim, which seems to me implicit in ethical judgments, that the tests are right ones and not merely those actually used, nor makes nearly enough effort to settle his account with opposing views. He further maintains that judgments in ethics, while they have certain similarities to judgments of a fact-stating type, are different enough not to warrant the application to them of the term true. He certainly does more justice to what they have in common with genuinely true judgments than is the fashion today, so much so that one wonders why his conclusion was not rather that, while there were some points of difference, they had enough in common with them to be called true. He is very much influenced by the analogy of commands, and this leads him to adopt the Socratic paradox about wrongdoing. He denies that we can reject the authority of conscience, just because it is our own command, and reduces all wrongdoing either to inability to do what we believe right, or mistakes as to moral principles or their application (pp. 172-3). But such kinds of wrongdoing would be necessarily involuntary and do not at all correspond to what is meant by "sin". Since people do sin, the fact that it leads to such a conclusion seems to me a refutation of this theory of ethics. Incidentally I do not see why the author should be concerned about defending free will, as he is in the last chapter, if we really cannot do wrong except involuntarily. In that case, there is no room left for an undetermined moral free will, whether everything is caused or not.

Other points of special interest in the book are (a) the elaborate but rather inconclusive discussion of what is meant by a conflict between different elements in the self (ch. 8); (b) the excessively sharp but illuminating distinction between "personal" and "moral" relations (pp. 193-9); (c) the case for duty being essentially negative (pp. 201 ff.); (d) the arguments against determinism (pp. 228-30). I shall say a word about the latter, which, unlike most, are not drawn from ethics. The author contends (pp. 228-30) that it would be logically impossible to give a complete specification and therefore a complete prediction of a particular event, but it seems to me that this argument is

open to the following objection. It presupposes that things (events) have infinite properties. But if the fact that it would be logically impossible for us to describe them all is (as mathematicians agree) no argument against their being infinite, the fact that we could not describe them and therefore they could not all be predicted is surely no argument against their being all determined. Mayo also argues that at least human action must always contain an indescribable element on the ground that, if we set out to record all the events in, say, our own life, we must fail because we could not always record the act of recording but would be involved in an infinite regress. But it seems to me that all this argument shows is not that the events that actually occur in our life are unrecordable but only that, if we recorded them all, we should thereby produce new events and, if we recorded these, others *ad infinitum*. This could only be done in fact if we lived for ever, but Mayo has advanced no argument for saying that it would be *logically* impossible for us to live for ever. There would even then never be an infinite number of events recorded in our life (provided it had a beginning) only a finite number increasing continually. The frequent but inexcusable mistake that Kant's argument against suicide is that, if everybody took his own life when he felt like it, there would be nobody left to commit suicide, is repeated in this book (p. 59).

A. C. EWING.

A Modern Introduction to Moral Philosophy. By ALAN MONTEFIORE. (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958. Pp. vii + 213. Price 14s.)

This book is an introduction to "the sort of philosophy that is at present practised in this country". More than three-quarters of it consists in an extended examination of the question "What is a judgment of value?", Mr. Montefiore's aim being to introduce novices, not by summarizing traditional problems and arguments, but by doing some philosophy before their eyes. In spite of his disclaimer, there is a good deal that will be of interest to professional philosophers; but the book claims to be an introduction for novices and as such it must be judged.

On the credit side, the general layout is good. Each chapter ends with a summary of its own contents and raises doubts and objections that are taken up in the next. The thing has what musicians call "forward movement"; we always know where we are and how we got there. The objections are raised and dealt with in a thoroughly honest and thoughtful way; there is no attempt to score cheap victories, to make the issues seem less complex and difficult than they are or to invest the solutions with a spurious aura of finality. Montefiore, in short, gives a good picture of how an able and humble philosopher goes to work. After such a sentence there must be a "but" and here it is. I have grave doubts as to whether Montefiore will succeed in stimulating understanding, interest or sympathy in the minds of any of his readers, except for those few who have a natural bent for academic philosophy—and they could be trusted to go without a guide to the works on which Montefiore avowedly draws. In the first place, the reader, who is supposed, remember, to be a real beginner, needs a fuller explanation and justification of the aims and methods of linguistic analysis than Montefiore offers him before he will feel at home in, let alone sympathetic towards, the manoeuvres through which he is about to be guided. Montefiore points out that sooner or later, when you are grappling with a knotty moral problem, there may come a time when it is profitable to ask "But what does it mean to call something

good?". But this hardly prepares the reader either for the discovery that this question is going to occupy most of the book or for the two chapters which follow, chapters which are the driest, most difficult and (for quite different readers) among the most interesting in the book. The distinctions, analytic/synthetic and *a priori/a posteriori*, have to be developed; but in my view they could have been brought in more gently as the need for them arose.

Concentration on the central topic gives the whole book a thinness of quality which, though it would not surprise a philosopher, can hardly fail to dismay a beginner. Not only is there much more to moral philosophy, as traditionally conceived, than his central question—he would doubtless admit this; but it seems to me doubtful whether the central question itself can be properly discussed in such splendid isolation. This is a criticism, not of Montefiore's handling of his theme, but of the kind of philosophy with which he is concerned. Consider a list of the topics discussed in Aristotle's *Ethics*. That is also an introductory work, in the sense that topics are raised and set aside with no attempt at comprehensiveness of treatment or finality of solution; but Aristotle showed that it is possible to use such topics as the particular virtues and vices, voluntary action, deliberation and choice, pleasure, friendship, the varieties of wrong-doing, and the rival merits of sensuality, activity and contemplation as introductory material and, incidentally, as material on which to perform linguistic exercises.

My concern throughout is not for genuine philosophers, old or new, but for the larger public who may well have sufficient interest in morality to wish to dip into moral philosophy—the two are after all supposed to have some connection—but who lack the genuine philosopher's interest in logic. What sort of people would they be? My guess is that many of them will be already committed to and fairly knowledgeable about some set of moral beliefs, such as Christianity or Marxism, and that the rest, though not themselves committed, will start with the assumption that such systems of moral "truths" are essentially what moral philosophy is about. Academic philosophers may wring their hands; but such people, if they are wrong in looking for what they do look for, must be shown to be wrong. Montefiore is aware of this. For he sees that the objection to his central thesis (the absolute distinction of fact and value) which is most likely to be raised is that it is incompatible with "the existence of objective moral values". In these circumstances it simply will not do to relegate to a footnote the remark "I had better make it clear in passing that I do not think that Marxism, still less Christianity, need stand or fall with the acceptance or rejection of this crucial distinction". These world-views come in for a little more discussion in Chapter II; but it is still too short and perfunctory, and it could profitably have been expanded at the expense of some of the discussions of topics that no novice would be likely to raise at all. In an introductory book tactics are important; and Montefiore's seem to me mistaken. His very honesty lets him down here; for he makes his central thesis rest on certain views about logical questions which he admits candidly to be doubtful. But surely no one who is initially disposed to cling to "objective values" is going to be much shaken by an argument in the field of general logic (where he will feel himself to be at sea) which is admitted by its author to be less than conclusive. I cannot but feel that Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are a tactical mistake, both because they give an unhappy prominence to logical matters and also because Montefiore handles exactly the same material in two later chapters on *Ought and Is* in a manner which is (I think) much better and is certainly better fitted to attract the attention and engage the sympathy of his inexpert readers.

Leaving the inexperienced reader to his fate, I should like to end with one comment on Montefiore's central argument. In Chapter 4 he tries to show that judgments of value are not statements, and the way for this is prepared in Chapter 3 where the logical distinctions mentioned above are deployed. After a good deal of discussion Montefiore frankly adopts two more or less arbitrary decisions: (a) that to be either analytic or synthetic is the hall-mark of a genuine statement, and (b) that the phrase "synthetic *a priori*" is a contradiction in terms. He then shows in Chapter 4 that judgments of value are neither analytic nor synthetic and, hence, cannot be statements. But this argument seems to me unsatisfactory on several counts. In the first place, since Montefiore has already said that analytic statements, being degenerate cases, can only be called "statements" by courtesy, why should the same courtesy not be extended to analytic evaluations? If "tall men are tall" is allowed to count as a (vacuous) statement, why should not "good men are good" count as a (vacuous) evaluation? Secondly the argument that value judgments are not synthetic is largely drawn from the fact that they cannot be said to ascribe a "property" to an "object". Now this argument, it seems to me, will stand on its own feet as an argument for distinguishing (synthetic) statements from (synthetic) evaluations. It is true that not all statements ascribe properties to objects; but this is certainly a typical role of statements, and I suspect that, if need be, parallel arguments could be adduced to show that value judgments could not be identified with statements of any other kind. (Anyhow, Montefiore finds it necessary, in the end, to rest his distinction on the reader's willingness to admit that it is one thing to describe a situation, another to be for or against it.) But Montefiore backs up his argument with another to the effect that judgments of value are not *a posteriori*—we do not need to conduct experiments or count cases to discover that cruelty is (or is not) bad. But even if this is true—and the issue is more complicated than it looks, since experience can lead us to modify our judgments of value—this argument only works if we have agreed to accept decision (b); and this may well raise doubts as to the propriety of accepting that decision. For it could be argued that, on Montefiore's final account of value judgments, they are synthetic *a priori*; synthetic in that, except in degenerate cases, they connect a described situation with an evaluation in a manner which is not logically necessary, and *a priori* in the sense that they are universal and, in a rather peculiar sense, necessary. I cannot but feel that Montefiore's journey through logical space was philosophically unnecessary in addition to being a tactical error. Could not the ramifications of the distinction between describing and evaluating have been explored in a more straightforward way without such reliance on the terminology of the schools, a terminology which was largely invented by men who wanted, not to explicate language but to replace it by a calculus? In Chapters 8 and 9 Montefiore shows that it can.

P. H. NOWELL-SMITH.

The Concept of Morality. By PRATIMA BOWES. (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1959. Pp. 220. Price 21s.)

This book is of special interest as the first, or almost the first, on ethics written from an objectivist point of view which takes account of the criticisms and theories of Wisdom, Hare, Nowell-Smith, Toulmin, Strawson and Popper, and there are certainly many points of value to be found in it. To take first a central one, the authoress makes a skilful attempt to defend the concept of

"intuition" against recent as well as against long-standing objections (pp. 66-84). She attributes a great deal of the dissatisfaction felt with this concept to the notion that, if intuition occurs at all, it must occur as an experience quite distinct from any other or, contrariwise, to the likening of it to sense-perception, which would suggest that the object of intuition resembles that of the latter in being given and forced on us, a view she rejects. The word intuition is here used in a wide sense so as to cover the recognition of a complex pattern in what is empirically observed, as when we, e.g., recognize that somebody displays the characteristic of industriousness, but a naturalist account of ethics is certainly not intended.

When it comes to describing the exact position maintained by Mrs. Bowes, I must say that I miss a certain decisiveness and clarity. She rightly insists that moral reasoning is not to be invalidated by pointing out that it is neither deduction nor induction, but when she replies by insisting that, e.g., geometrical reasoning too cannot be fitted into either of these classes (pp. 52-3) and likens the concepts of ethics to theoretical concepts of science such as, e.g., light-waves (p. 46), which also do not stand directly for facts but rather for ways of looking at facts, I think she is still assimilating ethical thought too much to the descriptive and the scientific. These scientific concepts, even if not directly verifiable, still help us to predict what is verifiable, and serve the purpose, eventually at least, of factual description, not the very different purpose of evaluation. Mrs. Bowes seems to hold that the justification of moral concepts lies in their ability to "explain" human action, but is there not a confusion here? It is certain that the human actions with which we are acquainted in experience could not be adequately explained without attributing to the agents moral beliefs, but it is irrelevant to the purpose of the explanation of the actions whether these beliefs are true or false, justified or unjustified. Provided only the belief actually is held, a false moral belief will explain human action as well as a true one would do. She insists that value-characteristics are not to be discerned "independently of any specific approach to them", but only, "when we take up a certain attitude towards them" (pp. 72-3), but leaves it unclear whether the characteristics thus discerned are supposed by her to be there independently of this attitude and only discovered as a result of taking the attitude or whether they are held to be created by taking the attitude. Her criticisms of her opponents, while on some occasions very apt, on others do them much less than justice. Thus I think she treats Stevenson's account of ethics as more purely emotive than it is and ignores his references to the practical functions of ethics as distinct from the function of merely expressing emotion. She objects to his account that it is often easier to change a man's attitude by getting him to look at the matter at issue from a different point of view than by suggesting to him by the emotive tone of words that he should change his feelings (p. 99), but would Stevenson deny this? She ignores the possibility that moral judgments might be capable of being true or false without being either explanatory of fact or descriptive. She makes a sharp distinction between general moral principles, in regard to which she maintains an objective view, and particular moral judgments, in regard to which she seems rather to favour a decision theory, but fails to develop adequately what is in some respects an illuminating suggestion but cannot be accepted as it stands. The point of which she has hold, which may well be right, is that, even if some general principles are objectively true, where an act falls under two conflicting principles there are cases where there is no conceivable rational means of inferring what ought to be done and the matter is just one for individual decision. But one might object that a general *prima facie* principle (she accepts the concept of "*prima facie*" duties) can hardly be true without

entailing the *truth* of any particular judgments which fall under it and do not fall under any other conflicting *prima facie* principle, and further there are many cases of particular decisions between conflicting *prima facie* duties where it is as certainly true that we ought to comply with the one rather than the other as anything is in ethics, e.g. a conflict between the *prima facie* duty to save a man's life and that to keep an appointment to play tiddlywinks.

The book tackles skilfully a number of ethical questions besides the fundamental ones mentioned above, the relation of good to happiness, the notion of justice, categorical and hypothetical imperatives, motives and consequences, praise and blame with reference to the determinist controversy, and on all these has something good to say.

A. C. EWING.

Moral Values in the Ancient World. By JOHN FERGUSON. (London: Methuen, 1958. Pp. 256. Price 22s. 6d. net.)

The contents of this book bear out its title: it is neither a systematic presentation of the history of Greek ethics nor a description of Greek and Hellenistic social customs but an exposition of the dominant concepts and ideals of the "ancient" world, chiefly Greek but Roman and Jewish as well, as expressed in religion, philosophy, literature and politics. The author—who is Professor of Classics in University College, Ibadan—is not only intimately at home in all spheres of the Graeco-Roman world but, thanks to his expert and lively treatment of its themes, able to arouse a satisfying feeling of familiarity also in readers whose acquaintance with that world is little more than elementary. His interest is humanistic and philosophical rather than philological or historical. He approaches most of the standard concepts that come under discussion with an analytical intent and a keen sense of distinctions. The analysis is not always rigorous, but the author has much to say on every point and never resorts to woolly generalities or cheap rhetoric. His book is not only substantial and very readable but stimulating and in parts provocative.

In keeping with the filiation of ethical concepts rather than in a strictly chronological order, the author advances from the Homeric Age to the Roman Empire, concluding with Judaism and the emergence of Christianity. (It is a pity that he does not bestow even a cursory glance upon Egypt and Persia.) What may strike the reader most vividly is the manifoldness and fluidity of the moral thought of mankind, side by side with the enduring validity and meaningfulness of its basic motifs—across all distances in time and space, in spite of all change of emphasis. And, further, the almost ever-present tendency of men to distinguish morality from religion and yet to postulate an intimate fusion between the two.

It should be added that Professor Ferguson's thought is guided by a strong and overt, though undogmatic and unsentimental, Christian bias. He sees in at least one pre-eminent set of Greek values—"philia", "eros", "philanthropia" and "homonoia", along with Roman "pietas", "humanitas" and "clementia"—and in Jewish "chesed" (Divine clemency or grace), an imperfect anticipation of, and groping towards, the comprehensive but transcendent concept of Christian love. I may best put it in his own words (Introduction):

Christianity can thus be seen as the culmination and conclusion of the old order as well as the beginning of the new. The method by which Christianity spread suggests that it served to fulfil the aspirations of the world

to which it came. One potent factor in helping it to spread was the concept of Christian love or *agape*. I have thus come to earlier evaluations to some extent against the background of that *agape* which gave satisfaction where they had failed, and this presupposition affects the presentation. But the presupposition arises from historical fact, not religious dogma. . . . What has *agape* got that the rest haven't got? The details of the answer lie in the remainder of this study. But the investigation forced certain conclusions which are written back into the earlier chapters.

The relation with specially Christian motifs of other classic standards, such as the "cardinal virtues" and "self-sufficiency" linked to "apathia" or "ataraxia", remains much less clear. Again, the author cannot help admitting that, apparently, men are in need of more articulate moral rules whose meaning does not depend on their possible consonance with Love. The jubilant experience of *agape* was, indeed, soon to be followed by what he calls (p. 242) "a story of decay".

AUREL KOLNAI.

The Logical Problem of Induction. By G. H. von WRIGHT. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Second revised edition, 1957. Pp. xii + 249. Price 25s.)

The first edition (1941) of this important book having been out of print for some time, the publication of a second and revised one is welcome. I shall confine my remarks to its thesis and the chief changes since the first edition, which consist mainly in some substantial additions.

Von Wright distinguishes the critical from the constructive task of inductive philosophy. The former is to dispose of the traditional problem of the justification of induction, or Hume's Problem, and it is with this that the book is chiefly concerned. Von Wright deals with it summarily (pp. 178 ff.). He maintains that Hume's scepticism regarding induction may be formulated in the proposition "It is [logically] impossible to guarantee . . . that an unknown instance of the property *A* will also exhibit the property *B*, if *A* and *B* are different properties". His solution of the problem consists in arguing that this proposition is no more than a tautology on account of the meanings of *unknown*, *different* and *guarantee*. For these, he says, are as follows: an instance of *A* is unknown if we do not know of any property (such as *B*) that it will possess apart from *A*; two properties are logically different when the presence or absence of the one does not entail the presence or absence of the other; and we can only guarantee that an *A* will be *B* if "An *A* will be *B*" is analytic.

This solution strikes me as too true to be good. The trouble lies, I suggest, in von Wright's formulation of the problem. For it seems to me that the problem of the justification of induction is rightly rendered: "Why are (or, What makes) some (but not all) inductions justified (or good, or probable, etc.)?" And this question cannot be disposed of so easily; moreover, in attempting to answer it, one naturally becomes involved in what von Wright calls the constructive task of inductive philosophy.

Von Wright holds that, whereas the critical task of inductive philosophy is concerned with the meaning and use of words, its constructive task "consists in the application of formal logic and mathematics to the analysis of inductive propositions" (p. 183). He admits, however, that his attempts on this second task in this book are only preliminary sketches.

The first of them consists in a reformulation of traditional ideas (notably Mill's Methods of Agreement and Difference) about induction by elimination

in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions (pp. 64 ff.). The work is admittedly based on Broad's discussion of the principles of demonstrative induction. The treatment is always highly competent and often interesting; yet I remain unconvinced by von Wright's claim that it is "a testimony [to] the value of logistics when used as a means of analysing and reinterpreting 'classical' doctrines and ideas on philosophical questions" (p. 61r).

Von Wright's second application of the methods of logistics is to inductive probability, and the chapter devoted to this (ch. VI) is the most important addition to the revised edition. His object is to show that certain received ideas about what makes inductions probable, e.g. the number and variety of the observed instances and the scope of the generalization, "can be formalized and made exact within the 'ordinary' probability-calculus" (p. 183). His method is to systematize and justify (i.e. prove) the rules in which these ideas are naturally expressed. He proceeds by constructing an axiomatic Abstract Calculus of Probability of the logistic type as found in, e.g. Keynes. He considers that there are two possible interpretations of this Abstract Calculus, namely, the frequency limit model and the range model. He then deduces the rules as theorems, e.g. his principal Theorem of Confirmation: "If the initial probability of a generalization is not minimal, its *a posteriori* probability increases with each new confirmation which is not maximally probable relative to the previous confirmations" (p. 119).

This line of approach will be familiar enough to readers of Keynes and Nicod. But it seems to me to be open to criticism on three fundamental counts. First, as to systematization: I do not believe that the various rules determining degree of inductive probability lend themselves to deduction as theorems from an axiom-set. Significantly, von Wright confesses his inability to accomplish anything of the kind in the case of simplicity, which he holds (wrongly, as I think) to be a criterion of inductive probability (p. 136). Simplicity in this sense applies of course to functional generalizations, a species of which are what Campbell calls numerical laws, such as Boyle's and Ohm's. It is a serious defect in this book that von Wright says next to nothing about this important sort of inductions and considers only universal and proportional (or statistical) generalizations. Second, as to justification: one can rightly speak of justifying, i.e. proving, a proposition when one deduces it from true premisses, but surely not when one deduces it from premisses merely hypothetically assumed. More fundamentally, I question whether the whole programme makes sense. The problem of eliciting the criteria of degree of inductive probability which are implicit in our judgments about the probability of generalizations is a genuine one. But I submit that the supposed ulterior problem of justifying or proving the rules expressing these criteria is not. Finally, von Wright's approach leads him into an untenable position on the crucial question of the meaning of *inductive probability*. This is that *probability* is defined implicitly by the axioms of the Abstract Calculus, and explicitly in terms of its two possible interpretations, relative frequency and range. Von Wright also depreciates the importance of the distinction in meaning between casual and inductive probability, since it is immaterial from his formal point of view. However, I do not believe that it is possible to explain or explicitly define the meaning of *inductive probability* in terms of relative frequency or of range, though I have no space to argue the matter here. Further, von Wright's depreciation of the distinction between the two meanings of *probable* seems to me retrograde; though this is not to deny that any adequate account of the meaning of *inductive probability* must indicate the resemblances as well as the differences between this and the other sorts or concepts of probability. One illustration of von Wright's unsatisfactory

treatment of this question must suffice. After noting that it has long been held that an essential difference between casual (or mathematical) and inductive (or philosophical) probability is that degrees of the former are expressed by fractions whereas degrees of the latter are not, he proceeds deliberately to ignore the issue (p. 92). But difficulties are not overcome by being ignored.

Ch. VIII contains interesting new critical material. Here, von Wright considers the fashionable thesis, or rather theses, that induction, like honesty, is the best policy. After some discussion of the ideas of Peirce, he gives a neat simplified account of Reichenbach's thesis that induction is the best method of reasoning about the unobserved because it is a self-correcting process, and criticizes it on grounds which are now, I think, generally accepted (pp. 162 ff.). Consider a proportional generalization about an infinite population of the form " $n\%$ A are B ". And grant for argument's sake that *proportion in an infinite population* is to be understood in terms of *limiting value of relative frequency in an infinite sequence* (see pp. 5 f.). Now, if there does in fact exist a definite proportion, in the sense explained, of A that are B , then it is demonstrable that there also exists a point of convergence after which the observed proportion of A that are B will not differ from $n\%$ by more than a given amount. If, therefore, we know that there exists such a definite proportion in the sense defined, then we also know that an estimate of that proportion from a sample consisting of a sequence of fractions of relative frequency will approximate increasingly to the true proportion until the point of convergence is reached. However, these facts do not help us at all in making such generalizations in practice, since we never in fact know that there exists a proportion in the sense defined, nor consequently whether there is a point of convergence; nor finally, if there is such a point, whether we have yet to reach it or have passed it.

Von Wright concludes with an elegant short essay directed against the thesis of Kneale and Braithwaite that induction is the best method of reaching conclusions about the unobserved for reasons other than its alleged power of approximating indefinitely to the truth. His criticism is that the proposition "Induction is the best way of reaching conclusions about the unobserved" is a tautology. For the most plausible, though not perhaps the only, account of the descriptive meaning or criterion of *best* policy in this context is *reasoned* policy; and it looks as though the only meaning that can be attached to a *reasoned* policy in this context is an *inductive* policy, since *reason* can here only mean observed facts which confirm some inductive policy. He makes the interesting point that reasoned non-inductive policies logically must yet also be inductive policies. Thus, suppose that I know that 45 of this 100 observed A are B . Then, it may be reasonable for me to predict inductively that 45 of the next 100 A will be B . However, it may also be reasonable for me to predict "counter-inductively" that ditto, although 50 and not 45 of this 100 observed A are B . But the only conditions in which it is reasonable for me to do so are when I have inductive grounds, such as that 55 and not 50 of the preceding 100 observed A were B , and that 60 and not 55 of the preceding 100 observed A were B . . . , etc. It will be noticed that von Wright uses the same technique to dispose of the thesis of Kneale and Braithwaite as to dispose of that which he imputes to Hume. Its application to the former seems to me as convincing as its application to the latter is unconvincing.

The notes contain a wealth of matter that is mainly of historical interest. The chief addition here is a long note on the role of induction and hypothesis in science (pp. 206 ff.), which takes the form of a just and timely protest against the extravagant claim of Popper and Wisdom that induction plays

no part at all in science. The useful bibliography has been amended and brought up to date.

The critical weaknesses in von Wright's inductive philosophy are unoriginality in respect of basic ideas and a misconceived method. What he calls the constructive part of it consists essentially in an application of Carnap's and Hempel's techniques of formalization and "rational reconstruction" to the fundamental ideas of Keynes and Broad. As I have said, this approach proves barren. In the critical part of it, indeed, he adopts a different analytic or linguistic technique. Yet even here, his conception of linguistic analysis is the older therapeutic one, in which the aim is not so much to solve philosophical problems as to dissolve them. What is missing is any prosecution of the thought that the constructive as well as the critical task of inductive philosophy may profitably be undertaken by the methods of modern analysis. Consequently, the chief value of the book, which is considerable, lies in expositions and criticisms of others' views. Von Wright indeed disclaims any scholarship in the history of learning or thought (p. ix); but in this he is too modest, since it is plain that he has mastered at least as much as any man living of the extensive and often difficult literature in this field. Readers in the English-speaking world are likely to find his remarks on Continental works particularly helpful.

My last criticism concerns style. Excluding the notes, von Wright deals with this whole tangle of problems in well under 200 pages. But he achieves this result by a compression which is often excessive. In this respect, the book seems still to bear the marks of its origin in a doctor's dissertation. For the examining professor, familiar (it may be hoped) with the copious literature, may well admire and commend the deftness with which von Wright picks out the essentials in complicated controversies and dismisses them in a terse paragraph or a single sentence. (See, e.g., his remarks on the relation of probability to irregularity or randomness (p. 99) or on criticisms of inverse probability (p. 113)). The undergraduate or graduate student, on the other hand, to whom this book is very frequently recommended, is only too likely to find these laconic comments unintelligible. And since what von Wright has to say on all these matters is well worth understanding, this is a pity.

J. P. DAY.

Whitehead's Metaphysics: An Introductory Exposition. By IVOR LECLERC.
(London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1958. Pp. xiii + 234. Price 21s.)

Dr. Leclerc prefaces his exposition with an account of the problems in the philosophy of science—dissatisfaction, in particular, with the fundamentals of Newtonian cosmology—that first led Whitehead into his metaphysical explorations. The discussion, in Chapter III, of Whitehead's view of metaphysics ("... the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted") brings out his tough, uncompromising rationalism; his rejection of any plurality of independent ultimate concepts. Each must be logically involved in all the others.

It is this intricate mutual relatedness of the key concepts in Whitehead's metaphysics that above all else sets its expositor such a severe challenge. As in introducing a large piece of furniture into a house with a narrow entrance: dismembering may result in damage, but it simply will not go in in one piece. Dr. Leclerc, however, manages his dissection and reconstruction most skillfully. The reader never feels that over-large sections are being dealt with at

one time. The *pace* of exposition is never too rapid: nor does it ever drag. Cross-references and recapitulations are just frequent enough to bring out the extraordinary unity and coherence of the whole structure.

Part One introduces the basic ideas of "actual entity" and "the ontological principle": Part Two the doctrine of "process", "creativity", "concrescence", "the forms of definiteness" ("Eternal Objects"), "potentiality", "relativity", "objectification". Part Three is concerned with Whitehead's doctrine of "experience", "feeling" and "prehension". Part Four consolidates, amplifies and integrates these concepts into a "metaphysical description" of the universe. Leclerc does not neglect to mark out the bearings of Whiteheadian notions upon the main metaphysical systems of the past—a procedure that clarifies a good many otherwise enigmatic moves. Illustrations—where provided—further clarify: but one wishes they had been provided more plentifully, so as to break the almost unrelieved high abstraction of the argument, and to relate the metaphysical language to the language of everyday at a greater number of points.

This is not conceived as a popularization of Whitehead; nor is it a work for the beginner in philosophy. It is "introductory" in the sense that it cuts away some of Whitehead's complexity, and defers critical comment and assessment to a subsequent volume. But, unlike so many "introductions", it is very far from being a free fantasia on its theme. Leclerc keeps scrupulously close to Whitehead's own texts, his characteristic procedure being to quote from them (often at length) and to interpret, sentence by sentence.

One does not have to be a convinced Whiteheadian, or even a convinced metaphysician in Whitehead's sense, to admire both the expository craftsmanship of the book and the power of the system it sets forth.

RONALD W. HEPBURN.

Logic Without Metaphysics. By ERNEST NAGEL. (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956. Pp. xviii + 433. Price \$6.)

This is not a new book but a companion volume to "Sovereign Reason", a collection of papers and reviews written by Nagel over a period of twenty years or so. Like "Sovereign Reason" the volume has obvious virtues and defects. It is admirably designed to bring out the main views to which Nagel subscribes—his belief in naturalism, instrumentalism and contextualism, his faith in scientific method tempered with an unwillingness to see the methods appropriate to certain sciences applied to all fields of knowledge without discrimination, and his interest in and belief in the value of formal logic (an interest which sometimes sits rather uneasily on the shoulders of his contextualism). The general impression that one gets is of the sanity and reasonableness of Nagel's approach to philosophy, the acuteness of his judgment and the clarity of the presentation of his views. At the same time it is not altogether clear what is the point of the volume as a whole. The policy of publishing collections of articles is at present a fashionable one, but it is a policy which should be carried out with discrimination. In this volume the articles are put together without regard to chronological order, and the only indication of their source of origin is a couple of pages of bibliographical notes tucked away at the end. Moreover, a third of the book is given up not to articles but to reviews. Apart from the dubiousness of the idea of republishing reviews at all, brief and sketchy as they generally are, the reviews collected here are taken from a great variety of journals, some technical, some definitely not

so, and the books reviewed range equally widely in their character. One may get from them a general impression of Nagel's cast of mind, but little else.

Of the articles, one on "Truth and Knowledge of the Truth" is taken from a symposium and is mainly devoted to a criticism of the views of two other symposiasts. Taken in isolation from their contributions the article is of little value and it is difficult to justify its republication. There is also a long article originally published in 1936 giving Nagel's impressions and appraisal of Analytical Philosophy in Europe at the time. The article has a certain academic interest (it is always of interest, historical at any rate, to read a contemporary's reaction to a movement), and Nagel's comments are often shrewd. But in 1936 analytical philosophy was in a period of transition and Nagel would no doubt have wanted to make different comments today. Once again its inclusion requires justification.

In several other articles Nagel sets out to defend naturalism, and in doing so he is fighting a battle which is perhaps unfamiliar to us in this country today. It is a battle in which Nagel is very definitely on one side. His case is well argued, but in general terms only, and the discussion rarely gets down to details. We are presented with a good account of a general philosophical point of view, but we are given little insight into the ways in which this point of view might be applied to specific philosophical problems. The task of philosophy, we are told, is the analysis of categories, but the validity of this analysis is an empirical matter; consequently, in carrying out linguistic analysis attention must be paid to the use of words in definite contexts and as applied to a definite subject-matter. In this last respect there are points of affinity between naturalism and Wittgenstein's approach to philosophy, and it is interesting to see that, commenting on Wittgenstein's approach in 1936, Nagel wrote that he had not found it altogether new.

Perhaps the two most interesting articles included are those on "Logic without ontology" and "Symbolism and Science". In the first of these Nagel is concerned to argue against those who hold that logic tells us something about reality. One view of logic, the usual contextualist view, is that logic is the study of the methods employed in the acquisition of knowledge, and this view Nagel himself espouses. But he sees value in formal logic also, and this is less easy to square with contextualism. He takes the view that systems of formal logic comprise regulative principles which provide the norms to which we should look in passing from one statement used in context to another. The choice between different principles is like a choice between different instruments used to attain a certain end. Nagel's position is an interesting one but it is not here worked out in any detail.

In the second article, Nagel distinguishes between natural signs and symbols, and amongst symbols he distinguishes between those which are descriptive, those which are auxiliary and those which he calls "maxims". The function of auxiliary symbols is to serve as connectives between other symbols, and the concepts of scientific theories are said to fulfil this role. By maxims he means those symbols which formulate rules for the employment of other symbols, and he has in mind definitions, postulates of theories, and regulative principles generally. Why these should be called "symbols" is not altogether clear; certainly they are not on a par with the other types of symbol already discussed. But perhaps the main interest of the chapter is an admirable account of the instrumentalist view of scientific theories. Nagel's clarity is here exemplary.

Amongst the reviews there are some of books dealing with aspects of the social sciences. Nagel has little of a positive nature to contribute here, but

his strictures both on pseudo-science and on obscurantism in this field are welcome. There is indeed much of interest in this volume, and there is much that is extremely attractive. But it scarcely adds up to a book. More is the pity, for the virtues of Nagel's way of thinking are real.

D. W. HAMLYN.

Lessing's Theological Writings. Selections in translation with an Introductory Essay by HENRY CHADWICK, B.D. (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1956. Pp. 110. Price 8s. 6d.)

Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit by S. T. COLERIDGE. Reprinted from the third edition 1853 with the Introduction by JOSEPH HENRY GREEN and the Note by SARA COLERIDGE. Edited with an Introductory Note by H. St. J. HART, B.D. (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1956. Pp. 118. Price 8s. 6d.)

The Natural History of Religion by DAVID HUME. Edited with an Introduction by H. E. Root. (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1956. Pp. 76. Price 6s. 6d.)

These volumes are the first in a new series of "reprinted writings of particular theological and historical importance, selected from works published in the past three centuries which are no longer in print or easy of access but which are concerned with questions of present interest". The need for such a series is well exhibited in the choices with which it is launched, for it seems to me unlikely that even reasonably well informed students will realize how much material that bears very closely on controversies of today may be found in writings like the present ones to which even the keenest do not find their way very often, and which others may be apt to disregard altogether. Undergraduates, and their teachers, ought to be particularly helped by having these neat and pleasantly produced volumes within their reach (and the reach of their purses) without the tedious labour, out of the question in most cases, of hunting for the appropriate material in the larger libraries. There are also discerning and informative introductions to each volume, and one hopes the general editor, Mr. Henry Chadwick, will be equally well served in the future.

One perspective which is very likely to be corrected by perusal of these volumes is that in which we usually view the so-called Deists of the eighteenth century. For while these are apt to be rather summarily dismissed today as holding a position of little appeal to either theologians or philosophers, the proper study of them would show that, in fact, far from subscribing to one or a few definite and unacceptable tenets, such as that of a remote Creator in no way involved in the particular course which events are taking, they were a very varied group of writers, characterized more by a certain common attitude than by agreed tenets, and that they canvassed in instructive ways many of the answers to religious questions which occur to us also at a time when the issue of truth and knowledge in religion has been sharpened by new demands for clarity and reasonableness. Lessing is a good example here, for, while it might not be easy to class him as a Deist, his religious writings arise in the context which gave its impetus to the Deist movement and owe much to it. Not many, incidentally, of those who know of Lessing as an outstanding figure in the history of literature and literary criticism will have appreciated the interesting and illuminating position he holds in the history of religious controversy. As Mr. Chadwick rightly stresses, Lessing never made it altogether clear where he himself stood in the religious debates in which he

participated, partly because he sometimes adopted the very questionable expedient of supporting a view in order to bring out its imperfections better and hasten its destruction, partly because he had much estimable intellectual caution, and partly because he had not worked his way through those views of his contemporaries with which he was dissatisfied to a firm position of his own. Traditionalist dogmas, and especially the belief that the evangelists were wholly preserved from error by supernatural inspiration, he certainly rejected, and he could raise without embarrassment the question of the sources of the Gospels because he held that the Bible "should be read like any other book". He sympathized with the Deist thesis that the simple and genuine Christianity of brotherly love had been corrupted by the conventional religion of priests, sacrifices and mysteries, but he also urged very forcefully against Reimarus and others that anyone who refines such mysteries altogether out of his religion "has as good as no religion at all. For what is a revelation which reveals nothing?" Lessing's support of orthodoxy was not merely the bewildering tactics of hastening the orthodox along the way to their inevitable end, he also felt there was a case to be made against the out and out rationalism of some Deists. As Mr. Chadwick sums it up: "To his mind there appear to be too few possibilities. The orthodox were fools. The liberal theologians of Halle were knaves. The enlightened could be too cleverly superficial." And in the attempt to steer a middle course between these extremes, in rejecting the apologetics which are based on miracles and the surprising expansion of Christianity, and in insisting, more constructively, that there is a divine disclosure in a historical process in which human frailty as well as divine immanence has its part, he anticipates many moves which we have also to make today. The view of prophecy as inspired insight into the meaning of contemporary events may not have been intended by Lessing in quite the way we would wish to stress it, but it is again a pointer in the right direction; and these are only some of the ways in which the religious thinker of today may find the way forward better defined for him by considering the various turns which the search for an adequate alternative to authoritarian orthodoxy took in the work of an ingenious and sometimes capricious thinker like Lessing who had also at bottom a very profound love of truth. In any case, even when he is not particularly helpful, Lessing is a very interesting figure.

Coleridge follows Lessing very closely in insisting that we derive most benefit from the Bible if we read it as we would read "any other body of ancient writings", and he devotes his *Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit* almost entirely to a sustained attack on the doctrine of the literal inspiration of the Bible. So close indeed is the affinity with Lessing here that it was thought wise to include in the second edition of the work in 1849 (the first publication was also posthumous, in 1840) an introduction by J. H. Green defending Coleridge, quite successfully, against the charge of plagiarism. This introduction is reproduced in the present edition and along with it we have a substantial essay by Sara Coleridge replying to strictures on the *Confessions* made in an article in the *English Review*. The *Confessions* have not much that is of positive interest today, although Professor Basil Willey is fully justified in his insistence that much that was unifying in later controversies on the same themes could have been avoided had due heed been given to Coleridge's views. Anyone who has to deal with a fundamentalist may well summon Coleridge to his aid, but he will also find that he gives some hostages to fortune in that Coleridge appears to allow that where the scriptural writer himself claims that the actual words were given to him to record by the "special command of God", the claim must be taken at its face

value. Elsewhere we are to rely on "the irresistible evidence of the Divine Spirit" which the Scriptures bear to the "soul and conscience of every Christian man". No analysis of the nature of this "evidence" is offered, and the willingness to accept the claim to automatic inspiration in some part of Scriptures shows how little Coleridge had advanced in the *Confessions* towards any constructive solution of the problem of revelation and scriptural authority. Much repetition and a typically too elaborate style will also tend to alienate readers of today. But the Note by Sara Coleridge is an altogether different matter. Here arguments are very clearly marshalled and neatly stated, and if I had to deal with a fundamentalist, I should be much more eager to put him on to Sara's defence of Coleridge than to the original letters in which the *Confessions* consist. Indeed I can think of nothing better for the purpose. In addition, the "Note" has strikingly up-to-date features which should give it considerable topical interest to the student of today, for example the insistence that we should not merely defend our views by argument, but also scrutinize statements carefully to see whether they have genuine meaning at all, and reject them when they only masquerade as meaningful utterances. Anyone who wishes to follow this up further should turn to the discussion of transubstantiation on page 98 of the present volume, or of "daemoniac" possession on page 102, or of literal inerrancy on page 112. In view of these anticipations of recent techniques (and much sensible restraint in the use of them) as well as for wise observations on such questions as private judgment versus public opinion, I do not accept at all the judgment of the editor of the present collection who regards both the "Note" and Green's Introduction as merely "period pieces of some tediousness" which the specialist may find "convenient to have at hand".

The *Natural History of Religion* by Hume will, presumably, be much better known than the works just noticed. It is a minor classic, and this verdict will not be withdrawn if one finds oneself in sharp disagreement with the author at many of the main points. The essay has all the celebrated clarity and incisiveness of Hume, and it provides us, in a short and readable form, with the substance of the beliefs about the origins of religion which dominated the first attempts of later and more scientific writers to account for the rise and development of religion. Hume's view, in brief, is that the rational considerations which incline civilized and sophisticated people to belief in God, the consideration of unity and design in the universe, for example, have no bearing on its origin. Religion began in crude superstition as "the acknowledgement of several limited and imperfect deities". These were invoked to account for occurrences of whose natural causes barbarians could have no understanding. Men find themselves in early times at the mercy of "secret and unknown causes, whose operation is often unexpected and always unaccountable". Imagination is employed in forming ideas of these powers and as "there is a universal tendency among mankind to conceive all beings like themselves", men were "necessarily led into polytheism". To think of one Controller of the Universe would be "to overleap, at one bound, the vast interval which is interposed between the human and divine nature", and this requires much sophistication and culture. The gods of barbarians have also often "ungainly forms", and far from thinking in terms of one Supreme Being, the vulgar tend to defy consistency by yielding supremacy in turn to several deities. Moreover, even after the rise of theistic ideas, men are often apt to sink into idolatry. But if they had been led into theistic beliefs by rational considerations and not by higher and higher encomiums of the deities they wished to placate, lapses would not be possible. We have, in short, this dilemma: If religious opinions have been originally "founded on arguments so clear and obvious as

to carry conviction with the generality of mankind, the same arguments, which at first diffused the opinions, will still preserve them in their original purity. If the arguments be more abstruse, and more remote from vulgar apprehension, the opinions will always be confined to a few persons", and theism could therefore hardly be "the primary religion of human race, and afterwards, by its corruption, give birth to polytheism". The answers to arguments of this kind are too involved for me to give more than a hint of them here, but the clue will, I think, be found by looking more closely at the "leap" over "the interval between the human and divine nature" which Hume mentions and by heeding especially what he himself tells us about it, namely that it has to be taken "at one bound". Perhaps this makes the leap less sophisticated than Hume, who thought of it in terms of involved reflections on the rationality of nature and the argument from design, ever understood. And once we have found our answer to Hume at this point we may discover that the phenomena of early religion of which, with very little systematic knowledge (in the case of heno-theism, for example) he seems to have had much shrewd appreciation, may be fitted into a very different scheme of things from the absolute contrast we find in Hume between, on the one hand, the crude superstitious religion which thrives on mystery and unreason, and, on the other, the completely rational religion which will have nothing mysterious and wholly beyond comprehension. From anthropology, theology and philosophy, we have recently had insights which help us to draw profounder and subtler conclusions about religion than those of Hume, but it is none-the-less hard to think of a more concise and forthright statement of the views to which we have today to find an alternative than is provided by him. His arguments are often much more to the point than those of later animists, and for these reasons it is well to have his treatment of the subject available as a separate work in its present form. I have already set as an exercise for my own students a comparison of the present volume with Otto's *The Idea of the Holy*, and this is one further illustration of the many ways in which the launching of the present series of religious writings should be a considerable boon to teachers of religious subjects.

I should add that Mr. Root's editing of Hume is scholarly and instructive.

H. D. LEWIS.

Reasons and Faiths. By NINIAN SMART. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958. Pp. 211. Price 25s.)

By now it would be commonly acknowledged that religious discourse is logically variegated. Admitting this, can we get any line on its structure?

What Mr. Smart does in his book is to give us some clues to this structure by distinguishing certain important logical strands within the discourse of various religions, chiefly non-Christian. Of these strands I think we may say that he considers the two most important to be those which have their basis in a numinous and mystical religion respectively; on the one hand there is language relating to our worship of the awesome (typified perhaps by Islam); on the other hand there is language relating to mysticism, of which Mr. Smart takes the Buddhist experience of Nirvana as typical. At the same time, Mr. Smart recognizes that any such separation, if taken as the last word, would much over-simplify, if not misrepresent, the case, and that some people have, for example, described the mystical goal as "union with the divine", in this way bringing together the two strands we have just distinguished. In fact,

Mr. Smart would say, here is a move which from a religious point of view is significant and typical. For the chief purpose of a doctrinal scheme is to unite in some way or other what are logically discernible strands. This can be especially seen in the identification of Brahman and Atman where there is a "convergence of mystical and theistic doctrines" (p. 106). Again, in doctrines of incarnation, "propositions about a holy Teacher are woven together with those about an object of worship", and this weaving together, Mr. Smart says, is "analogous to that described earlier in connection with the numinous strands" (p. 125). To take yet another example, Mr. Smart points out that "in developed doctrinal schemes moral assertions are (also) incorporated into the pattern of belief", an incorporation which (p. 179) "may be regarded for our purposes as a case of weaving-together such as we have discussed with respect to the specifically religious strands", i.e. strands of numinous and mystical discourse respectively. In this way moral beliefs, while representing an independent strand of discourse, may then be and often are combined with other strands, e.g. the numinous strand, the mystical strand, or the incarnation strand.

Against such a background, four different kinds of justification can be given to doctrinal assertions. First there is what is called the *basic* justification of doctrine. This occurs when we show how, for example, propositions about the Creator can be grounded in reactions of awe. There can then be *formal* justification when, for example, according to a test of simplicity, monotheism is preferred to polytheism. There is then what Mr. Smart calls an *organic* justification whereby "the weaving-together of doctrines" (or should it be the weaving-together of discourse in doctrine?) can be justified by appeals to "analogies and similarities" between the separate strands. It may be, for example, that each speaks for "timelessness". Finally, there can be *preferential* justification which concerned doctrinal schemes, and gives one such scheme priority over another. In all these ways then "reasoning" in and about religions displays diversity and complexity.

Besides these general considerations, there are many points of a more particular interest discussed in the course of the book. For instance, Mr. Smart aptly criticizes the kind of "missionary utterance" which would say that "the southern Buddhists, in speaking of Nirvana, are really speaking of much the same thing as Christians are talking about in talking about God" (p. 198). Again, Mr. Smart would see religious paradox as arising from and being expressive of the distinctively religious desire to integrate and identify strands of discourse, which differ in their logical structure. "It is a common feature of the religious mind to seek identifications" (p. 81). Further, he reminds us that when reasoning in religion can be so diverse in its character, religious argument has consequentially to be regarded as something much looser than traditional views supposed, something which could be better called "ways of talking", whose purposes can be as diverse as strands of discourse are diverse.

Quite apart from its particular merits, the book is important for at least two general reasons. First of all it takes its examples of religious discourse from many religions, and in this way it gives us new hope for what has traditionally been called the history and philosophy of religion. Secondly, Mr. Smart in various ways illuminates for us the complexity of religious discourse, and helps us to see how diversely we can "reason" and talk on religious matters.

But, like all good books on philosophy, it clarifies some issues only to raise new ones, in discussing which, we may be taken further forward in our inquiries. In this connection an outstanding problem I find raised by the

book can be put in the following questions: Why are these various strands ever brought together in one language? What is common to all? What is involved in what Mr. Smart calls *organic* justification? How can what is logically diverse ever be satisfactorily united? Can we hope, in other words, to have any sort of straight defence of a doctrinal system?

Now the very formulation of these questions raises a problem as to what Mr. Smart conceived himself to be doing throughout the book. At times he speaks as though the various logically different strands are there to be discerned in religious discourse. But I think he would certainly agree that this metaphor of "discernment" can be somewhat misleading. Indeed, he gives us a warning on page 81 that "in dissecting a doctrinal scheme we are hardly doing it full justice". So we approach another view which might be taken of Mr. Smart's enterprise. Is it not rather that by a combination of insight and logical grip (and we may admire Mr. Smart's possession of both) he formulates for us such logically precise strands as, by their very precision, can illuminate the complexity which religious discourse displays. But we have now left on our hands the problem of uniting these strands. Only if we can give some logical account of their union shall we come now to treating the most distinctive feature of a doctrinal scheme. He sees very clearly that the link does not arise because of any entailments between the strands. Unity may arise because of a certain overlapping, because of "certain analogies which obtain between concepts such as God and others such as Nirvana" (p. 197). Yet (as he admits) these analogies are never so close as to conceal the diversity of the different strands. Again there may be some kind of union between strands because of what he calls an aesthetic parallel. But altogether we are left with the union of strands as very problematical. Yet (as Mr. Smart has said) unification is a distinctively religious intention, and if we are to do "full justice" to a doctrinal scheme, this characteristic feature is what we shall have to concentrate our attention upon. May not the "unity" which belongs to religious discourse only arise when the logically distinguishable strands are so peculiarly related as to do justice to that strange kind of object which religion contrives to talk about? In other words, how far can we go in giving an account of the most characteristic features of religious discourse without involving ourselves in questions of ontology, which Mr. Smart (I think deliberately) leaves out of consideration in the present book? How far does the very thoroughness and honesty of Mr. Smart's discussion reveal the inadequacy of that merely evaluative account of religion which I think is implied in his concept of basic justification and which proves sufficient for most of what Mr. Smart wishes to say?

But whatever problems the book raises, and is all the more valuable for so doing, it helps us to think in the right directions, to ask the right questions and to make the right distinctions. If at times the reader is a little bewildered and not very clear where the argument is leading, it may be because he finds that Mr. Smart's skilful manoeuvres keep his eyes off what religious people have thought to be their Target. But this may be Mr. Smart's express intention. In any case every reader will benefit from the invigorating discussion, and from a novel approach to a subject which for years has been in need of some such logical spring-cleaning as Mr. Smart has given to it.

I. T. RAMSEY.

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It is the object of The Royal Institute of Philosophy to provide a forum for the rational discussion of these and similar questions. This requires strenuous thinking, but it is hoped that the services which the Institute provides, and particularly the existence of a journal in which such thinking is carried out in language as free from technicalities as the nature of the subject allows, will help to maintain standards of intellectual appreciation and satisfy a cultural need.

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Professor L. J. Russell
- Friday, February 5th. "A Kantian Problem"
P. F. Strawson, Esq., M.A. (University College, Oxford)
- Friday, February 12th. "Political Empiricism"
W. H. Walsh, Esq., M.A. (Merton College, Oxford)
- Friday, February 19th. "Morals and the Concept of Man"
R. S. Peters, Esq., B.A., Ph.D. (Birkbeck College, London)
- Friday, February 26th. "Aesthetic 'Expression' and Aesthetic 'Embodiment'"
Professor L. Arnaud Reid (Institute of Education, University of London)
- Friday, March 4th. "Symposium"
Subject and Speakers to be announced later.
- Tuesday, March 8th. "Body and Mind"
Sir W. Russell Brain, Kt., D.M., P.R.C.P.
The Manson Lecture.
- Friday, March 11th. "Reflections on Sartre"
The Rev. F. C. Copleston, S.J., M.A. (Heythrop College, Chipping Norton)

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

- ANTHONY QUINTON Fellow of New College, Oxford. Has contributed to *Mind*, *Philosophy*, *Analysis*, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, and other philosophical journals; and is also a literary critic. Is writing a book on modern British Philosophy.
- CZESEAW LEJEWSKI Has contributed to the *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, *Philosophy*, and the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*.
- D. H. MUNRO Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Sydney. Author of *Argument of Laughter* (1951) and *Godwin's Moral Philosophy* (1953). Has contributed to *Mind*, *Analysis*, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, etc.
- A. H. JOHNSON Professor of Philosophy, University of Western Ontario. Author of *Whitehead's Theory of Reality*, and *Whitehead's Philosophy of Civilisation*, and of articles in various philosophical journals.

PHILOSOPHY

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To the Editor of PHILOSOPHY

September 1959

DEAR SIR,

We should be obliged if you would draw the attention of your readers to a proposal to form a British Society of Aesthetics. This is considered desirable, both generally to promote the study of the subject, including communication with foreign correspondents, and with a particular view to the forthcoming International Congress of Aesthetics to be held in Athens from September 1st to September 6th, 1960. Those of your readers who are interested should write to the Acting Secretary at the Library, University College, Singleton Park, Swansea.

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
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
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the nature of History). Forthcoming book, *Spirit and Man*.
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Professor of Philosophy in the University of St. Andrews (Queen's
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Lecturer in Moral Philosophy in the University of Aberdeen. Has
contributed to the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, etc.
Author of *Christianity and Paradox* (1938). See p. 177 of the
present issue. Has just been elected Professor of Philosophy in
the University of Nottingham.

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The Editor of Philosophy regrets that Mr. D. H. Moore's name was wrongly spelt on the
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- HERMANN JOSEF FRINGS AUS ZÜLPICH-HOVEN. *Medizin und Arzt bei den Griechischen Kircheng Vätern bis Chrysostomos*. Bonn. 1959. Pp. 127. No price given.
- EUGEN RINK. *Alles und Nichts: Ein Umweg zur Philosophie*. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague. 1959. Pp. (viii) & 250. 15.75 guilders.
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sions, there can be no understanding of its central drive without living commitment to persons which in one form is "love". "Love" is a vague and elusive notion. Here it is not identified with "Eros" even in the widest sense in which that includes friendship. It is more like "Agape" in that it is spontaneous, giving without thought of gain. But since this is an ideal seldom attained, a practical problem arises. Love, to be love, must be spontaneous. Yet, since we love spontaneously but rarely, love has to be set up as obligatory: and where it is obeyed from obligation it loses its character of love. Kant's moral love from duty is less than love. (If this is not recognized we are in danger of a particularly priggish kind of sentimentality.) For the author, the only way out is the Christian solution—infusion of divine Agape: we can only love one another "in God".

Because truth must be "lived into", not only "thought into", there is special need for the education of feeling—which the intellect mistrusts and much contemporary life renders shallow. It is a need to be emphasized in an age still too dominated at the higher scholastic levels by examination rigidity.

Professor Jeffrey's book, though short, is a little diffuse and jump-y. He ranges widely; he offers to the student not familiar with them a series of personalist-existentialist impressions. But the impressions are slight, taken up, then left, and we miss on the one hand a fuller development of some of the topics, and on the other a steadily argued theme. . . . The student of education finds himself frustrated. But in a small book for the general reader one cannot have everything.

L. ARNAUD REID.

Books also received:

Notes on Books

DAGOBERT D. RUNES. *Pictorial Survey of Philosophy*. Philosophical Library, New York, 1959. Pp. (x) & 406. \$15.00. This book invites comparison with Russell's *The Wisdom of the West*. Unlike Russell's, however, it has no illustrative diagrams and the pictures are not in colour. Furthermore, it is arranged as a dictionary of philosophical authors with about 300-500 words for each. These biographies are arranged partly in periods but also according to the nationalities of the philosophers. Walt Whitman, Tolstoy and Jakob Burckhardt and other writers who could hardly be called philosophers are included with the result that the space given to more important philosophers is consequently reduced. The device of including a portrait of Hitler alongside one of Martin Heidegger and one of Stalin alongside one of Bertrand Russell will not commend itself to many. The text has little value.

H.B.A.

R. OSBORN. *Humanism and Moral Philosophy*. George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1959. Pp. 115. 18s.

WM. THEODORE DE BARY (Editor). *Sources of Indian Tradition*. (Records of Civilization Sources and Studies, Number LVI.) Columbia University Press, London: Oxford University Press, 1959. Pp. (xxv) & 961. 55s. (U.K. only).

T. R. MILES. *Religion and the Scientific Outlook*. George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1959. Pp. 224. 21s.

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Mystery of Man. By M. V. C. JEFFREYS. (Pitman, 1957. Pp. viii + 111. Price 15s.)

Year Book of Education for 1957.

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conduct and with the will to right conduct. And perhaps his greatest invention or if you like, everything is morality with him because everything deals with method is a sort of morality, a morality of thinking or a morality for thinking; *Bergsonisme*, in which Péguy wrote of Descartes: "What I imagine is that his are from Péguy's second last pamphlet, *Note sur M. Bergson et la philosophie*. But now for those redeeming six lines, cited by Monsieur Siegfried. They ideas of intellectual discipline in educational matters.

of Dewey's positions. Mr. Price shows a marked tendency to return to ancient which, it seems to me, rest upon the almost wilful misunderstanding of many Mr. Kingsley Price gives us a number of criticisms of John Dewey's philosophy, slow curtain-raiser to the streamlined smartness of neo-conservative America. to think, is unfortunately in the process of getting lost. We turn from this a hint—that there may have been a great tradition which, Mr. Walsh appears Plato and Descartes and Kant. There is the hint—of course not more than We read again that Plato and Christianity have some affinities, as have the stock-in-trade of Oxford philosophical teaching for the last eighty years. philosophical tradition—just those elements, oddly enough, which have been ness of old-world Oxford. Mr. Walsh mentions *some* elements in the European After the fulsome blague of intellectual Paris we proceed to the grey devious little more before concluding.

anything else contained in the whole volume, and about which I shall say a grace to quote six lines which are of a quality wholly different from that of in the midst of seven pages of this sort of stuff, Monsieur Siegfried has had the of the new "mass" civilizations now appearing in other continents. However, of our democratic institutions, and there is a somewhat sneering mention brief, entirely unilluminating and one-sided reference to the development niques upon which we depend were first developed in Europe; there is a to the Greeks; there is the familiar falsehood that all the important tech Foundations of European Civilization". There is the inevitable reference or perhaps one should say an after-dinner oration—entitled "The Spirit and European free trade should preclude from export from France. It is an essay—Siegfried gives us a contribution of a kind which, I suggest, framers of future Siegfried, Mr. Walsh of Oxford and Mr. Price of Johns Hopkins. Monsieur what I referred to as the curtain-raiser which are supplied by Monsieur André could best be given some kind of unity by inspirational treatment—hence any definite logical mould: their idea apparently has been that the volume committal introduction disown any attempt to squeeze their material into of education must not do is abdicate. The editors in their lengthy but non-Neither reaches an answer, but both conclude that the one thing a philosopher address themselves to the question "What is the philosophy of education?" sity of Southern California and Professor Louis Arnaud Reid of London, who themselves. In the latter class we have Professor Brackenbury of the Univer- various types of moral uplift—and live performances by professors of education The philosophical contents may be divided into curtain-raisers—employing writing students in university departments of education.

can be learned by lecturers in education, and, I suspect, much more by essay-developed in the Union of South Africa. From such chapters as these much revealing statement upon the "Christian and national" conception of education Steiner schools, the Montessori experiments, and so on, as well as a remarkably on, e.g. Jesuit schools, the Quaker schools, the French lycées, the Rudolph to educational practice, and a number of excellent short informative studies, is an authoritative account by Sir Cyril Burt of the relevance of psychology non-philosophical sections and chapters contain valuable material: there Györy Lukács, there is not the remotest hint. On the other hand, its explicitly

Can it be that 1957, the year of the Sputniks and Zeta, of Mr. Kennan's speech lectures and Lord Russell's open letters to Eisenhower and Khrushchev, will also count as an *annus mirabilis* of philosophy? There was that unusually voluminous of *The Listener*, there was Mr. Gellner's lone David-like assault upon the affronted Oxonian Goliaths, and Professor Passmore's Anglo-Saxon chronicle of what Britain has done for philosophy during the last hundred years; and finally—almost as if to cap all this—the editors of *The Year Book of Education* have devoted their 1957 volume to the topic of education and philosophy. Unfortunately, as far as its philosophical contents are concerned, this volume is as unrepresentative of recent philosophy, whether British or American or Continental, as anything that can be imagined. Of the influence of the Logical Positivists, of Collingwood, of Popper, of Wittgenstein, of Sartre or of

The Year Book of Education 1957: Education and Philosophy. (Evans Bros. Price 63s.)

IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ.

concerned with nineteenth-century intellectual history should fail to read it. figure. In sum, Iris Mueller has provided us with the first clear picture in the English language of Mill's relation to French theory and politics. No one carefully, and does not attempt to present him as a consistent or synthetic *Mill and French Thought* that it reveals that he was advocating. It is the prime merit of *John Stuart* proposed than what he was advocating. It is the prime merit of *John Stuart* St. Simon or Comte), indicates that Mill was far more knowing about what he this reviewer's opinion as a result of Harriet Taylor's influence than of either Mill's from private property sentiments to a socialist orientation (more in theory of history. The many editions of the *Political Economy*, with its attendant economic progress, he yet proved unable to forge an adequate or consistent Mill's social theory. Noting that Mill served as a watchdog for freedom and Mueller does much to explain the basis of the ambiguities which pervade de Toqueville, was either elliptical or non-existent. essays on freedom and organization, the influence of St. Simon, Comte and or events, would indicate that in Mill's late period, the period of the classic in content, and only incidentally involves Mill's relations to French philosophers 1873, a fabulously rich period in French social history, is the most general as an influence in Mill's outlook is not borne out by either Mill's correspondence or activities. That the final chapter, which covers the period from 1848 to as an influence in Mill's outlook is not borne out by either Mill's correspondence or activities. That the final chapter, which covers the period from 1848 to quietude which followed the failure of the 1848 revolution. The author's conclusion that French theory was second only to Benthamite utilitarianism as an influence in Mill's outlook is not borne out by either Mill's correspondence or activities. That the final chapter, which covers the period from 1848 to dispute. What may perhaps be questioned is whether Mill was responding to French theory or English political practice. The evidence indicates that the latter was probably the case. Mill's interest in France waned after the political quietude which followed the failure of the 1848 revolution. The author's conclusion that French theory was second only to Benthamite utilitarianism as an influence in Mill's outlook is not borne out by either Mill's correspondence or activities. That the final chapter, which covers the period from 1848 to orderly function of government in general. That Mill owes much of his political realism to French sources is beyond a prime merit of Mueller's work to show the tough-minded foundations of in this book as a far less sentimental thinker than is sometimes imagined. It is murky areas of conscience and speculation, while in the clearly etched realm of polity he urged a curb on individual caprice if it contrasted with the "permanent interests of a man as a progressive being" (p. 231). Mill emerges

The author is excellent in putting to rest the myth of Mill's *laissez-faire* ideology. It is effectively noted that Mill confined his defence of liberty to the arena.

Mill's regard for the efforts of Alexis de Toqueville to develop an empirical sociology is illustrative of his willingness to learn from a scholar whose aristocratic bias was alien to Mill's spirit. De Toqueville in no small way transformed Mill from a liberal immersed in Bentham's calculus of pleasures and pains, to one who perceived the failings of political democratic theory—its substitution of the myth of the mass for the knowledge of the specialist. That *Democracy in America* had the immediate effect of turning Mill towards elitist sentiments should not obscure the fact that it had the long range effect of turning Mill toward the "higher democracy" of socialism. As Mueller notes, it is the paradoxical truth that de Toqueville could do what the world of Victorian radicalism was unable to do, turn Mill towards socialism as the necessary economy of the future. Although Mill's socialism was of utopian despotism in nonetheless had the merit of recognizing the threat of political despotism in the name of economic unity long before it became a live issue in the political philosophy.

Mueller's book shows Mill to be modest in his search for a solution to the issue of human freedom without compromising the libertarian tradition. In his empirical orientation he differed decisively from his French colleagues. While learning from French philosophy, he remembered what it frequently lost sight of—that the philosopher is a seeker of truth, not necessarily its dispenser. The mystic cultism of St. Simon, no less than the spiritualism of Comte's science of sociology, fostered a radicalism which Mill feared was contrary to the spirit of science and democracy alike. Thus, while Mill absorbed and even defended the humanitarian and socialist faith of Gustave D'Eichthal, and the genetic vision of Comte, he did not fall victim to the myth of infallibility common to advanced French social theory. The charge of Mill's criticism that he reacted cautiously to French thought because he denied the possibility of a scientific explanation of social events is shown by the author as groundless. His major concern was the search for factual anchor points from which to gain a clearer vision of the body politic. This is adequately attested to by Mill's *Logic* no less than his *Political Economy*. What separates him from Comte and St. Simon was the belief that truths once possessed should be an instrument for gaining further truths—and not to be used to stifle further enquiry. The great divide between Mill and French utopianism and scientism is somewhat obscured by the author in her desire to trace Mill's indebtedness

The concern Mill showed for the leading men and movements of France stemmed in some measure from his personal regard for the traditions and morals of a people he had come to respect first through the Benthamite movement, of which his father was a prime mover, and as a youth through personal contact. But the basis of this concern was ultimately an awareness "that France is the key to European politics and ideology". France was re-producing the conflict between conservatism and liberalism at a more mature stage than anywhere else. The French were the first seriously to seek solutions to problems raised by a politically disenfranchised and economically dispossessed plebeian mass. And Mill is revealed as a man who steadily looked to the future to solve the riddles of the present. It was natural that just as Mill's intellectual predecessors had learnt from Helvetius the credo of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, so Mill was taken with the St. Simonian idea of the religion of humanity—of the need to universalize the respect of each man for every other man for the purpose of releasing human

The confusion which still pervades the intellectual remains of Mill is being steadily lessened through the efforts of persevering scholars such as Hayek, Britton, Plamenatz, and St. John Packe. They have shown beyond question that the judgment of Mill's contemporaries was sound. Mill was a truly probing and practical mind. If modern historians of ideas differ in their conclusions as to Mill's position on capital and labour, liberalism and conservatism, democracy and autocracy, it is understandable when we consider that Mill was both scientific in methodology and eclectic in theory, liberal in terms of nineteenth-century realities. However, not all, or necessarily most of the ambiguities reside in Mill proper. His interpreters have too often viewed his writings as a solid mass requiring only a synthesis in order to reveal the "true" Mill. In fact, Mill lived a long life. He began his career at the tail end of Enlightenment and continued well into the late Romantic epoch. The historical requirements of Mill's early years hinged on a final settlement of accounts between aristocracy and bourgeoisie. Whereas the latter part of the nineteenth century saw energies polarized between the power of commerce and the numerical power of the industrial mass. Where Mill stood on these social contests, more than general formulas on liberty, determined the character of his social philosophy; and if it made him a contradictory figure it no less made him an interesting one. To the select group of scholars who have recognized this must now be added the author of *John Stuart Mill and French Thought*. Iris Mueller has worked out Mill's pivotal relation to St. Simon, Auguste Comte, and Alexis de Toqueville with great clarity. She has proven adept at showing the impact on Mill of French upheavals of 1830, 1848, and to a lesser extent, the Paris Commune.

John Stuart Mill and French Thought. By Iris WESSSEL MUELLER. (University of Illinois Press, 1956. Pp. viii + 275. Price \$4.00.)

MARGARET HEWITT.

Dr. Sampson disputes the claims of Marx to have satisfactorily achieved this, but we are left in no doubt that the ends of man are rational ends. Unforunately, however, he yields to the temptation of overstating his case. In spite of the cautious judgement of an earlier chapter that "the faith in reason, rightly applied and critically held, is a worthy, faith", we are assured in the final pages of the book that "the correct explanation (of the trend in international relations) must be ultimately somewhere in the character and inner structure of all existing nations or sovereign societies". For this assertion we are given no proof (to say that we now have a clearer understanding of man-kind than previous generations is not to prove that future generations will have a perfect understanding). Dr. Sampson, no less than those to whose claim to see the end of the Age of Reason and the dawn of a new Age of Faith he makes reference, may be convicted of a "dogmatic insistence (which) suggests the author's own need of reassurance".

The remainder of the book is devoted to an analysis of Hume's challenge to the belief in the rational foundation of values on which the whole structure of Natural Law philosophy rested and the significance of the development of a speculative philosophy of history as an attempt to restore these foundations. Dr. Sampson disputes the claims of Marx to have satisfactorily achieved this, but we are left in no doubt that the ends of man are rational ends. Unfortunately, however, he yields to the temptation of overstating his case. In spite of the cautious judgement of an earlier chapter that "the faith in reason, rightly applied and critically held, is a worthy, faith", we are assured in the final pages of the book that "the correct explanation (of the trend in international relations) must be ultimately somewhere in the character and inner structure of all existing nations or sovereign societies". For this assertion we are given no proof (to say that we now have a clearer understanding of man-kind than previous generations is not to prove that future generations will have a perfect understanding). Dr. Sampson, no less than those to whose claim to see the end of the Age of Reason and the dawn of a new Age of Faith he makes reference, may be convicted of a "dogmatic insistence (which) suggests the author's own need of reassurance".

Orwell might well have derived inspiration from some of these descriptions of humanity's final state.

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Despite the disappointment and disillusionment of the last fifty years; despite contemporary agitation that, in the light of developments in nuclear

Progress in the Age of Reason. By R. V. SAMPSON. (Heinemann, 1957. Pp. 259. Price 21s.)

G. H. R. PARKINSON.

qualified by the clarity explicit by its discernment from another with which it is epistemically, or otherwise, united and indivisible? Or of the assertion (p. 48) that time is "the duration of a finite being in the sempiternity of the infinite world as a generalized privative exposition of its eternity"? Passages of such extreme obscurity occur constantly in the book, and their presence calls for some explanation. Perhaps the author overload his sentences with shortness of the book, which may have made the maximum of meaning. But this can only be a partial explanation, since the same author's *Aeternitas* is a much longer work, but is at least as difficult. A more likely explanation is one which takes into account the nature of the book's subject-matter. Much of the book is concerned with metaphysics, and metaphysics is a notoriously obscure topic. But the adherent of a "truncated empiricist philosophy" will want to know whether anything intellectually respectable lies behind this obscurity. In his defence, the metaphysician might argue that he is concerned with matters which language is ill adapted to deal, so that he must in effect put a severe strain on the very tool which he uses. To illustrate: Professor Hallett argues (if I understand him aright) that Spinoza's universe is not a static world of timeless essences, but is something dynamic, a "potency-in-act". Now if, as some have argued, language was developed to express a more or less static world of distinct objects, it is not surprising that Professor Hallett, like Whitehead and others before him, should have to do violence to language in order to express his meaning. But here the problem of communication recurs. The present-day empiricist is unlikely to be impressed by this chafing at the limits of language. He may not be quite so ready as once he was to dismiss philosophy of this kind as mere nonsense, but he will certainly ask for good reasons why he should regard it as making sense. And if this demand is to be satisfied, it will only be by someone who is capable of talking the empiricist's language. But this book gives no indication that Professor Hallett has this capacity.

I have little room to discuss this work purely as a piece of Spinozist scholarship. Interesting and original things are said, but that they represent anything which Spinoza would have recognized as his own is often far from certain. For example, the author repeats the view put forward in *Aeternitas* that the Spinozist mode is a kind of microcosm, more akin to the Leibnizian monad than has generally been supposed. But, as Joachim has already pointed out, this rests upon the most slender evidence. Nor is this the only case of Professor Hallett's suggestions which the scholar would like defended at greater length.

In many respects, then, this book must be regarded as a failure. Yet the author's earnestness, his strong conviction of the importance of Spinoza's philosophy, does communicate itself to the reader, and may well make him want to read Spinoza for himself. Perhaps Professor Hallett would count this as at any rate a limited success; and if he did so, I for my part would not disagree.

Professor Hallett insists that he is not writing for the "man in the train"; he evidently has in mind the man who really wants to understand Spinoza, and who is prepared to meet with difficulties on the way. But there are limits to what the "candid student" may be expected to endure, and in this book these are repeatedly transgressed. What, for example, is the reader to make of a sentence such as (p. 20) "For the determinacy of each Attribute in the modal perspective is but the obfuscation of its own implicit negativity

of doubt. open modern eyes to hitherto unsuspected virtues in Spinozism, is a matter of which the author has succeeded in writing a popular exposition, and whether he will introduce the "candid student" to Spinoza's philosophy. But whether the book being highly polemical. It is also avowedly a popular work, designed to own expositors. The author's attempts to remove these obstacles lead to his of Spinoza. First, there is what he calls the "truncated empiricist philosophy" has been wrongly criticized. He sees two main obstacles to an understanding of Spinoza. First, there is what he calls the "truncated empiricist philosophy" exposition than was *Aeternitas*, Professor Hallett seeks to show that Spinoza many articles on Spinoza. In the present short book, more concerned with Professor Hallett, already known for *Aeternitas*, *A Spinozistic Study*, and for indeed. However, if there is anyone who can be called a Spinozist today it is from the wreckage. Nevertheless, the present-day Spinozist is a rare bird wrecked as a deductive system, there may be much which can be salvaged is not to say that his work is valueless, for although the *Ethics* may be rary ways of thought; that rationalism of the type which he advocated has It needs no stressing that the philosophy of Spinoza is foreign to contempo-

Benedict de Spinoza: The Elements of his Philosophy. By H. F. HALLETT. (The Athlone Press, University of London, 1957. Pp. 171. Price 25s.)

THOMAS MCPHERSON.

for this. But up to then, it is only fair to say again, the book is very good. acceptance/rejection. (Love/hate?) The earlier chapters do not prepare us put forward in previous chapters. What we get is a coyly ambivalent Christianity because of, or an acceptance of it in spite of, the considerations book it doesn't belong to. The conclusion one expects is either a rejection of called for. Dr. Hepburn's last chapter has the air of being tacked on to a think some rather full explanation of wherein its religiousness consists is does not enjoy mystery and paradox is not "naturally religious", but I do Scientific Humanists; and this is surely odd. I do not say that a "mind" that that the people who best fit into the class of the naturally religious are his account of the sort of religion such minds embrace, with the impression sceptical but "naturally religious" mind. As it is, we are left, after reading might well have prompted Dr. Hepburn to enlarge on the idea of the tance religiously is surely much less. The notorious trickiness of "natural" Their importance philosophically is, of course, considerable, but their impor- sort of logical difficulties Dr. Hepburn points to might well seem unimportant. Christianity is rarely on logical grounds.) To a naturally religious mind the forgotten Western Vedantists or Buddhists; but their dissatisfaction with cannot on *logical* grounds accept any orthodox form of Christianity. (I have ven- British or Western European) "naturally religious mind" that nevertheless

But Dr. Hepburn is better at knocking down than at building up; and his only unsatisfactory chapter is his last—or at least the latter half of it, where he attempts something more positive than has gone before. Having, however, efficiently cut the ground from under him by the negative criticism of the earlier chapters he naturally has difficulty in finding a foothold when he might be acceptable to a "sceptical" but nevertheless "naturally religious" mind; its most clearly graspable component is a moral one. He does not succeed, however, in making clear exactly what he means by a (presumably

grounds. that the theological opinions considered must be rejected, mainly on logical grounds. upshot of the discussion—I shall not attempt to single out any part of it—they read can result in victories too easily won to be worth having. The and think themselves as well as they can into the frame of mind of those of theology by those who have not taken the trouble to read widely in it in his comments he makes some acute points. He rightly insists that criticism of his theologians—he finds a place for subtle as well as crude views—and "the cosmos". Dr. Hepburn is scrupulously fair in his presentation of the views explanatory concept, "making sense of" history or of moral experience or of talk about God to talk about Jesus, (c) yet others say that God is a kind of (b) others say that God is known exclusively "through Christ" and reduce purposes thus: (a) some say that there is a "direct encounter" with God, but he has something to say about most of those who are in fact influential today—at least among Protestants. He classifies theologians for his own problems of meaning) in Christian theology to be happy about it. His discussion is limited, as it is bound to be, to the views of only a few theologians; sympathies with Christianity are real, but he finds too many problems (largely philosophers that has been going on in the past few years this book must take a high place. The blurb calls Dr. Hepburn a reverent agnostic. His

In the surprisingly large output of writing about religion by "linguistic" By RONALD W. HEPBURN. (C. A. Watts and Co. Ltd. 1958. Pp. 211. Price 18s.)

Christianity and Paradox. Critical Studies in Twentieth-Century Theology.

J. P. DAY.

believe that it is these which will be read with most interest and profit. of the philosophies of such as La Mettrie, Herder, Cournot and Royce; and I about the great philosophers. On the other hand, there are few other con- the main reader is unlikely to learn from this history much that is new to him of philosophers of the second and third rank. For the fashion of teaching the history of philosophy in British and American universities is on the whole to concentrated efforts are made to enrich the diet, and Malebranche or Vico, Reid or indeed, efforts are made to enrich the diet, and Malebranche or Vico, Reid or the main the lesser philosophers are ignored. Consequently, the student or Name de Biran, Mill or Peirce, are temporarily included in the canon; but in history of philosophy in British and American universities is on the whole to The chief value of this book will perhaps be found to lie in the expositions does not made plain here in what these resemblances consist. assertion (p. 594) that the pragmatist's theory of meaning is similar to the logical positivist's, in the sense that Peirce's doctrine of meaning, when sifted, does in fact bear important resemblances to the verifiability principle; but it

Philosophy. In a history on this scale, there are bound to be places where the reader wishes to put in a demurrer. Thus, it seems to me false or at least misleading to call Spinoza "the most rigorous Cartesian" (p. 116); and false to say that Berkeley did not deny that ideas of sense "were sometimes caused by objects existing outside the human mind", and that he held that "the ideas in the mind of God are the causes of our ideas" (pp. 209, 228). It is untrue that Kant's things-in-themselves "counted values among their number" (pp. 506 f.), and misleading and unjust to say that "the most influential source of 19th century anti-intellectualism was undoubtedly Kant's first two *Critiques*" (p. 515); though it is of course true that the technique of post-Kantian idealists from Fichte to Gentile was, roughly speaking, to inflate to monstrous proportions the selected parts of Kant's system, while dropping or suppressing the parts which did not commend themselves. (Cp. J. Royce's *Lectures on Modern Idealism*). Again, T. H. Green is not correctly described as the real founder of the school of English Hegelianism (p. 562). Finally, in the section on James, the relations between Peirce's pragmatic theory of meaning and James's pragmatic theory of truth are not satisfactorily elucidated. There seems to me truth in the

Naturally, Professor Boas has his personal emphases and interpretations, of which a couple of examples must suffice. In expounding Descartes (pp. 92 ff.) he devotes about as much space to that philosopher's doctrine of the passions, as to his doctrine of method. He observes that Descartes' interest in the passions, in the problems both of analysing and of mastering them, is representative of his age, a similar interest being noticeable in Charron, the French classical tragedist, and of course in Spinoza's preoccupation with human bondage. The point is worth making, since though every student reads the *Discourse on Method*, very few read the *Passions of the Soul*. A more questionable view is that which Professor Boas takes of the importance and influence of the English Platonists. He sees Herbert, More and Cudworth as a powerful idealist tradition opposing the empiricism of Bacon, Hobbes, Locke and Hume. Berkeley, by virtue of *Si vis*, is represented as having a foot in both camps. He also follows Dr Lovejoy in supposing these Platonists to have exercised a strong influence on Kant (p. 234). In this he seems to me to overestimate the significance of these authors and to advance a dubious thesis about the origins of the Critical

In general, his accounts of the great philosophers are of the high standard one expects from Professor Boas, though there is a fairly conspicuous unevenness. He seems more at home in the 16th to 18th centuries than in the 19th and 20th, and with the philosophers of Italy, France and Great Britain than with those of Germany or his own country; though the chapters on Kant are among the best in the book. His confession of partiality to Hume is revealing (p. 217). The expositions of Descartes, Spinoza, Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Rousseau are on the whole thorough and accurate, though these very virtues make them rather heavy reading. The account of Leibniz is disappointing, largely because Professor Boas considers only the works published in Leibniz's lifetime, which contain his exoteric and less interesting philosophy, his esoteric and more interesting one being contained in documents first published much later. One may agree that there is some exaggeration in the panlogical interpretations of Lord Russell and Couturat without going to the opposite extreme.

him. Again, Shaftesbury appears out of place in a chapter on Kantian ethics. And the three pages on Mill constitute one section of a chapter, the other sections of which are devoted to Spencer, Bergson and Whitehead, and which is called "The Acceptance of Time"; a title which recalls his friend Carlyle's comment on a remark of Margaret Fuller's.

These being the stated aims of the book, my chief criticisms of it are as follows. What the most frequently recurrent and influential problems are taken to be does not clearly emerge; the book actually reads much more like the traditional sort of history of philosophers and their works. Despite its title, the *Leitmotif* of the work are not distinctly audible. The concentration on exposition and interpretation is regrettable, not least because when Professor Boas does criticize his comments are interesting. As to selection, although some degree of individuality is both expected and welcome (cp. Lord Russell's chapter on Byron in his *History*), Professor Boas's borders on eccentricity. Thus, as to proportion: whereas the period Machiavelli to Kant receives 300 pages, the remaining period gets only 150. About as much space is given mainly to the scepticism of Montaigne and the anti-Cartesianism of Gassendi, Pascal and Huet as to Cartesianism itself. The English Platonists (principally Herbert, More and Cudworth) receive more than half as much space as Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley and Hume combined. And whereas Kant receives two chapters, the Cartesians and the British empiricists receive only one each collectively. As to omissions: there is nothing on Bentham and utilitarianism; on Burke (though there is a section on de Maistre and de Bonald); on Peirce though there are sections on James and Dewey); on Boole or Frege or the transience of logic in the 19th century; on Lord Russell (though there is a section on Whitehead); on neo-Thomism; on Professor Moore, Wittgenstein and philosophical analysis though there is a chapter on existentialism). On the other hand, there are included a number of philosophers of subordinate rank, as Telesio, Burthogge, Condillac and Hamann; as well as some thinkers not usually reckoned as philosophers at all, as Paracelsus, Voltaire and Spengler. Finally, there are some odd groupings. Thus, Boehme figures as a predecessor of Leibniz; and, while this is doubtless literally true, it seems an odd light in which to present

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Large-scale histories of philosophy by a single hand are uncommon in these days, though less so in the U.S.A. than in Great Britain. But there is good reason why they should continue to be written. Namely that, as Lord Russell points out in the preface to his *History of Western Philosophy*, if the writing of histories is left to teams of specialists, important resemblances and possible or probable influences between works by authors of different periods will pass unnoticed. Witness e.g. Professor Boas's remarks on certain analogies between the philosophies of Vico, Condorcet and Comte (pp. 354 ff., 371 ff. and 380 ff.). Of course, the writing of such books prequires a formidable fund of knowledge; but this Professor Boas has. He is well known for numerous studies on the history of thought, and as an editor of the *Journal of the History of Ideas*. An honorary chairman of the editorial board of that journal is Dr. A. O. Lovejoy, to whom this history is dedicated, and whose influence is evident at many points throughout it.

Professor Boas tells us that the book is intended to be a history of philosophical problems and their solutions; specifically, of those which seem to him most frequently recurrent or most influential. He adds that he aims at exposition and interpretation rather than criticism. And he admits to a marked degree of individuality in his selection, as evidenced by his omission of many standard authors and inclusion of many unorthodox figures, by the much greater amount of space given to the period Machiavelli to Kant inclusive than to the period Kant to the present, and by the avowedly sketchy treatment of the 20th century (pp. v. ff.).

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recommended as likely further to sustain his interest.

ALAN MONTEFIORE.

soon enough to be sure of making the theoretically perfect decision. So the only thing to do is to be as calm and as rational as one can be and to be beware of all extremes. As in morals, so in politics. Descartes was not a rigid conservative; but he was an exceedingly cautious one. Still, if for the most part his political and social views may not have been particularly remarkable, they were, given the general context of his thought, consistently sober and sensible; though it has to be admitted that apart from the commentary on Machiavelli composed for the somewhat serious-minded distraction of the Princess Elizabeth and from some of his letters, particularly those which he wrote to the Princess, it is not very easy to get together any great weight of Cartesian social theory.

The final section on "La vie religieuse" is considerably the shortest of the three. Somewhat surprisingly when one thinks of the space that was given to the passions, there is here no development of the arguments for the existence of God—though several pages are given to the famous question whether animals have souls. But quite apart from this it is, I think, a pity that this section is the shortest, for some of the issues that it raises remain among the most actively disputed today. As M. Lefèvre says (on p. 187), "Le cartésianisme ne s'explique ni par les doctrines qu'il prépare, ni même par celles qu'il remplace, mais par les problèmes qu'il résout. Ils sont engendrés par le croisement du conflit scientifique du mécanisme et de la scolastique, avec le conflit religieux du libéralisme et de l'apologie." In these conflicts Descartes was continually liable to find himself turning up on the wrong side, very much in the way in which a left-wing opponent of Communism in a country such as present-day France may find that to support his allies on any one issue is more often than not effectively to support, in the same people, his enemies on any other. However sceptical Descartes may have been for methodological purposes, he thoroughly disapproved of scepticism in religion; but at the same time he regarded as an obscure disaster the sort of metaphysics to which many churchmen believed themselves to be committed by their faith. This sort of position is always likely to provoke the most constant and energetic attacks, and Descartes' was no exception to the rule. But how, he protested, can rational arguments be held to be subversive by anyone who is confident in the truth of his own beliefs? "Car je ne puis craindre", as he wrote to Mersenne, "qu'une vérité soit contraire à l'autre." Indeed, he was convinced on the contrary that his own rational principles provided the only secure metaphysical basis to the beliefs of the Church. M. Lefèvre does not really allow himself enough space to fill in the background to these controversies, a background whose importance and interest he himself underlines, and at times his allusions are compressed into what becomes little more than a list of names. But in spite of this he succeeds in bringing out the essentially progressive nature of Descartes' overriding faith in the methods of rational enquiry, a faith that is fundamentally progressive though held by a political conservative and without which a radical is never decisively removed from a reactionary. It is this faith which is the proper justification for talking of *L'Humanisme de Descartes*.

To sum up. This is not perhaps a very exciting book; nor does it achieve a monumental solidity. But it is, as its author very fairly claims, "un livre sérieux". It may be unlikely to arouse any great enthusiasm in a reader who has none for the subject to start with; but to one who has it may be recommended as likely further to sustain his interest.

The section on "La vie morale", a good deal of which is taken up with Descartes' discussions of the passions, the allegedly basic and the allegedly derivative, is the first and longest of the three. In general Descartes believed that progress towards perfecting one's behaviour depends on rational control of the passions and on progress towards certain knowledge as to the nature of the universe, knowledge which could only be ensured by his own method of enquiry. But, sensibly enough, he was very ready to concede that since in practice man is not a creature of reason alone, his ability to exercise his reason and the degree of influence that it may have on his behaviour will in any given set of circumstances depend on a variety of non-rational factors; and that in the pressing business of everyday practical life he could anyhow very seldom hope to know all that might be relevant

in the most sympathetic possible light. The result of this follow-up is, to put the matter a little more soberly, an account of Descartes' views on morals, politics and religion, an account which at all times presents his views though fairly, yet object of this book is to follow "Le mouvement de cette grande âme, en quête du Soverain Bien". The result of this follow-up is, to put the matter a little more soberly, an account of Descartes' views on morals, politics and religion, an account which at all times presents his views though fairly, yet

The "humanism" in the title may seem at first sight surprising. But M. Lefèvre has not, of course, discovered anything to suggest that Descartes might today have been tempted to join the Ethical Union. On the contrary, "On découvre", he says in his preface, "que le cartésianisme est, et a voulu être... un effort d'amélioration de la nature par la culture, un appel à l'épanouissement de la liberté en vérité, une ascension du vouloir, individuel, collectif, vers l'univers et vers Dieu. D'un mot, un humanisme." And the object of this book is to follow "Le mouvement de cette grande âme, en quête du Soverain Bien". The result of this follow-up is, to put the matter a little more soberly, an account of Descartes' views on morals, politics and religion, an account which at all times presents his views though fairly, yet

France. 1957. Pp. viii + 248. Price 800 francs.)

This is the second book on Descartes by Roger Lefèvre that has appeared in the last few months—the first was *La Vocation de Descartes*—and there are two more to come. The series, as far as one can tell so far, is conceived not so much as the four volumes of a single unified work as a set of more or less independent studies of Descartes' thought and attitudes from different points of view. At any rate there are in each of these first two books, already somewhat repetitive on their own separate accounts, a number of passages dealing with material that can be found treated perhaps at a greater or lesser length in the other one too. It may also be helpful for prospective readers to be aware that they will be assumed to have some (rather indefinite) degree of prior acquaintance not only with Descartes' thought, but also with the facts of his life and times. In the work under present review, for example, much use is very properly made of the correspondence with Elizabeth; but it is only as he goes along and almost by the way that any reader who does not already happen to know, will discover who she was and why Descartes wrote so many letters to her. He may admittedly follow what goes on even without knowing all this from the beginning; but he is likely, if he does not know, to get from time to time the disconcerting impression that the author is not really talking to him.

account of these philosophers' opinions.

found. This is a reliable book, valuable for anybody who wants a clear account of these philosophers' opinions.

C. H. WHITELEY.

A History of Philosophy. Vol. V: *Hobbes to Hume.* By FREDERICK COPLESTON, S. J. (London: Burns Oates and Washbourne. Pp. 413. Price 3os.)

W. VON LEYDEN.

Locke wrote his *Examination of Malebranché's Opinion of Seeing All Things in God* not in 1695, as is stated on p. 203 and is indeed generally assumed, but in 1693, this being the date found at the end of one of the MS. drafts of the work. The point is of interest since it shows that Locke studied Malebranché in French, for the first two English translations of the *Recherche de la vérité* did not appear till 1694. It might be argued that it would have been advisable for Mr. Copleston (a) to have included dates in the footnotes where he refers to a philosopher's correspondence, as such matters of chronology are often relevant; and (b) to have indicated, in his otherwise most useful bibliography at the end of the volume, some of the important articles that have appeared in periodicals during the last twenty years. P. 134, note 1, the reference to Pascal's *Pensées* should be Fragment 77 (Brunschvicg), not page 77. P. 338, in the list of authors' names, read "Olgiaſti" for "Olgiaſti".

Spinoza's reputed atheism is likewise admirably objective, though I personally cannot share the author's surprise that charges of atheism, especially if justified, should ever have raised indignation; for were they not, and perhaps are even today, invariably expressed with indignation? I also wonder whether Spinoza, as Fr. Copleston is inclined to think (pp. 249-51), is inconsistent on his own premisses in maintaining a thorough determinism and at the same time speaking in terms of freedom and moral obligation. Did he not make moral advance lie in intellectual advance and this in behaviour which, though never completely undetermined, is yet free in proportion as it is *unconstrained*, i.e. undetermined by external factors? As regards Leibniz's metaphysics, Fr. Copleston attempts, rightly in my opinion, to dismiss (pp. 290, 293) the one-sided theory, propounded by Russell and Couturat, that it was almost exclusively built upon his subject-predicate logic. He also endeavours to free Leibniz from the charge of insincerity (e.g. p. 331), brought against him by Russell and others, which I have always thought belied in the case of a man who refrained from publishing his criticism of another philosopher because this one had died meanwhile and could not reply.

It remains for the reviewer to call attention to a few very minor errors and defects that occur in the book.

To return to the merits of the volume. A great advantage is that Fr. Copleston can bring his unrivalled knowledge of scholasticism to bear upon seventeenth-century philosophy, which after all retained much of the traditional and controversial questions, such as the meaning of Descartes' doctrine of "simple natures" or the role of experience in his physics. The discussion of

space is God, or else that there is something beside God which is eternal, doctrine was meant to remove—namely that "of thinking either that real was aware that here lay a seventeenth-century dilemma—one which his own became suspect to contemporary theologians. Berkeley (*Principles*, para. 117) Henry More's controversy with Descartes; it also explains why Cartesianism is relevant to an understanding of Malebranche's and Spinoza's positions and of matter as extension in regard to the problem of creation. The question is have welcomed an account of the implications of Descartes' doctrine of "characteristic" in which relations are reduced to predicates. One also might would have provided an opportunity for criticism of Leibniz's "universal" nature of relations and non-syllogistic forms of inference. The reference which he admired and which was the first to deal seriously with the independent nature of relations and non-syllogistic forms of inference. The reference not include a reference to J. Jung's *Logica Hamburgensis* (1638)—a book Richard Burthogge? I also regret that the discussion of Leibniz's logic does including the peculiarly idealist tendency which he shared with his disciple are there not further aspects of Geniux's philosophy worthy of discussion, been said about the Port Royal Logic and the writings of Pierre Nicole; and concerning matters of relatively minor importance—a little more might have perhaps by way of expansion. For instance—to hazard a few suggestions but the present volume; indeed, it would be hard to improve upon it, except as is to be expected, a detailed and extensive knowledge is evident throughout the present volume; indeed, it would be hard to improve upon it, except

This volume, the first of Professor Copleston's history of the modern era in philosophy, covers the great rationalist systems of metaphysics in vogue on the Continent during the seventeenth century, leaving the next one, volume V, to deal with the rise of modern empiricism in England during the same period. For purposes of exposition the dichotomy is inevitable and there need be no objection to this on any other grounds unless it is taken to imply which is certainly not the case with Fr. Copleston—that rationalism differed from empiricism in kind rather than merely in degree, or that the former was invariably associated with the Continent and the latter with England.

Copleston, S.J. (London: Burns Oates and Washbourne. 1958. Pp. xi + 370. Price 30s.)

A. R. LACEY.

philosophy before him" (p. 228), though not without inadequacies in the relation between God and the world which led on to Stoicism. A number of metaphysical issues are discussed, notably the relations between substance and essence in Plato and Aristotle, and there are occasional excursions into polemical controversy. Misprints, etc.: P. vii: For "224" read "244". P. 59n.: Isis and Osiris deserve an ablativ. P. 77 line 5: Omit comma after "Hippasos". P. 151 has an unattached footnote. P. 173 line 3 from bottom: For "on" read "on". P. 215 line 1: After "world" read "of". P. 220, 221: For "ingenuous" read "ingenious" (?)

in Aristotle, whose "theology came nearer biblical revelation than any and finally a reascend on the foundations laid by Socrates and Plato, culminating in expressing itself in a pullulation of dogmatism ending in sophistic scepticism; insoluble the question of "the nature of god and his creation" (p. 213-14), and due to faulty methodology and "excessively mythological concepts" rendering invisible", culminating in Heraclitus and Parmenides; a period of frustration, Greek philosophy itself is divided into three periods: an "ascent to the "dominates the field only so long as it does not enter it" (p. 25).

Revelation is "the silent and concealed judge of all speculation", and the inadequacy of this as long as it was limited to the speculative level, speculative monotheism in its place, and finally seeing, or beginning to see, the inadequacy of the unspeculative traditional polytheism, erecting a revealed truth" of Christianity (p. x). This "vision" seems to consist in seeing revelation, had an "underlying vision" which was an "analogue to the Dr. Kroner's "perspective" is that Greek philosophy, though deprived of Parmenides, Plato, and Aristotle (V, VIII, IX).

revelation will still find many interesting ideas, especially in the chapters on Kroner's belief in the all-embracing philosophical importance of the Christian its diversity into its sameness" (p. 94, on Heraclitus). But those without Dr. "The cosmos is one by integrating its multiplicity into its unity or by absorbing some acquaintance with Greek philosophy [and can deal with sentences like: development. The book is therefore best read by those who have at least requirements of this perspective, and only discusses what is relevant for its writes from a "perspective" (ch. II), but because he limits himself to the in it, not because he eschews the impossible aim of complete impartiality and Dr. Kroner's book is not so much a history of Greek philosophy as a study are transiterated. There are three indexes.

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Green, USA 1956, GB 1957, pp. xiv + 276.)

Speculation in Pre-Christian Philosophy. By RICHARD KRONER. (Longmans,

NORMAN GUILLY.

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As is to be expected, a detailed and extensive knowledge is evident throughout the present volume; indeed, it would be hard to improve upon it, except perhaps by way of expansion. For instance—to hazard a few suggestions concerning matters of relatively minor importance—a little more might have been said about the Port Royal Logic and the writings of Pierre Nicole; and are there not further aspects of Geniunx's philosophy worthy of discussion, including the peculiarly idealist tendency which he shared with his disciple Richard Burthogge? I also regret that the discussion of Leibniz's logic does not include a reference to J. Jung's *Logica Hamburgensis* (1638)—a book which he admired and which was the first to deal seriously with the independent nature of relations and non-syllogistic forms of inference. The reference would have provided an opportunity for criticism of Leibniz's "universal characteristic" in which relations are reduced to predicates. One also might have welcomed an account of the implications of Descartes' doctrine of matter as extension in regard to the problem of creation. The question is relevant to an understanding of Malebranche's and Spinoza's positions and of Henry More's controversy with Descartes; it also explains why Cartesianism became suspect to contemporary theologians. Berkeley (*Principles*, par. 117) doctrine was meant to remove—namely that "of thinking either that real space is God, or else that there is something beside God which is eternal, uncreated, infinite, etc."

A History of Philosophy. Vol. IV: Descartes to Leibniz. By FREDERICK CORPSTON, S.J. (London: Burns Oates and Washbourne. 1958. Pp. xi + 370. Price 30s.)

A. R. LACEY.

philosophy before him" (p. 228), though not without inadequacies in the relation between God and the world which led on to Stoicism. A number of metaphysical issues are discussed, notably the relations between substance and essence in Plato and Aristotle, and there are occasional excursions into polemical controversy.

Misprints, etc.: P. vii: For "224" read "244". P. 59n.: Isis and Osiris deserve an ablative. P. 77 line 5: Omit comma after "Hippasos". P. 151 has an unattached footnote. P. 173 line 3 from bottom: For "on" read "on". P. 215 line 1: After "world" read "or". P. 220, 221: For "ingenuous" read "ingenuous" (?)

A R. Lacey

in Aristotle, whose "theology came nearer biblical revelation than any and finally a reascent on the foundations laid by Socrates and Plato, culminating in expressing itself in a pullulation of dogmatisms ending in sophistic scepticism; insoluble the question of "the nature of god and his creation" (p. 213-14), and due to faulty methodology and "excessively mythological concepts" rendering "invisible", culminating in Heraclitus and Parmenides; a period of frustration, Greek philosophy itself is divided into three periods: an "ascent to the "dominates the field only so long as it does not enter it" (p. 25).

Revelation is "the silent and concealed judge of all speculation", and the inadequacy of this as long as it was limited to the speculative level, speculative monotheism in its place, and finally seeing, or beginning to see, the inadequacy of the unspeculative traditional polytheism, erecting a revealed truth" of Christianity (p. x.) This "vision" seems to consist in seeing revelation, had an "underlying vision" which was an "analogue to the Dr. Kroner's "perspective" is that Greek philosophy, though deprived of

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In the Beginning. By W. K. C. GUTHRIE. (Methuen and Co. Ltd. 1957. Pp. 151. Price 18s.)

This book represents a series of lectures given in 1957 at Cornell University. Its aim is to illustrate the transition from a mythical to a scientific approach in Greek thought on the origins of life and the early state of man. The survey is a general one, suited to a general audience, and ranges over a wide period—from very early religious ideas and myths to philosophical theories of the first century B.C. First there is a discussion of views on the origins of life, beginning with the religious idea of Earth as wife and mother, and tracing the development of naturalistic theories in Anaximander, Empedocles, Aristotle, and Theophrastus; then a discussion of views on man's early state shows how the ideas of the Golden Age myth are replaced by rationalistic accounts of the gradual development of civilization from an early form of life which was "prish" and "disorderly". Throughout there is emphasis on the influence of myth on later philosophical and scientific thought.

Professor Guthrie brings to this subject a fine scholarship which enables him to illustrate it from a wide variety of sources (detailed references to these are given in notes at the end of the book), and the result is an extremely interesting and lively account. This interest is, however, as is readily acknowledged, more historical than philosophical, in that the book is exploring by-ways from the main road of Greek philosophical thought, and the details of the exposition have, for the most part, historical interest only. I do not suggest that these by-ways are unsuited to illustrate the transition from myth to reason; indeed they are admirably suited to illustrate one aspect of this transition, since it is especially in these subjects that the earlier Greek philosophers seem to have linked their naturalistic assumptions with a method of analogy from every-day experience which readily lends itself to vivid and detailed illustration; but they are by-ways largely unrepresentative of either the principal problems or the methods of pre-Socratic philosophy, the period to which most attention is given, and only with extreme caution can generalizations be made from them to mark the nature and significance of the Greeks' philosophical advance as a whole. Professor Guthrie's presentation of this subject does perhaps make it too easy for the general reader to assume that such a generalization is possible.

These limitations on the philosophical interest of the book detract in no way, however, from its success in its primary aim, which is to show that the historical interest of the details of this subject is a considerable one. The arrangement and interpretation of this detail is skilful, often ingenious, and the style has an ease and lucidity which make the book extremely pleasant to read. Of particular interest to scholars will be the interpretation of the myth in Plato's *Protagoras*, for here the area of possible disagreement is much wider than is the case with most of the rest of the material. Guthrie rightly assumes that *Protagoras* is presenting a rationalistic account of the origins of human life and civilization, and on this basis convincingly resolves many of the apparent inconsistencies in it. He gives special attention to the objection that the virtues of justice and of respect for others are presented both as pre-conditions and as products of social life. The ground of this objection is that the myth describes these virtues as a gift from Zeus to all men to remedy their increasing fatal inability to settle in communities. It then draws reasons for the view that they belong to all men from the beliefs and practices of men in existing civilized societies (*Protagoras* is thinking particularly of democratic city-states), and ascribes men's possession of them, not to "nature", but to the teaching received through membership of such societies, in this it appears to

(this is Needham's spelling; I write, phonetically, "Lao-dz"), the founder of the later Chinese Taoism (phonetically, "Daoism"), was consequently driven to a disbelief in any divine government of the universe. He expressed this attitude so effectively and was so well supported by contemporary social conditions that Hsün Ching (I wrote "Hsüntze", now, better, "Sün-dz"), whose thoughts dominated Confucianism for the next millennium, also rejected a personal supreme God. He gave to the word *T'ien* (previously meaning "Heaven" or "God") the meaning "nature", which has clung to it ever since. So, by the third century B.C., the problem of evil, so trenchantly expressed by the Lao-dz, had ended any debate in China between theism and naturalism. This historic process, however, occurred before there was much Chinese philosophic writing. When thus the outstanding theistic philosophy, Confucianism, silently discarded its theism, nothing was said in Confucian literature about any change having occurred. So this fundamental change has remained little known to occidentals.

Needham's discussion of Daoism is, in general, very good. But he is apparently unaware that, prior to about A.D. 200, the term Daoism is an anachronism. The word *dao* was used by the Confucians, long before the Lao-dz and Juang-dz (whose name Needham spells "Chuang Tzu"), to denote the "Way" of the universe and the Confucian principle of conduct, so that *dao* was not originally a Daoist term! Even in the first century A.D., there was not yet in China any single word for what we now term Daoism. Instead there were two terms: Lao-Juang (i.e. the philosophy of the Lao-dz and Juang-dz) and Huang-Lao (i.e. the philosophy of the (mythical) Yellow Lord (*Huang-di*) and the Lao-dz). But these two doctrines are quite incompatible (something Needham fails to note). The first philosophy, now found in the works attributed to the Lao-dz and Juang-dz, makes death to be merely one of the continual metamorphoses characteristic of the universe, in which nothing is created or lost. Man should consequently feel no loss in death and should receive it obediently without the slightest sorrow. The second philosophy emphasized alchemy and the attainment of a prolonged existence upon this earth. Death was to be avoided by magical means. (Cf. Sept., '56). Since the book, *Juang-dz*, unambiguously accepts death as the inevitable end of individual existence, whereas the *Lao-dz* says little about death, the second of these two "Daoisms" could attach itself to the Lao-dz but not to Juang-dz.

It is then a mistake for Needham to use the term "Taoism" for all anti-Confucian theories, such as the *Lü-shih Chün-tzu* (he writes "*Lü Shih Chün Chün*", p. 72), the "diggers" (p. 120 f), the cult of the divine Mother Queen of the West (his "Hsi Wang Mu", p. 138), the Red Eyebrows (ibid.), for whom there is no evidence of anything more than the popular Chinese polytheism, and the Yellow Turbans (ibid.), for whom there is evidence of partly Confucian and partly Mazdean influence. These are details of history, in which Needham has been misled because he has followed the occidental "authorities." We should not complain that he did not search the primary sources—that is beyond the powers of even an encyclopedist.

This volume is an extraordinary achievement. It brings together a great amount of information concerning Chinese thinking, particularly their semi-philosophical and semi-scientific thinking. Its best sections are very good. But the book cannot be relied upon everywhere. Much more specialist research must be done before we can be sure about the details of Chinese philosophy.

H. H. Dubs.

In dealing with the major Chinese philosophers, Needham sometimes appears blind. For example, he writes, "One of the most important features of nearly all Chinese natural philosophy was its immunity from the perennial debate of Europe between the theistic world-view and that of mechanical naturalism" (p. xxiv). The facts are, however, quite different. Confucius is today recognized, by critical and unprejudiced scholars, to have been a theist, just as Socrates. Just as Socrates asserted that no evil can happen to a good man, either in this life or the next (*Apology*, 41), so Confucius, when threatened by a powerful noble, said, "Heaven (i.e. God) beget the virtue that is in me. Heaven 'T'ui—what can he do to me?" (*Analects* VII, xxii). The actual monotheism of Confucius has been hidden from us, because we use English translations of his sayings. The English language has only two generic words for superhuman beings, "gods" and "spirits", whereas ancient Chinese had three: "gods" (6430), "spirits and manes", When Confucius refused to discuss the *gwei* and *shen* ("manes and gods", *An. XI, xi*), and when he would not discuss *shen* ("minor gods", *An. VII, xx*), he was merely rejecting polytheism. He was not denying the high God (*di*), for whom he used the ancient name T'ien, "Heaven". Of Heaven, Confucius spoke many times, even saying that Heaven had sent him as a warning bell to his people (*An. III, xxiv*). This linguistic difference between English and Chinese has blinded us to Confucius' high monotheism.

This, the second volume of what promises to be an extensive survey of Chinese achievements, is an inquiry into the bearing of Chinese philosophy upon that country's scientific and technological thought. In dealing with the minor Chinese philosophers, Needham has done quite well. His study of the Later Mohists (pp. 171-184), of Tsou Yen (232-273) and of natural law (518-583) is very good. This volume represents an astonishing amount of research. There are 64 pp. of bibliography (590-653). Needham's quotations and notes indicate a wide acquaintance with the literature. There has, however, been a vast amount of misleading writing about China, so that most secondary sources cannot be trusted in detail. The time has not yet arrived when a survey of Chinese thought can be made from secondary sources, while the amount of philosophical research required to read the original and avoid the many Chinese misinterpretations and harmonizations of incompatible ideas is so great that one person can only undertake this task in a limited field.

L. C. ROBERTSON.

Appendix in which he will find the hypotheses and explanations of some physical scientists, biologists, psychologists and philosophers summarized with admirable concision. One section devoted primarily to the views of Professors Broad and Price contains a neat and lucid exposition of Bergson's theory of the brain as an organ of imitation as set forth in his *Matière et*

psi on the various special sciences and on philosophy will appreciate the general reader not disposed to make any special study of the impact of somewhat bewildering mass of literature.

The general reader not disposed to make any special study of the impact of somewhat bewildering mass of literature. belatedly entering this field and finding himself confronted with a vast and mystery-mongering, it will be of service to the serious philosophical student a subject long associated in the popular mind with occultism and medievalistic general reader to discriminate between the factual and the purely fanciful in As such it is a timely and useful production, for apart from enabling the sketch of the work done in this comparatively novel field of scientific study, Perception", is less a critical examination of *psi* phenomena than a historical Mrs. Heywood's book, though sub-titled "An Enquiry into Extra-Sensory however numerous and imposing the normal facts supporting it may be". there must be something seriously wrong with the Materialistic theory not to happen if the Materialistic theory were true. But it does happen. So phenomena, has said in regard to telepathy that it "is something which ought Professor Price, equally impressed by the philosophical implications of *psi* reconstruction of scientific cosmology.

the acceptance of the evidence for precognition would involve a considerable the principle of the priority in time of the cause to its effect. And in his view limiting principles of ordinary thought", the chief of these, perhaps, being that the phenomena of precognition undoubtedly clash with certain "basic Professor Broad and Professor H. H. Price. Professor Broad has pointed out Prominent among British philosophers who have recognized this fact are importance in philosophy can no longer be ignored.

Academic philosophy is somewhat tardily beginning to take an interest in the type of phenomena investigated by parapsychologists and societies for psychological research. The evidence collected, particularly since the beginning of the century, is so impressive and many of the results of parapsychological experimental work so startling in their implications, both philosophical and scientific, that the relevance of the whole subject to problems of central importance in philosophy can no longer be ignored.

The Sixth Sense: An Enquiry into Extra-Sensory Perception. By ROSALIND HEYWOOD. (London: Chatto and Windus, 1959. Pp. 224. Price 21s.)

C. H. WHITELEY.

far from the truth. are in the right places, and its general conclusions are, I am convinced, not up-to-date survey of the subject. It is careful and thorough. Its emphases The book as a whole may be strongly recommended. It is the most complete with anyone else's, either). satisfied with Hirst's solution of this problem (but then I am not satisfied contents to the spatial properties of the associated brain-processes. I am not culty is greatest when one tries to accommodate the spatial properties of sense- And it is odd to treat two descriptions so discrepant as that of a brain-event and that of a conscious experience as referring to the same event. The diff- anything (the physical is not, as the sensory is, a way in which things appear). On Hirst's theory, perceptual consciousness is an aspect of what, in another aspect, is a process in the brain. This account gets rid of the anomalies of causal interaction between distinct physical and mental realms. It has, how- ever, its own anomalies. It is odd to speak of physical reality as an aspect of On the representative theory, perceptual consciousness is usually supposed to be a non-physical effect of certain physical causes, viz. brain-processes, On Hirst's theory, perceptual consciousness is an aspect of what, in another aspect, is a process in the brain. This account gets rid of the anomalies of causal interaction between distinct physical and mental realms. It has, how- ever, its own anomalies. It is odd to speak of physical reality as an aspect of

(1) While the representative theory is an acceptable theoretical explanation of what perception really is, it is not a correct description of what perception seems to be to the perceiver. Perceptual consciousness neither is, nor contains as an element, a direct infallible awareness of private mental objects; it is always an apprehension of physical objects. (Since sensory qualities are not, that it is always largely a misapprehension.) It is, indeed, a probable hypothesis that perceptual consciousness is produced by a blending of two components—a basic "sentience", corresponding to the stimulation of the peripheral sense-organs, and "modifications" of various kinds and degrees, largely but not wholly due to learning. But this blending takes place unconsciously, and pure sentience cannot be recovered or isolated in consciousness.

He agrees with the representative theory. He agrees with the doctrine of primary and secondary qualities. He disagrees with the representative theory on two important points. The object; and he accepts a modified version of the doctrine of primary and secondary qualities. He disagrees with the representative theory on two important points. The object; and he accepts a modified version of the doctrine of primary and secondary qualities. He disagrees with the representative theory on two important points.

Hirst's own view is closest to the representative theory. He agrees with that theory in holding that the perception of a physical object is not a direct confrontation with the object, but is a mode of experience which is partly caused by the object, and has a content in some respects corresponding to the object; and he accepts a modified version of the doctrine of primary and secondary qualities. He disagrees with the representative theory on two important points.

There is a full discussion of the "sense-datum" analysis, of phenomenism, and of the representative theory. All these views are rejected. The arguments against them are, of course, mostly familiar; they are assembled and presented very competently. Hirst's own view is closest to the representative theory. He agrees with that theory in holding that the perception of a physical object is not a direct confrontation with the object, but is a mode of experience which is partly caused by the object, and has a content in some respects corresponding to the object; and he accepts a modified version of the doctrine of primary and secondary qualities. He disagrees with the representative theory on two important points.

Mr. Hirst's book contains a comprehensive examination of the philosophical problems and theories concerning perception. These problems arise, in his opinion, because "a study of the psychology and physiology of perception and of the characteristics of illusions and hallucinations seems to call for a radical revision of the plain man's assumptions". So he gives a good deal of attention to the psychological and physiological findings which produce these objects. But there is plenty of evidence indicating that not all these assumptions can be true. Thus the issues are not merely linguistic, and cannot be dealt with by an investigation of ordinary language—that is, the language of people who are ignorant of the scientific evidence. On this topic, Hirst makes some effective criticisms of Malcolm, Ryle and Paul.

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COLIN SMITH.

A. J. Ayer, whose empiricism is really theology. "Existentialism is based upon the evidence of the cogito, empiricism upon faith in the existence of a supreme order" (p. 190, note 3). Science too must be disavowed, because it seeks one final explanation for everything. Existentialism would be better described as one current of the thought of today, with its own handful of key ideas, but at the same time with its share of the general *Zeitgeist*. The rejection of essences is not its monopoly, any more than its misgivings about a soul which animates behaviour. In one's unfairer moments one might be tempted to conclude that a naggingly didactic tone, a cult of restlessness and a flair for showmanship are the continental embellishments added to the more pedestrian project of exorcising the ghost in the machine.

The other fault of the book, a serious one since it puts existentialism in a false relationship to other forms of thought, is the peculiarly slapdash way in which all non-exentialists are lumped together in one category of "essentialists". Nor is this any post-mortem on dead philosophies; the observations tradition persists, and one of its foremost contemporary representatives is

for the return." The family reunions and the home with its memories. The essential is to live thing is that the things by which we have lived should remain, the customs, "but it is a false absence, for his home is still there behind. . . . The essential absence of the prodigal son", writes Saint-Exupéry in *Le Petit Prince*. Advance into novelty. All is well so long as there is a return. "Sweet is that is, a familiar, substantial world, not a Sartrean world of perpetual But this solid experience tends to reconstitute a world to which a man belongs, hence the similarity of his Battle of France and Stendhal's Battle of Waterloo. Exupéry, like Stendhal, sees reality only in a concretely detailed experience, homes. The significant inter-relationship of things has been destroyed. Saint-Exupéry, like Stendhal, sees reality only in a concretely detailed experience, France of 1940. The refugees from the battle area pile their household belongings on to carts which contain, quantitatively but not qualitatively, their animated by the picture of the fragmentation of that life in the invasion of concept of a "way of life" (banal in the abstract) which is paradoxically not make sufficiently clear that in this story, or set of reminiscences, it is the unity of experience. Dr. Knight refers frequently to *Pilote de Guerre*, but does which Saint-Exupéry undoubtedly undertook, for a concrete basis of the In Chapter 3 of Part II there is a half-hearted discussion of the search

cerated self haunts the novel. It is never demolished. action the only worth-while form of self-expression? Nevertheless the incarnor (as the novel shows) communicate, has it any practical value, and is not *Humaine* is surely one of valuation. If I have a self which I can neither display fragmentary and atomic way, there is a Self. Malraux's problem in *La Condition humaine* is over and besides "myself-for-others", which my acts constitute in a out anticipations of Sartre, overlooks the fact that in so far as there is some question in relation to Malraux (pp. 150 and ff.), but in his zeal to point thing, no doubt, but fundamental and valuable. Dr. Knight deals with this substance—a self—which stands apart from what man does: a contingent in at least Malraux and Saint-Exupéry, which causes them to hanker after a One is that he fails to show adequately that there is an ambiguity, a bipolarity Dr. Knight's book has two defects, both arising from over-simplification. is imposed by the unconstrained action of man without a "nature", enough to thrive in the bracing air of a meaningless world, upon which value with their search for the One. The existentialist, like Zarathustra, is strong by the intellectuals, amongst whom it would cause consternation; they proceed happen, without panicking about it. This Humean discovery has not been made ciating. One might hazard the guess that to be lucid is to see that things just somewhat occult virtue which only the initiated can be quite sure of appreciating. One might hazard the guess that to be lucid is to see that things just true, display lucidity (Malraux being particularly strong here), but it is a offensive suspicion of thinking systematically and coherently. They do, it is place, as Dr. Knight shows, and he dutifully contrives to clear them of any selves in the approved corner-boy vernacular, but their heart is in the right an Intellectual or a Rationalist. The precursors do not, of course, express themselves in the right place, as Dr. Knight shows, and he dutifully contrives to clear them of any guilty of bad faith and becomes a Swine (saland) or, equally discretely, as Malraux has it, man is what he does. What he does, moreover, is what he freely chooses to do. If he allows himself to act in accordance with any principle of self-knowledge, or preconceived notion of the sort of person he is, he is as Malraux chooses to do. If he allows himself to act in accordance with any principle of self-knowledge, or preconceived notion of the sort of person he is, he is

Dr. Knight tells us in effect that there are two kinds of philosophy: Existentialism and The Rest. The Rest is variously designated as "classical", "orthodox" or "essentialist", and is quite homogeneous in the only respect that matters, that is, it possesses in all its forms the weakness of seeking a single explanation, justification or underlying Order in the diversity of things. Pluralism remained unknown until the writers with whom Dr. Knight deals discovered it.

The prophets who paved the way for the existentialist Messiah Sartre are Cide, Malraux and Saint-Exupéry, with a few proto-existentialists and kindred spirits such as Baudelaire, Husserl and Valéry. The theme traced through these writers is that of the "suppression of the Self". Man, individual or collective, has no "essence", no underlying, unchanging, spiritual or material substance.

Kegan Paul, 1957. Pp. xvi + 240. Price 25s.)
Literature Considered as Philosophy. By EVERETT W. KNIGHT. (Routledge and

D. D. RAHAR.

he will do so on another occasion.

and I am sorry that he did not elaborate his remarks on this topic. Perhaps equipped than most moral philosophers to talk about comparative religion, the could do with more investigations of this kind. Professor Hourani is better at civilization are substantially the same as moral standards everywhere. We creeds, for and against the idea that the moral standards of modern western chapter he surveys comparative evidence, from political and diverse religious One feature of Professor Hourani's book is particularly welcome. In a final the concept of punishment; it concerns tort, not crime.

The latter, while certainly also a claim of justice, has nothing at all to do with is not covered by Utilitarianism, his reply confuses retribution with reparation. that the element of retribution or desert in the justification of punishment always a matter of equal distribution. (3) When dealing with the objection is firm. But he makes no attempt to show that the justice of promise-keeping is the obligations of justice and are therefore covered by his revised Utilitarian-utilitarian principle, Professor Hourani replies that promises are examples of equal *distribution* can be included with satisfaction as intrinsically good. (2) When dealing with the objection that promises do not conform to the mind can be intrinsically good, but fails to explain how, in that event, (1) Professor Hourani holds, with Sidgwick and Rashdall, that only states of not connected with any confusion between logical and criteriological questions. I should perhaps mention some additional difficulties about justice that are no clouds of metaphysics.

but "intuition" as used by Sidgwick is a relatively harmless notion, trailing defect of Sidgwick's theory for Professor Hourani is that it appeals to intuition; indeed, Sidgwick's theory remains the best statement of Utilitarianism. The we must say that he has not taken us one step farther than Sidgwick; that, of morals is a theory of the criterion of right action. But in that case I fear the analysis of meaning alone and had recognized that a utilitarian theory Ex hypothesis he has already answered those questions.

do or which is the right action, he cannot mean "Which is the more useful?" or "Which is the more just?" or "Which is both more useful and more just?"

necessity to choose between doing one action which he thinks more useful and doing another which he thinks more just, and asks himself which he ought to

(3) The chief problem for Utilitarianism lies in conflicts between utility and pigeon-hole, or at least in an adjoining one. Both Sidgwick and Rashdall gave painstaking consideration to this question. Professor Hourani sees very well that it is the biggest difficulty to be faced. But how does he deal with it? He says on p. 163 that because he finds this problem intractable "the only alternative open to me, then, is to *stuff* into my definition of 'right' all that is required". The italics, I may say, are his own, but is not particularly worried because he regards his formula as a definition, because the conflicts, he says (p. 158), do not *contradict* his definition. But when a man is faced with the definition includes both utility and justice.

(1) He excuses himself from discussing Kant's view that only the good will is good, because this "is not an analysis of the *meaning* . . . of 'good'. It is a statement about . . . the detailed content of the good." As if Professor Hourani's own view were any less a statement "about the detailed content of the good". Professor Hourani explicitly rejects the method of those philosophers who put forward definitions as linguistic recommendations. He says that his definitions and other analytic propositions represent the meaning of normative terms in present-day ordinary usage. But when he comes to deal with the alleged self-evident principles of Deontologists, he is led by his definition of "right" to paradoxical conclusions. He defines the right action as the best possible, and the best as that which will bring about the most satisfaction possible and distribute it as evenly as possible. Accordingly he says that the principles "We ought to produce happiness" and "We ought to distribute happiness equitably" are analytic. On the other hand, "We ought to tell the truth" and "We ought to keep promises" have to be called inductive generalizations. Now it seems to me, as it seemed to Sidgwick, that most uses of all these propositions in ordinary language are synthetic. But if we want to call any of them analytic, the principle of obligation to keep promises stands first in the queue of candidates. On pp. 123 and 129 ("a debt . . . is merely the fact that if I pay someone I shall be doing right"), Professor Hourani implies that because of the connection between "ought" and "owe," the principle of obligation to pay debts is analytic. The obligation of debt-paying to call for being placed in the same pigeon-hole, or at least in an adjoining one.

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has yet been made altogether clear. Professor Hourani presents his theory not as a statement of criteria but as a *definition* of the present-day meaning of the most general normative terms. He deliberately commits himself to a move which, as he acknowledges, would be called by Moore an instance of the naturalistic fallacy. This is a bold step to take, and in some ways a command-

In this programme there is much to be welcomed. Utilitarianism is a theory of the first importance on the main problem of moral philosophy. Its successor, the "Ideal Utilitarianism" of Rashdall and Moore, was not, on the whole, an improvement, and I for one agree with Professor Hourani in thinking that a restatement of the utilitarian position should go back to Mill and Sidgwick for a solid base. Moore's theory was particularly defective in giving little attention to the concept of justice, and anyone who wishes to advocate Utilitarianism is well advised to follow Mill, Sidgwick, and Rashdall in recognizing a cardinal problem in the relation of justice to utility. Most important of all, it is high time we got back to debate about the criteria of right action. The scope of moral philosophy has been unduly narrowed by the recent preoccupation with logical and epistemological questions, although there is in my mind no doubt at all that the results of that preoccupation have shed light and removed illusion. Not that the relationship between the two questions in ethics

Professor Hourani (who is a graduate of Oxford and Princeton, and now teaches at Michigan) wishes to restate "in the most logical and defensible form possible" the Hedonistic Utilitarianism of Bentham, Mill, and Sidgwick. The distinctive features of his version of the theory are these: (1) Where the Utilitarians spoke of pleasure or happiness, he prefers to speak of satisfaction. (2) Like Sidgwick, and unlike Bentham and Mill, he explicitly recognizes equal distribution as a criterion of value independent of the production of a maximum amount of happiness. (3) Like Bentham and Mill, and unlike Sidgwick, he rejects the idea that satisfaction is an exercise of intuition.

Pp. 233. Price 18s.)

Ethical Value. By GEORGE F. HOURANI. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1956.

R. N. SMART.

for how it is that symbols can have new relevance (and so survive) but not for how they promote change. It shows how they are good at adapting themselves, not how they have dynamic power. Is there an ambiguity in "power" here? e.g. "Some religious symbols thus seem to have the power to go on being contemporaneous" (p. 202). (3) The term "purpose" is often qualified in sociological contexts, in that questions like "What is the purpose of X?" so easily seem to invite a defence of X (or at least an account of a possible defence of X), rather than a description of people's aims or an explanation by reference to these. Though this shoal is here nearly always avoided, yet: "We can . . . talk in terms of . . . 'purpose' when we are concerned with the rational justifications which might be offered for them" (sec. activities) (p. 276). (4) These carpings should not obscure the fact that this book contains a considerable amount of informative, interesting and convincing discussion of current sociology and anthropology. It gives a deprive themselves of significant subject-matter. It should provide food for reflection to those who are concerned about moral and political philosophy, and includes much that touches on the philosophy of religion.

NEW BOOKS

Function, Purpose and Powers. Some Concepts in the Study of Individuals and Societies. By DOROTHY EMMET. (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd. 1958. Pp. viii + 300. Price 28s.)

Summary. Professor Emmet here deals principally with three concepts which she believes to be of cardinal importance in sociology—those of *function*, *purpose* and *vocation* (in a special sense). First, it is useful for certain purposes to view a social system as one where disturbances of equilibrium are corrected internally: and here there is an application for such notions as "structure" and "function" (in line with modern trends in social anthropology one must have a flexible model of a social system—where it is conceived as a region in which there are various constellations of human relationships). Clearly, however, though a functional account of society is a realistic corrective to political philosophies which are written in terms of the concept of purpose, this latter notion is one which is required also: the teleophobia of biologists and physicists should not be carried over to the human sciences. In addition to the above two categories, we need to take note of the hair and creativity of individuals (what Professor Emmet here calls "power"). The notion linking these three others is that of "role": for first, in the flexible account of society suggested, structure is less bound up with function in its organic sense than with people's roles; second, purposes have to be worked out in relation to the web of roles which people occupy; and third, creativity as a sustained affair, which is here called *vocation*, is the exercise of individual powers in a particular role. The author considers also the social part played by religion and how it has both a conservative and a dynamic effect: in particular she examines the functions of and power in religious symbols, as a clue to understanding this ambivalence, and goes on to investigate the charismatic power of certain individuals. These latter discussions link with the distinction between open and closed morality (Popper is criticized for supposing that the rationality characteristic of the open society is enough: why should good will necessarily go along with critical intelligence?—he underestimates the need for personal dynamism in creating a new moral outlook). In such ways the author attempts to give a way of regarding society which will help us to understand not merely its institutionalized and repetitive aspects but its capacity for change. Roughly: social statics falls under functional concepts, social dynamics under purposive and vocational ones.

Comments (1) Professor Emmet criticizes Chaplin and Coon's theory as to the reason for five-day or weekly intervals between reconciliatory rituals (namely that the gap is not so long as to allow the equilibrium to become too disturbed, not so short that too few conflicts will have arisen): "It suggests too calculating a frame of mind" and is "confusing purpose and function" (p. 171). But why not similarly criticize Evans-Pritchard's account of the function of the blood feud among the Nuer (p. 85)? The careful scrutiny in this book of "function" seems to show that functional *explanations* are illusory: they are, rather, descriptions of interesting facts (that there are blood feuds, and these have a stabilizing effect) which themselves demand explanation. In this respect, *function* and *purpose* are not on a par as vehicles of faith but as sociological forces. Much that she says is convincing; but the fact that symbols have a "promissory" character, pointing beyond what is consciously seen and given to men at any one time, accounts

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ANTHONY QUINION.

world they were of an exclusively academic kind. I certainly never meant to suggest that Collingwood was lazy or that he neglected his duties: the volume and quality of his published work would plainly dispose of any such accusation. Nor did my borrowing of Belloc's phrase imply an endorsement of its point of view about academic life that it was intended to express by its author. My authority for Collingwood's refusal to answer criticism is his own *Autobiography* and for his lack of concern with administrative questions the Master of Pembroke's obituary of Collingwood in the *Proceedings of the British Academy* for 1943.

New College,
Oxford.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of PHILOSOPHY

DEAR SIR,

One of the doubtful privileges of growing old is that one can observe the process by which legend substitutes itself for history. Writing in your current issue on *Russell's Philosophical Development* Mr. Anthony Quinton gives a picture of the late Professor R. C. Collingwood which will surprise those of us who were acquainted with the man himself. In particular, he described Collingwood as "a pure example of the obscure and ineffectual don". From the context, as well as from ordinary usage, this appears to mean that Collingwood was obscure and ineffectual as a don—one who (if I may quote further) "made out that he was too busy to answer criticism or to take part in college administration or university politics".

If this is the meaning, such a view bears little resemblance to the facts. As a don, that is, as a teacher and lecturer, Collingwood, almost from the start, had the reputation of being one of the most effective in Oxford. Though frail in body, he bore an unusually heavy load of teaching and research in ancient history as well as in philosophy, and his devotion to hard work may well have contributed to his early death. He served his college well through difficult times, and in the circumstances he had every right to avoid controversy and the routine of academic administration. I cannot say what he did at college meetings, though I never heard the slightest suggestion that he avoided them; but I can say from personal experience that whether as a member or as chairman of a Board of Faculty he was neither obscure nor ineffectual: he was always effective and at times even formidable. In any case it would be a little less than charitable to describe a don as ineffectual merely because he was not one of the few who became prominent in university business.

Mr. Quinton, it is to be presumed, can hardly mean that Collingwood was obscure and ineffectual because he did not seek to be a politician or a publicist, but devoted himself to his academic duties with conspicuous success. Collingwood had his weaknesses, as we all have, and some of these became greatly exaggerated after a succession of serious illnesses. But being ineffectual was not one of them, and I should be sorry to see Mr. Quinton's picture of him accepted without a challenge. We may perhaps leave ineffectual dons to Hilatre Belloc, who was disappointed in his ambition to become one of them.

January 31, 1960.

To the Editor of PHILOSOPHY

I am sorry that my remarks about the late Professor Collingwood should have seemed to express the view that Collingwood was "obscure and ineffectual as a don". The point of the remark is to be seen in the corresponding remark about Lord Russell: "an influential public figure too lively and multifarious to be contained for long in the university". Collingwood's activities were entirely concentrated within the academic world and in that

H. J. PATON.

sciences—enough at least to know what the sciences can and cannot do. But this is a very different matter from succumbing to the clamour that all the best of them should be directed, or enticed, into scientific careers. We have learnt to see the vices of the *laissez-faire* doctrine when carried to excess. But we can reasonably deny that there is yet a considerable element of truth in Adam Smith's dictum that excessive governmental intervention in the current of nature is likely in the long run to cause more harm than good. Society is more richly endowed, and more resourceful, than any one man's conception of it. It is more able to keep itself naturally in a healthy condition than we commonly imagine. Intervention should be modest and judicious; tactical rather than strategical. It would seem not unlikely that the efflorescence of the sciences in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is a brilliant but transitory phenomenon: that in time they will settle back to become a steady and useful, but no longer hectic, adjunct to human affairs. Planning for the peak of the curve, although attractive at the moment, may well turn out to be vain and wasteful. Short-term adjustments we must make; but we should not unduly sacrifice long-term health to short-term advantages.

Precisely how the country's talent at any given time is best deployed; what proportion may safely be encouraged to enter the sciences, and what proportion to stay out, is a matter for informed and balanced judgement. But it would seem clear that for the real welfare of the country, and in the best interests of the sciences themselves, a very substantial proportion of young people entering the universities will always be best employed reading Plato and Thucydides.

*University of Auckland,
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and precision are caused to prevail, while outside all is tumult and accident. There is always something of artifice in the structure of the modern exact sciences.

We live in an unruly world, one which is primarily a whole in its own right. The elements are what they are because of being members of the greater whole. (As Locke partly realized in his more reflective moments. Cf. *Essay* IV, vi, 11.) If all the cages of a vast zoo were thrown open, we should not for long have an assembly of disciplined animals. Soon the animal society would settle into a new equilibrium with all the animals in a wild state. The notion that the universe is literally composed of the precise and discrete elements of scientific domestication, was perhaps the way in which the new men of the seventeenth century explained to themselves what they were doing. But it has never been more than a metaphysical myth. In the physical sciences the abstraction of bodies obeying the "laws of nature" yields a very useful agency for doing, but leads to absurdity if treated as the metaphysical reality of nature. (Likewise, men like Ruskin and Keynes, on similar grounds, revolted from too great subservience to classical economic theory, and its abstraction, the "economic man".)

Accordingly, we cannot build our understanding, as Huxley wanted to do, on a primarily scientific foundation. The exact sciences can never be more than our domesticated agencies. Men at bottom, and the core of human affairs, must always be essentially "wild". (A conclusion which Sir Charles Darwin recently came to, from a quite different starting point, in *The Next Million Years*.) There would be no scientific outlook, if there were no continuing prior "unscientific outlook". To universalize the scientific attitude is to cut off the branch on which one is sitting. Scientific methods are for the solution of particular problems, as they are met with in practice. The customary mode of formulation of scientific statements in universal terms is deceptive: the universality lies in the unlimited possibility of employment of the particular discipline; it is not a real universality of being.

Huxley's dream, of assisting the progress of science by banishing discourse of spirit and spontaneity from all regions of human thought, is self-contradictory. The man who directs the science must himself be above the science. The cleverly constructed province of "matter and causation" must be ruled by minds in the full enjoyment of "spirit and spontaneity". For all our talent to be devoted to the internal conduct of the sciences would be like sending the ship's captain and his officers down to the engine-room to help stoke the fires. It would defeat its own purpose, and could only lead to the doubtful expedient of sending the engineers up to the bridge to pilot the ship. It is always the well-informed "wild" man, not trained expertise alone, which directs affairs.

The old classical literary education cultivates those primary talents which are needed in the natural world of profusion and conflict; where good judgment and flexibility and understanding of human nature are needed to handle the normal unruliness of affairs. The conventional scientific education turns away from this; it trains men intensively for work in the artificial enclaves where confusion is systematically expelled and order made to prevail. An exclusively scientific education would create efficient agents, but of itself trains the mind admirably in one direction, but leaves all the rest to chance; and it is in what is left to chance that the elements of primary importance, and we live in a jungle (and always will) and in a jungle the huntsman is a more valued companion than the animal trainer.

Probably all students in these days can profit by some acquaintance with the

Huxley's confidence in the omniscience of the sciences was unbounded. Certainly, his notion that the sciences can take over some field and bring order and system where before there was confusion and dimness, is not without a measure of plausibility. When Western science is brought to a barbarous country, the mists of ignorance, terror, and superstition are rolled back; scientific agriculture replaces fertility rites; modern hospitals drive out the witch doctor; schools supplant tribal initiations. All this we may readily grant. But how far does it take us? Do the scientific methods really impinge on the central core of human endeavour, or are they rather in the nature of very clever agencies by which we achieve our purposes? Admitted that there is "feed-back", that our purposes are enlarged and diversified by the possession of these agencies: but agencies they remain. In view of Huxley's claim of omniscience: that the sciences in some sense can, and should, drive out spirit and spontaneity and occupy the central place, it would seem to be time to make a new appreciation of the situation. If Huxley is right, then the more scientific training we institute, the better: not only to meet a present emergency, but so as to promote the general welfare of the human race, both morally and materially. If, on the other hand, the claim of omniscience is excessive, then the claims of scientific education would needs be more modest.

is made fundamental. Huxley, the practical effect is little different: scientific enquiries are moved from a peripheral significance into a central significance; the scientific approach it be materialism as commonly understood, or the refined agnosticism of nothing but obscurity and confusion of ideas" (*ibid.*, p. 164). But whether alternative, or spiritualistic, terminology is utterly barren, and leads to a set of symbols most conducive to the progress of science, whereas "the scepticism" of David Hume; he uses the language of materialism as that he himself eschews materialism in the vulgar sense, and subscribes to the Physical Basis of Life" in *Method and Results*, p. 159.) Huxley explains human thought of what we call spirit and spontaneity. (From his Essay of causation, and the concomitant gradual banishment from all regions of than ever, means, the extension of the province of what we call matter and science will admit, that its progress has, in all ages, meant, and now, more quest, T. H. Huxley, wrote: "Anyone who is acquainted with the history of counsel. A century ago that indomitable campaigner for the scientific sciences have been strenuously promoting their claims, heedless of warning judicious Locke discerned for them. Nevertheless, the protagonists of the progress has been within the intrinsic limitations which the cautious and time, the exact sciences have made great progress. But it would seem that the understanding (cf. *Thoughts Concerning Education*, §§ 190 f.). Since Locke's ment for a young man. But they could never occupy a central place in human An acquaintance with the various systems would be an elegant accomplishment. The sciences could minister to the comfort and well-being of the human race. reach the essences of things and would always be a groping in the half dark nature, never be more than peripheral. Natural philosophy could never this matter. His general conclusion was that the new sciences could, by their inception of the modern scientific era, John Locke undertook an enquiry into depend on our notion of the role of the exact sciences in the world. At the youthful talent to the scientific field likely to lead to good? The answer will doubtless has some force. But on a longer term view, is such a diversion of If we restrict our perspective to immediate practical exigencies the argument trivial.

testinal Calculus and the Quantum Theory of Radiation. The former studies, the argument would run, are agreeable but barren, the latter are austere but

The old controversy between the classical education in the humanities and the modern kind of education in the sciences is frequently before us in these times. Russia is rapidly gaining ascendancy in scientific achievement; England and the United States of America are urged to meet the challenge by increasing the pressure of a scientific training for all capable of it. Is such a policy really desirable? From one point of view it might seem merely a matter of changing the subjects to be studied at school and university. Instead of the talented youth reading Plato and Thucydides, he is to be directed to the Inmi-

GAVIN ARDLEY

WHAT KIND OF EDUCATION?

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California.

Hume would argue, I am convinced, that analysis need have no such restrictive import, that it consists precisely in a search for new laws of thought and new properties of experience, and that it is an attempt to isolate more exactly those entities to which our most important philosophic conceptions refer. And if, by such an analysis, it is discovered that a concept—such as that of necessary connection—pertains to a mental determination, then a proposal to use language in a certain way is not an arbitrary fiat, but rather a suggestion founded upon increased knowledge of the nature of the situation. While it is certainly possible to quarrel with Hume's assumptions and to question his assertions, it is difficult to do either by attributing to him a purpose and a set of conclusions which are wholly foreign to his manifest intention and his written philosophical position.

Hume would argue, I am convinced, that analysis need have no such restrictive import, that it consists precisely in a search for new laws of thought and new properties of experience, and that it is an attempt to isolate more exactly those entities to which our most important philosophic conceptions refer. And if, by such an analysis, it is discovered that a concept—such as that of necessary connection—pertains to a mental determination, then a proposal to use language in a certain way is not an arbitrary fiat, but rather a suggestion founded upon increased knowledge of the nature of the situation. While it is certainly possible to quarrel with Hume's assumptions and to question his assertions, it is difficult to do either by attributing to him a purpose and a set of conclusions which are wholly foreign to his manifest intention and his written philosophical position.

removed from the text and which strains quite severely the confines of statements, Professor Lazero-witz renders a reading of Hume which is far desire to exaggerate the similarities and dissimilarities between types of he seems to assume that the only basis for proposing linguistic alteration is a it forced to argue that any philosopher who has claimed to have done anything for linguistic alterations are the only options open to the philosopher. And he is forced to the conclusion that descriptions of linguistic usages and proposals vinced that it is impossible to discover new information about phenomena, he share the same conception of analysis. Because Professor Lazero-witz is con- preceding difficulty arises because Hume and Professor Lazero-witz do not (3) In the third place, it is, I think, worth suggesting that much of the things."

we speak is a felt necessity of the *mind* and not an observable property of sequences but not to others. As a result we know that the *necessity* of which know far more specifically why it is that we attribute causal connection to some sequences of impressions which they have always referred to. But now, we one. Certainly causal verbs can and must still be used to refer to those refer—far from being in any sense arbitrary—my analysis is the only correct pulsion. Having explored all of the other impressions to which this idea might of necessary connection *can denote* is that internal impression of mental com- function within the human mind, it follows that the only thing which the idea

discover new information about phenomena. In every case, if we look hard enough, we can discover that "the new 'properties' are nothing more than disguised language alterations".¹

In this note I wish to state very briefly why I believe each of the above points to be incorrect.

(1) In the first place, it is evident that if Hume could not have found some prior impression of necessary connection, he would not have been justified in speaking of the idea of necessary connection. If Hume had not located an impression of necessity, Professor Lazzerowitz might have good grounds for arguing that Hume must have been doing something else when he analysed causality. But Professor Lazzerowitz is, I submit, quite incorrect in his assertion that Hume never did find an impression of necessary connection. While Hume does at times seem to suggest that there is no impression of necessity, in both *A Treatise of Human Nature* and *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, Hume explicitly announces that he believes he has discovered the impression of necessary connection. The only peculiarity lies in the fact that this impression is not like most other ones. Rather than being a property of objects or an external relation, it is an impression which is produced in the mind by the observation of repeated causal sequences, i.e. sequences related by contiguity and succession.

"... After a frequent repetition of such sequences, I find that upon the appearance of one of the objects the mind is *determined* by custom to consider its usual attendant, and to consider it in a stronger light upon account of its relation to the first object. It is this impression, then, or *determination*, which affords me the idea of necessity."²

The impression of necessary connection is an internal rather than an external impression; it is, nevertheless, the impression of which the idea of necessity is a copy.

(2) In the second place, it seems quite implausible to argue—as Professor Lazzerowitz does—that Hume was seeking to point up the similarities between causal necessity and accidental occurrence, or that Hume sought "by linguistic fiat" to deprive causal verbs of their use. On the contrary, Hume's analysis of causality would appear to have the following two implications:

(a) Hume would insist, I believe, that when we assert of any object that it is the cause of some given effect (or the effect of some given cause) the only thing we can mean is that in the past the two impressions have been experienced in the relations of contiguity and succession. As a result of the repeated experiencing of this sequence, some sort of internal compulsion to pass from the given cause to the expected effect is produced in the mind of the perceiver. Accidental occurrences are to be distinguished from causal connections, Hume would insist, precisely because this inward determination is lacking in the former case. To put it in a more contemporary idiom: We mean, when we say of two events that they are only accidentally related, that we do not feel any psychological compulsion to believe that the one will invariably follow the other. (b) More importantly, perhaps, Hume would argue that under no circumstances is he seeking to deprive causal verbs of their use. Rather, he would assert that he is giving the only possible correct criteria for their use. His argument might be something like this: "Given that impression-idea phenomenaism which is the only true basis for an understanding of human knowledge, and given an awareness of the ways in which the laws of association

¹ Morris Lazzerowitz, "Moore and Philosophical Analysis", etc., p. 217. Cf. *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, Sec. VII, Part II.

² Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, Part III, Sec. XIV. Cf. *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, Sec. VII, Part II.

In his article entitled "Moore and Philosophical Analysis",¹ Professor Morris Lazero-witz selects Hume's analysis of causality as an example of the way in which philosophers have in the past misleadingly stated what they were trying to do. Professor Lazero-witz asserts at least three things of Hume's analysis. (i) Since Hume insisted that there was no impression of necessary connection, it follows that Hume could not have been examining sequences of events. (2) Therefore, Hume must have been doing something else; namely, mis-leadingly calling attention to the fact that it always makes literal sense to say of any two supposedly causal events that they are only accidentally connected. Hume, in other words, deprived causal verbs of their use "by linguistic fiat" so that he could more pointedly illustrate the likeness between causal and accidental-occurrence statements. (3) All of this goes to prove, Professor Lazero-witz concludes, the fallaciousness of the belief that it is possible by analysis to

¹ Morris Lazero-witz, "Moore and Philosophical Analysis", *Philosophy*, XXXIII, No. 126 (July 1958).

HUME AND PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS A REPLY TO PROFESSOR LAZEROWITZ RICHARD WASSERSTROM

"The 'Mental' and the 'Physical'", in *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, vol. II (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1958), p. 444.
"Systematically Misleading Expressions", *P.A.S.*, XXXII, 1931-2, p. 170.

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Res venit ad Trivios. Lazero-witz's weighty contentions lead to a deadlock. Will philosophy have to accept it?

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scientific knowledge rationally and critically. However, but it is certainly different and more difficult, namely to appraise theories? I do not know whether the task of the epistemologist is sub-task than the detection of the sources in linguistic idioms of . . . absurd in Ryle's reflection that he would rather assign to philosophy a "sublimar pet "ism". Isn't there, on the contrary, perhaps a trace of melancholy "discontents" do not weep over paradises lost, about the sad dissolution of with rigorous scientific reasoning to realize how serious the issue is. The hardly be rewarded. After all, philosophers of science are, on the whole, better equipped than analysts who frequently are too little acquainted of language should not be roundly dismissed as out-dated adherents of "on a perdu." Those who reject P-A in the exclusive sense of an analysis from Marcel Proust says somewhere: "Les vrais paradis sont les paradis observables," in our experience; they are not truncated entities separated

4a. Philosophy of science, i.e. the contemporary version of epistemology, is untenable without some presuppositions: scientist-philosophers seek to comprehend the world which they believe to be intelligible; language cannot be completely severed from facts and events; there are unanalysable concepts; common-sense knowledge is not infallible; interpretation of data, laws and theories is primarily descriptive though it can be explicatory at times; scientific inquiries may render structural patterns transparent, invent or discover hypotheses and principles, and confirm (or falsify) their validity. Are these tenets compatible with Lazero-witz's conception of $P-A$? His lucid, elegant account of Hume's analysis of causality might have answered this question, were it not for the regrettable fact that he refrained from dealing with the most important issue, referred to in 4.

Wittgenstein remonstrated with philosophers for being concerned with the general case, on the ground that that was the job of mathematicians. Other authors advocate or defend the not very convincing thesis that each statement has its own logic.¹ I do not know whether Lazero-witz subscribes to such views which reduce philosophy of science to a travesty of genuine systematic knowledge. None the less, even if Lazero-witz upholds such ideas, he still has to decide upon his position regarding the possibility of basic information about the world. The sharp demarcation line between language and scientific knowledge, logic and experience, philosophy and science must be abandoned as uncertain. Einstein's analytic investigation of the nature of space and time was a philosophical achievement as well as a contribution to empirical science. Philosophy is indeed verbal—though not a "critique of language" as Wittgenstein thought—but so are the propositions and formulae of science; a formalized symbolic language is merely neater, more rigorous than colloquial language. I therefore agree with Russell that no responsible scientist would deny the "propriety of analysis".² But if $P-A$ is $C-A$ in the narrow linguistic sense, then there is no alternative left but to succumb to the epistemologically vacuous verbal manoeuvres imposed by the ultramontane orthodoxy of analysis.

Res venit ad Trivium. Lazero-witz has cast light on a problem which gravely affects all philosophizing: the relation between $P-A$ and philosophy of science. Recent discussions as to the truth or value or meaning of physical theories clearly show that we shall land in a hopeless impasse if we continue to be inimical to every sort of empirical realism. Popper has stressed that the most exciting questions resulting from the progress of science will remain obscure to those who "confine themselves to analysing . . . common-sense knowledge or its formulation in ordinary language".³ The analysis of scientific cognition cannot be equivalent to linguistic analysis—it can only incorporate it as a concomitant method in our reasoning. Theoretical concepts, avers Feigl, are "anchored" in the

¹ E. g. J. O. Urmson: *Philosophical Analysis* (Oxford, 1956), p. 179.
² *Tractatus*, 4.0031.
³ "Philosophical Analysis", *The Hibbert Journal*, July 1956, p. 329.
⁴ *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (London, Hutchinson, 1959), p. 18.

(A) bodies move with relative motion to each other; (B) the expression "absolute motion" is meaningless, for it is not verifiable (*konsitierbar*).¹ But to say that a body moves, means that it is changing its position. And since the position is only determined by its distance to other bodies, the concept of motion is intrinsically relative. Hence, (A) is analytic—in fact, it is a tautology. Interpretations of this kind are admittedly classificatory, yet they also express synthetic scientific knowledge; they are neither trivial nor commonplace. To call a highly complex procedure involving a multitude of diverse criteria in addition to data of experience a merely classificatory analysis, is endowing this term with unwarranted elasticity and range. The elucidation of concepts and propositions can only be a preliminary process for the more essential task to organize the ever-growing findings of our knowledge of the world.

3a. Lazero-witz regards *actual* analysis as trivial, and he adduces conclusive reasons for doing so. In contradistinction, *conversion* analysis (C-A) provokes some interesting queries. To begin with, he seems to be quite successful in circumventing the so-called paradox of analysis: suppose analysis and analysisans to be equivalent, then the analysis is trivial though true; if there is no equivalence, the analysis is inexact and possibly false. In other words, a correct analysis requires a definite, finite set of concepts. Lazero-witz admits a constructive, creative aspect of C-A and thus avoids another pitfall, namely the "paradox of the paradox of analysis". For, granting for the sake of argument that P-A is to dissolve paradoxes stemming from inexact use of language, a simple illustration will indicate the problem at stake.

Take a string of beads of the same colour; they may either be of equal or of different sizes, as long as they are arranged in symmetrical order. C-A would then consist in replacing some or all of the beads by others of different colour. Such an alteration or conversion could be aesthetically creative and often even attractive. Note that a string of beads carries its own measure within itself, as its beads are discrete and denumerable.² So far the analogy between sentence and beads holds. *Per contra*, a concept can be likened to a uniform thread which does not contain its measure within itself. By parity of reasoning it follows that any measure has to be found by extra-linguistic reference, provided we wish to assert something of cognitive value in the philosophy of science. Putting it another way: there are multifarious meta-languages, but a meta-ordinary-language cannot exist.

The philosopher of science could therefore be confronted with the dilemma of crude, uncontrolled metaphysics or a P-A (alias C-A) which might afford him the gratification he may derive from playing with beads of different colours. On these grounds, is Lazero-witz prepared to expand the epistemological range of C-A rather than its linguistic connotation so that P-A can be effectively applied to the analysis of scientific discussions in general and physical theories in particular?

¹ H. Thirring: *Die Idee der Relativitätstheorie* (Wien, Springer, 1948), pp. 4-5.
² M. von Lane: *History of Physics* (New York, Academic Press, 1950), p. 10.

M. Black, in the preface of *Philosophical Analysis* (Ithaca, Cornell U.P., 1950).

The simplest formulation of the principle of special relativity claim that analysis is nothing but sheer clarification cannot be supported rather than trite expressions as material for his clarificatory analysis, it potential?) As Lazzerowitz chooses philosophic and scientific concepts tain that such analyses are a challenge to the philosopher's cognitive eat an apple". Perhaps I am facetious, but can anybody sincerely maintain the harmless, common-sense type, e.g. "I am seeing aunt Esmeralda one fail to appreciate the significance of analysing empirical statements ing distinct their "hidden parameters" or constituents. (However, I for sions, for unfolding their sometimes ambiguous meanings and for render doxes. There exists today a predilection for elucidating familiar expres shipsod language-habits can generate contradictions and lead to par system, that people are prone to commit grammatical errors, and that One may add the further truisms that everyday language is not a closed course, it is commonplace that all, not only ordinary, language is vague pragmatic considerations will ultimately prove cognitively aid. (Cists solely of syntactic substitutions at the expense of semantic and dictum becomes conclusive when one realizes that any $P-A$ which co "clarification" is no less equivocal than "analysis".¹ The validity of this 2a. It has been stated, with a large measure of plausibility, that

science.

analysis, his exegesis of $P-A$ is scarcely acceptable to philosophy of operational method, as the only legitimate interpretation of concept Therefore, when Lazzerowitz urges us to consider activity, viz. a condition of an analysandum.

the dogmatic claim that an analysans must be the necessary and sufficient a meaning criterion. This concession is, of course, hardly compatible with (activities) so that they are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for of tautologies. The situation can only be met by restricting operations physics as well as in everyday language, the outcome would be a levithan late radically by employing an operational method in logic, mathematics, (events, objects). In other words: if we adopt Lazzerowitz's *activity* position cance when we do not insist that "somewhere" $P-A$ must resort to facts the correlated set of operations. But the latter statement loses its significance when we have propounded the view that a concept is synonymous with physics in use and not in explicit definitions, and philosophers as well as 1a. Others, too, have skillfully argued that philosophy issues in defini

scrutiny.

correctly. On this assumption the following remarks are submitted for These four points reflect, I think, the gist of Lazzerowitz's contention might suggest "true views which give basic information about the world" 4. It appears as if Lazzerowitz rejects the possibility that philosophy

type, however, is tantamount to $P-A$ proper which can be nothing else than *linguistic alteration*. Yet whereas actual analysis is trivial, $P-A$ (i.e. conversion analysis) is creative, though only in the sense that language is subtly changed.

analysis. The former is the straightforward case of ordinary analysis (e.g. Moore's hackneyed paradigm "A brother is a male sibling"). The latter

denoted by a term" by the phrase "literal use of a term". The purpose is obvious: words such as "meaning" and "concept" can wrongly be regarded as objects. To avoid this ostensibly false interpretation he proposes the term "literal use", that is, *activity*.

In an incisive paper¹ Lazzerowitz examines the technique of analysis. He rightly claims that the nature of philosophical analysis ($P-A$) is a mystery, and it is simple enough to corroborate his opinion. To worsen matters, under the expression $P-A$ are subsumed the following types of analysis: empiricist, phenomenalist, new-level, reductive, traditional, logical, logical, formal, casuistic, contentual, methodological, epistemological, linguistic, and meta-analysis. The term $P-A$ has, no doubt, become an "umbrella" slogan. Now, Lazzerowitz has introduced additional labels for specific techniques and thereby touched on issues that are of critical relevance to the philosophy of science. A penetrating piece of philosophical reasoning is one that either provokes controversy or evokes a new pertinent questions, he has accomplished both. Let me briefly condense the most salient of his contentions.

ROBERT OPPENHEIMER tells the story about a group of Bible scholars who practised exegesis with grim determination. A visitor, admiring so much earnest learning, inquired whether they did not find certain texts supremely difficult. Answered one Bible student: "Indeed—but what we do not understand we explain to one another."

A REPLY TO M. LAZEROWITZ

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND ANALYSIS

Plas Penrhyn,
Penrhynenddraeth,
Merioneth.

the arguments for the subjectivity of ethical values, but I find myself incapable of believing that all that is wrong with wanton cruelty is that I don't like it. I have no difficulty in practical judgments, which I find that I make on a roughly hedonistic basis, but, when it comes to the philosophy of moral judgments, I am impelled in two opposite directions and remain perplexed. I have already expressed this perplexity in print, and I should deeply rejoice, if I could find or be shown a way to resolve it, but as yet I remain dissatisfied.

DISCUSSION

NOTES ON PHILOSOPHY, JANUARY

1960

BERTRAND RUSSELL

The article on my theory of descriptions by Mr. Lejewski raises two points. One is as to the copula. I do not quite understand why it is thought that an ambiguity in the meaning of the word "is" is relevant in regard to my theory of descriptions. There are many problems in regard to which it is relevant. I have mentioned one of these in criticizing Hegel in *Our Knowledge of the External World* on p. 39n of the original edition (1914). But, although I have read Mr. Lejewski's argument several times, it still seems to me quite clear that in "Scott is the author of Waverley" the "is" is that of identity. Nor have I been able to understand why he considers his theory of descriptions preferable to mine. I am, however, quite willing to believe (and I say this in all sincerity) that there is some point that I have missed in his discussion.

He says: "According to Russell, no description, whether definite or indefinite, can be defined in isolation. This I take to mean that there are no identities of the type ' $a = b$ ' where ' a ' is a description and ' b ' is an expression which can be regarded as a definiens of the description." I thought I had demonstrated what I take this to mean by the illustration that "George IV wished to know whether Scott is the author of Waverley" but did not wish to know whether Scott is Scott. I do not find in Professor Lejewski's article anything that I feel to be a refutation of this position. I do not suggest that there is any positive error in what Mr. Lejewski substitutes for my theory. I say only that he has shown no error in mine, and that his is much more complicated.

In connection with the problem of descriptions, there is one point in Mr. Anthony Quinton's article which calls for some comment. I said that Mr. Strawson did not distinguish between the problem of descriptions and the problem of egocentricity, and that I had dealt with both. Mr. Quinton, as regards egocentric words, says of me, "He has certainly recognized that there are such words, but this, though important, is a platitude." One would hardly guess from this that I have discussed such words at great length in *Human Knowledge*, particularly in Part II, Chap. IV, and Part IV, Chap. II, and that, at least in large part, the purpose of the whole book is to show that all empirical words are in an important sense egocentric. Nor does Mr. Quinton or Mr. Strawson notice that in the problems which I am discussing when I deal with descriptions the words "the present King of France" can be replaced by "the King of France in 1905", which is no more egocentric than any other phrase concerned with empirical matters. In all other respects, I am grateful for Mr. Quinton's very friendly article.

The only thing further that I have to say concerns Mr. Monro's article on my moral theories. I am not, myself, satisfied with what I have read or said on the philosophical basis of ethics. I cannot see how to refute

the distinction between Civil Society and the State was something more than second-rate. Nor can I agree that the *Philosophy of Right* reveals a "deep loss of integrity both in his character and in his thinking" (p. 320). The views which Findlay criticizes there were held by Hegel in 1807 and even in 1802, as the quotations in Bradley's "My Station and its Duties" make clear.

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the most baffling of philosophical writings; it is to recognize only to what extent it is a document of its time, which charts the intellectual Odyssey open to a Hegel, or at most a German of Hegel's generation and general outlook, but no longer available as a live possibility to us. Hegel's lectures, again, could be allowed to have something less than the coherence of a logical system, in so far as their material is plainly derived from their author's knowledge of the history and practice of art and religion and the history of philosophy; their unity is, to some extent at least, externally imposed. But how could anything similar be said of Hegel's *Logic*? What is the source of its concepts, if they are not supposed to arise necessarily one from another? (Mr. Mure suggested that they, or some of them, represent different positions taken up in the history of philosophy, but Findlay does not notice this suggestion, nor, I think, would Hegel allow that the development of philosophy had only a sort of aesthetic coherence). And if they are supposed to arise necessarily one from another, what precisely is their relationship? Findlay has some interesting passages in which he maintains that Hegel understood terms like "identity" and "contradiction" in ways different from those with which we are familiar in logic; yet even if we allow Hegel to take these notions, and presumably others like negation, in what may be called a broad sense, the way in which one Hegelian category leads on to another is still not clear. What is clear is that Hegel thought that they *must* develop as a series, and could only develop in a single way. Remove this element from his system, and it is hard to see that it is recognizably the same.

I suspect that Findlay is more complacent on this point than he should be because, to him, the proof of the Hegelian pudding is in the eating: it is the applied philosophy he really cares for, not the pure theory it is supposed to embody. Something else may enter into the matter too, namely his tendency to see Hegel as a Wittgenstein before his time, a dialectical thinker in the sense in which Wittgenstein was a dialectical thinker, brilliantly moving from position to position and in doing so exposing prejudice, pomposity and the unlimited capacity of the human mind not to think. A dialectic of this kind clearly has no particular beginning or end. But though I think it is true that Hegel and Wittgenstein stand close together here, especially if we confine our attention to the Hegel of the early writings and the *Phenomenology*, and though I believe it is legitimate for an expositor to seize on this aspect of his thought to make it come alive, the fact remains that there are also less palatable features to Hegelianism. Hegel was a systematic thinker as Wittgenstein was not once he repudiated the *Tractatus*; for all his antipathy to formal logic, he retained a fondness for logical distinctions of a sort, which the later Wittgenstein did not share. Whether we like it or not, we cannot really have Hegel without the system, and we cannot have the system without taking the Dialectic for the logical instrument it was intended to be.

As an unargued postscript I should like to add that I find Findlay's verdict on Hegel as a political and social theorist a surprising one. I can see what he means when he describes Hegel's thought on these matters as "provincial"; I cannot help thinking, however, that a man who grasped

had better not put too much stress on Reason; you should pay attention to the deliverances of Experience, too. The result is that in his applied philosophy he often writes like a wilder, more imaginative, in some ways more penetrating, Kant. But his doing so can scarcely be taken as a merit in view of his professions and pretensions.

If we accepted Findlay's view of Hegel as an empiricist we should, it seems to me, solve one problem about him only to land ourselves with another: that of the status and interconnection of the concepts of Hegel's *Logic*. What sort of concepts are these supposed to be and (to put it crudely) where do they come from? We all know of Kant's heroic and (to Kant was troubled by the point, said that Kant had not been to great pains to find out just which concepts were categories. Presumably he thought himself in a better position to deal with the problem thanks to his possession of the Dialectic. But how exactly does the Dialectic help here? And how can one think that it helps at all if one believes, like Findlay, that it is the generic name for a variety of kinds of linkage, none of them of a strictly logical type?

Findlay does not deny that Hegel tried to make out that the Dialectic was a rigorous process, with a necessity akin to, though importantly different from, that manifested in a mathematical system; he agrees that Hegel thought that, if you began with the concept of pure Being, than which nothing could be simpler, and really thought philosophically, you would be carried on *inevitably* to the finally satisfactory category, the Absolute Idea. But he says that if we look at Hegel's practice, we find that "his transitions are only necessary and inevitable in the rather indefinite sense in which there is necessity and inevitability in a work of art" (p. 74). This verdict is repeated at many places in the book: on p. 109 we learn that Hegel's procedure at one particular point in the *Phenomenology* shows that he "may be said to laugh at" the pains of those who seek a strict deductive necessity in his transitions; on p. 182 that the passage from Measure to Essence in the *Logic* is permissive, not obligatory; on p. 195 that the transition to Ground inside Essence involves "a considerable amount of arbitrariness"; finally on p. 334 that when Hegel comes to treat subjects like aesthetics, religion and the history of philosophy in his lectures his "empirical spirit seems to range in barefoot delight over the broad fields of beauty, worship and speculation, quite freed from the pinch and creak of dialectical boots". I cannot believe that all this is equally well-judged. For surely it is one thing to maintain that the *Phenomenology* (which, as Royce showed, has some of the characteristics of a philosophical novel) possesses no more than aesthetic coherence, and quite another to say the same of Hegel's *Logic*. The contents of the first work may be allowed to be in some degree arbitrary: even if its starting-point in naive perceptual consciousness, and its termination in the absolute knowledge of philosophy, were regarded as fixed, it would not follow that to get from one to the other we had to pass through, say, the unhappy Consciousness or the Religion of Light. This is not to detract from the merit of the *Phenomenology*, among the most brilliant as well as

It follows that Hegel's logical notions cannot of their own nature serve as a source of particular knowledge; at most they will help us find our way about in the jungle of contingent data. The Idea is, in the last resort, not so much constitutive as regulative (cf. p. 253).

My difficulty with all this is that it would, if correct, make the gulf between Hegel and Kant far less deep than Hegel himself was apt to suggest: the *Philosophy of Nature* would turn out to be no more than an improved version of the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*. Perhaps this was all it was intended to be, but if so, Hegel's empiricist conscience seems to have been less stringent than Kant's, for there is no analogue in the latter to Hegel's attacks on Newton's ideas about colour and Dalton's theory of chemical composition. Hegel's alleged "paralogisms" would certainly disappear on this account of the matter, but so would his polemic against the abstractions of the Understanding, for the kind of content Findlay claims here for the Concrete Universal could be claimed for any universal which was not a simple idea. I cannot believe that Hegel was enough of a Kantian to be happy with that, and suspect that the truth is rather that, here as elsewhere, he wanted to have things both ways: to say at once that even the concepts of his own *Logic* were abstract, and yet that Reason, and nothing but Reason, constitutes the world. But he was of course sensible enough to see that, in practice, you

at once. But these matters must be left without discussion here, and I must pass on to some of Findlay's other main points.

Was Hegel an empiricist? The suggestion that he was must have surprised Professor Ayer, who, odd as it may seem, first encouraged Findlay to write his book. Yet it must be admitted that Findlay has shown beyond reasonable doubt not only that Hegel had a wide knowledge of empirical fact, but further that he was prepared to twist the Dialectic to accommodate what had been empirically established. The question is, however, whether he should have been willing to make any such accommodation. When Hegel wrote, speaking about the comets, whose erratic behaviour apparently offended him, "Was vorhanden ist muss notwendig im Begriffe gehalten seyn" (cf. Findlay, p. 277), was this the reluctant concession of a thwarted rationalist, or the platitude of a sound empiricist? Findlay, although he admits that Hegel's pronouncements on the matter are ambiguous, argues stoutly that he was not a rationalist in any indefensible sense. In particular, it was never his ambition to deduce individual facts from general ideas. The Concrete Universal is self-specifying only in the sense that it is differently realized in its different species and sub-species; as Findlay puts it himself (p. 226):

The thought of logic . . . while in a sense purely formal, without the rich content which will accrue to it from the study of nature and mind, has, none the less, Hegel holds, a content, a material, a "reality" peculiar to itself. If it does not (we may say) include the kind of references which are expressed by individual and predicate constants, it at least contains the kind of references which are expressed by individual and predicate variables.

potentiality and actuality, a set of ideas in terms of which whatever falls within experience can be rendered intelligible; the fact that he thought that pure form existed is incidental to his metaphysics, not of their essence. Leibniz, again, began his philosophical career as a materialist, and devised his concept of the monad to overcome the difficulties into which, he believed, anyone who persisted with materialist ideas was inevitably led. There is little or no evidence that he despised the familiar world and was enamoured of the Beyond for its own sake; his interest in things supersensible was surely due to the light he thought they threw on things sensible. I do not say that all metaphysical writers can be treated in this way (Plato's case presents the most obvious difficulties), but perhaps enough has been said to suggest that Hegel is less unique in this respect than Findlay appears to believe.

Findlay's general account of Hegel raises a difficult question which he glances at rather than solves, namely how we are to decide whether or not to accept a particular overall conceptual scheme. In one place (at the beginning of his discussion of Hegel's logic) he writes: "It is obvious that there can be no question (in the ordinary sense of the words) of either truth or validity in such a series of recommendations [i.e. of progressively more adequate ways of comprehending]. There can only be questions regarding the linguistic or conceptual adequacy or satisfactoriness of its terms" (p. 131). I take this rather obscure pronouncement to imply that criticism of a system like Hegel's can in the end only be internal: you have to see the world as Hegel sees it to make sense of what he says. But I am not sure either that this is what Findlay finally wants to say on this point, or that he would be correct if it were. As he points out himself, metaphysical theories have a necessary relation to fact, though it is not the direct relation which scientific theories have. You cannot definitively refute a metaphysical theory, since a metaphysician, by the nature of his office, has the last word to say on any matter on which he chooses to pronounce; but you can, all the same, reject his version, not so much as untrue, but as unpalatable. What makes one find a metaphysical theory unpalatable is, I suggest, a feeling that it fails to cover the facts. I admit that this is unsatisfactory, especially to people who commonly move in circles where clear-cut decisions, backed by compelling reasons, are the order of the day; but I think it is as much as can be reasonably claimed on this subject. Those whose business is with the humanities, and who know how hard it is to produce knock-down arguments to support a literary reading or even a large-scale historical interpretation, may recognize the metaphysician's predicament here as their own.

Findlay's treatment of this subject raises other important questions, above all that of the sense in which a metaphysician like Hegel can be said to *explain* anything. Findlay is clear that he is not advancing any straightforward causal hypothesis, though his own suggestion that Hegel means his remarks about Spirit to be taken teleologically would imply that Hegel was putting forward a different sort of empirical thesis. My own view is that this cannot be all that Hegel meant to claim: if pressed he would follow Aristotle (whose enormous influence on his thought Findlay rightly stresses) and make Spirit final, formal and efficient cause

and difficult detail of Hegel's writing, remarkably lucid, one finds it hard to express one's admiration for what he has done adequately, as a piece of philosophical exposition and criticism Findlay's book is a model of its kind: sympathetic to its subject, yet nowhere partisan; successful in showing the historical setting of his problems, yet clear throughout that the point of studying a philosopher historically is to learn from him philosophically. If Findlay cannot interest students in Hegel, no one can.

It remains, however, to ask whether Findlay has succeeded in making out the main points of his interpretation of Hegel. In the most important of all, the point about Hegel being an immanent as opposed to a transcendent metaphysician, it seems to me that he has succeeded. When Hegel talked about "Spirit" or "the Absolute Idea" his purpose was plainly to introduce a language in which we might give a description, at once coherent and comprehensive, of things with which we are all familiar. As Findlay makes clear, he came by the general idea as a result of attaching especial importance to the dogmas and symbols of the Christian religion, the drama of Spirit which goes out into its own "other" to return to itself enriched is modelled, obviously enough, on the Incarnation. But his metaphysical achievement does not consist in his having seen the whole of reality in this peculiar way, for a poet or a visionary might have done as much. It consists rather, first in his having worked the idea out at the conceptual level and demonstrated (or attempted to demonstrate) its superiority in the matter of internal coherence to other ways of taking things, and then in his having brought it to bear on the facts of experience and shown that it could be used to give a reading of those facts which was truly illuminating. That this last is the object of the whole exercise—that Hegel is trying to produce a unitary way of talking about the facts of science and history, the phenomena of art, religion and social life—is surely abundantly clear.

My only doubts about Findlay's thesis here concern something which he does not really discuss, namely what any other sort of metaphysics is supposed to be. I do not know quite how he would define a "transcendent" metaphysician; presumably someone who postulated unexperience-able entities, as Plato, Aristotle and Leibniz all did, would qualify for the title. Findlay himself more than once speaks of Bradley as if he were such a metaphysician. Now, as regards this particular case, I am inclined to think that Findlay has made altogether too much of Bradley's talk about everything being transfigured in the Absolute, taking the latter, as the Positivists did, as if it were a peculiar non-sensible particular. But "the Absolute" does not designate any sort of particular (you could not be introduced to the Absolute, any more than you could be introduced to the Spirit of the Age); it is simply Bradley's name for everything that is the case seen as constituting a single self-differentiating system. Despite some differences, there is ground for thinking that Bradley was no more of a transcendent metaphysician than Hegel. And while the other philosophers mentioned above were certainly different here, it is not clear that their ultimate aims were all that importantly different. Aristotle, for instance, may be seen as providing, in his concepts of form and matter and

Fortunately for his readers, Findlay is not content to make these points in a general way: he carries his interpretation of Hegel into considerable detail. There are two chapters on the *Phenomenology*, three on the *Logic*, and four on the remaining parts of the system; and in all there is an attempt, more often successful than not, to explicate the detailed content of Hegel's teaching as well as to familiarize the reader with its broad outline. It is from this, indeed, that the main attraction of the book springs: Findlay quite evidently thinks not just that there is *some* truth in Hegelism, but rather that there was *much* which Hegel got right in particular; and he has had the courage to say just what this was. To find someone ready to declare himself in this sort of way is in itself a refreshing experience; and when one adds to this that Findlay's reconstructions of his author's thought are not only bold and imaginative, but also, when account is taken of what he himself calls "the willfully baroque exuberance

of intelligibility which are rightly held to spring from man's spiritual nature" (p. 220). related, and their constant connection with certain central ideals of profound affinity of notions too often and too lightly thought to be unrelated, despite that; although formally a failure, it serves to make clear "the high, but believes that it has considerable philosophical importance discarded. Findlay allows that Hegel pitches his claims for Dialectic too which could be accepted as valid only if ordinary logical laws were we think of the Dialectic as a rival to ordinary logic, or as something of progressing from one position to another inside the system. Nor need transitions, we need not suppose that there must be one and only one way queer aesthetic appropriateness" even in Hegel's most seemingly arbitrary is by no means the monster it initially appears to be. Although there is "a explicit declarations on the subject, we see that the celebrated Dialectic claims that if we concentrate on Hegel's practice, as opposed to his that this, but denies that his true view covers more. Secondly, Findlay admits that Hegel often uses extravagant language which suggests more commentators have put it, the prius of Spirit, not its creation. Findlay serve and make possible certain conscious experiences. Nature is, as some teleologically: the point of there being such a thing as nature is to sub-nature. Hegel's Idealism, according to Findlay, must be understood did he subscribe to any form of the Kantian theory that the mind makes example, believe that things exist only when perceived or thought of, nor opposite of idealist as the word is commonly understood: he did not, for tremendously misleading. In many respects, Hegel's outlook was the very Hegel's own description of his philosophy as a form of Idealism is extended Findlay adds to these contentions two further major points. First, that though "there is absolutely nothing *wile* in it" (p. 327). an unedifying piece of writing, largely lacking in thought and argument", with deep political and social understanding"; his account of the State "is all echoes familiar criticisms: Hegel, he tells us, was "not really gifted as a sober and serious achievement as well as an integral part of the system. It is only when he comes to his author's political views that he extends this claim even to Hegel's philosophy of nature, which he regards interest in contemporary learning and knowledge of its results. Findlay

PERHAPS the most remarkable thing about Professor Findlay's generally remarkable book is that it was written at all. Only a few years ago Hegel seemed to be the most discredited of philosophers: "even as error", heard to say that he could not make sense of his writings "*avant-garde*", and there were few in Great Britain who were prepared to take them with any seriousness, let alone to give time to their elucidation. It is true that Popper's portrait of Hegel as not only intellectually disreputable, but morally dishonest as well, was received with some incredulity; people could scarcely bring themselves to believe that matters were as bad as that, even before Mr. Kaufmann showed conclusively that they were not. But it is one thing to acquit Hegel of the charge of being a conscious fraud and another altogether to view his work with positive admiration. Despite hints to the effect that Hegel and Wittgenstein had views in common, it was not to be expected that someone as fully conversant with and as appreciative of, recent philosophical work as is Professor Findlay should devote himself to a full-scale reassessment of Hegelianism and come out with a verdict which is very largely favourable. Yet it is just this that we find in the present book.

True, the Hegel of Findlay's pages is in some respects very different from the Hegel of philosophical (or at any rate British philosophical) tradition. In the first place, he is not a metaphysician, or rather not a transcendent metaphysician. It was never Hegel's aim, according to Findlay, to beguile us with news from another world, however much his followers (to whom Findlay, on the whole, shows scant respect) may have diverged from him here: Hegel's concern was exclusively with the here and now, and his ambition to make what we as human beings know and experience intelligible. Hegel urged us to see everything as subserving, or manifesting, the activity of something he mysteriously called "Spirit", but this did not involve him either in denying any everyday facts or in asserting as factually true what no non-Hegelian would allow to be such: it involved him only in recommending and working out a fresh way of looking at the world. As a result he was not, despite the common belief to the contrary, guilty of attempting to deduce truths about the world from purely logical premises; as Findlay puts it neatly, in the Hegelian philosophy "we progress to ever more adequate modes of conceiving, not to new truths deductively entailed by previous truths" (p. 86). So far from being an apriorist Hegel was a radical empiricist, both in his theory and in his practice: in his theory because pure thought, on the Hegelian view, is abstract and needs to be brought to bear on something outside itself to gain real significance, in his practice thanks to his encyclopaedic

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HEGEL: A RE-EXAMINATION



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The Idea of History, 190.

There is a lack of symmetry in Collingwood's theory of history, because the status of the mind of the historian is by no means as essential as the status of the object of his mind as thought. But Collingwood, for systematic reasons, wanted to emphasize the parallel status of the historical object and the historical subject and even made this parallelism the main point in his criticism of the German school's approach to history on the one hand, and that of the contemporary French philosophical school on the other: "... whereas the German movement tries to find the historical process objectively existing outside the thinker's mind, and fails to find it there just because it is not outside, the French movement tries to find it subjectively inside the thinker's mind, and fails to find it because, being thus enclosed within the subjectivity of the thinker, it ceases to be a process of knowledge and becomes a process of immediate experience: it becomes a merely psychological process, a process of sensations, feelings, sentiments. The root of the error in both cases is the same. The subjective and the objective are regarded as two different things, heterogeneous in their essence, however intimately related. . . . it is wrong in the case of history, where the process of historical thought is homogeneous with the process of history itself, both being processes of thought".¹ The error of both schools lies in their one-sidedness; only Croce, as Collingwood observes, grasped the synthetic nature of history. But Collingwood is actually closer to the German school than he himself was aware of: although he tries to establish the synthesis between thought as object and the mind of the historian, the mind of the historian has a secondary status only since the meaningful event is bound to be understood, precisely because it is meaningful. The mind of the historian may have value as an example of the height human understanding is able to reach, but according to the principles of Collingwood's own view it cannot have an ontological status. Although Collingwood strove in his later conception of history towards a well-balanced synthesis of object and subject he still retains a conception which attributes a preponderance to the historical object.

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² *The Idea of History*, 226.
see *Speculum Mentis*, 218.

¹ *The Idea of History*, 219. For a different interpretation of the saying,

historian, which is fundamentally a part of the objective realm. cannot be a problem of principle connected with the mind of the narration, or else it is a part of the historical realm and hence there self-evident identity between history as *res gestae* and their of the historian has an independent standing and thus there is no put this critical observation in the following way: either the mind mind which exhibits itself in the events investigated? One may and how is it that it stands at the bar of judgment and not the for parts of it."² The mind of the historian is a part of the process only in so far as the minds which are parts of it know themselves "The historical process is itself a process of thought, and it exists of thought, how is it that the historian can fail to understand them? are meaningful in themselves, since they are placed within the domain or to the weakness of the mind of the historian. If historical events Collingwood could attribute this fundamental status to the strength historical object. However, there remains the question of how spiritual nature of history appears in the very content of the non-spiritual, phenomena of facts. Within the later system, the of Mind, although Mind manifested itself in neutral *prima facie* of history was inherent in the status of history as one of the forms the fore: within the system of *Speculum Mentis* the spiritual nature are understandable. Again the spiritual nature of history comes to the former trend: although historical events are not justified they man who tries to understand them. This is a mitigated version of henceforth a psychological or spiritual weakness on part of the events in the realm of thought. The failure to understand them is the historical events as such are understandable since they are absence of meaning in the events as such. As a matter of principle his failure is an indication of his own weakness, and not of the the meaning of the realm he is investigating. If he fails in that of his entire view. If so, then it is the task of the historian to detect outset a meaningful realm. This is a kind of an axiomatic assumption is the history of thought. Thus history is, of necessity, from the new understanding of history lies in the assumption that all history this subjectivist connotation? The starting point of Collingwood's and its vices".¹ How could Collingwood attribute to the old saying there reveals his own mind in its strength and weakness, its virtues It is the historian himself who stands at the bar of judgment, and *Welligericht*: and it is true, but in a sense not always recognized. wood put into this saying a new content: "*die Welligeschichte* is das determine the success and the value of the previous events. Colling- within the actual historical process, where the superseding events

¹ *The Idea of History*, 214.
² Croce's *Philosophy of History*, *The Hibbert Journal*, Vol. XIX, London, 1921, p. 274. Compare: *Speculum Mentis*, 218.
³ *idem*, *idem*.
⁴ *Ruskin's Philosophy*, Kendal, 1920, 20.

We have considered above what Collingwood understood as the second condition of historical consciousness, i.e. the mind of the historian. This condition has been regarded as trivial, since it puts forward the psychological disposition of the historian and not the objective essence of historical consciousness as such. Collingwood would certainly reject this interpretation because of the main subjectivistic trend of his new system. History shifts in his view from the domain of the understanding of the specific nature of the object to the emphasis of the meeting between object and subject. This is a subjectivistic interpretation of the saying: "Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht". ("The history of the world is the world's bar of judgment.") This saying, in Hegel's context pointed to the trial

by the systems which one rejects".⁴
 live one's own life and yet to admire and to love people who live connection with Ruskin's view: "... tolerance: the activity to but rather to a tolerance, the nature of which he formulated in does not lead to the Leibnizian optimism which Collingwood rejects, the nature of historical knowledge as the understanding of a thought intellectual act and not as moral approval. It seems that to regard this statement refers to the feature of the understanding as an which takes it for the whole truth."³ The half truth hinted at in distorted if it is twisted into the service of the vulgar optimism act, once we understand it in its motive. "... this truth is grossly motives. Collingwood rejects explicitly the moral approval of every act is understandable and as understandable it is justifiable. Justification does not mean approval of the act but detection of its can be understood in the light of his later development: since means to justify the event".² This line in Collingwood's thought business of history to trace the reason and to state it. And that article: "what happens, happens for a good reason, and it is the This line in Collingwood's thought was expressed in an earlier in deeds. To know a thought means to understand it.

understand it. After the historian has ascertained the facts there is no further process of inquiring into their causes. When he knows what happened, he already knows why it happened."¹ The ontological nature of the historical realm "qua" thought leads to some clear epistemological consequences: towards thoughts there is only one possible attitude: that of a thoughtful activity. "A parte subjecti" this activity means understanding of the motives, since thought "a parte objecti" means motives and purposes expressed in deeds. To know a thought means to understand it.

earthquake, although by no means a purposive activity created within the human realm, certainly has a historical meaning through its impact on the human realm, that is to say through the meaning connected with this disaster after the event and not in anticipation of it. This is another indication of the anthropological view of history as set out by Collingwood: man is a being who projects the future, a being to whom the future is not given but is rather created through his own deeds. Hence history as an understanding of human affairs has to discover this essential feature of human existence. But Collingwood detached human activity from its given environment and took into account only the meanings created by a purposive action and those anticipating the forthcoming results.

Historical research, however, does not deal with thoughts within the realm of one's own life. Thought creates results, and unless it does so it is inaccessible to the historian. The first condition for a historical object *qua* thought to be known is, that thought has to express itself in the realm of facts. Collingwood here remains faithful to his original understanding of the nature of the historical object *qua* fact, but goes beyond the realm of mere facts by rooting them in the realm of thought. This is the first condition which makes historical knowledge possible "a parte objecti". But there is another condition "a parte subjecti": "the historian must be able to think over again for himself the thought whose expression he is trying to interpret".² One wonders what kind of condition is brought to the fore in this formulation. The first condition is certainly an epistemological condition: unless it has results there is no way of knowing the thought itself. The second condition, that "a parte subjecti", sounds like a psychological condition: one has to be a mathematician, at least a potential one, in order to understand mathematics, or one has to be able to reconstruct the plan of a political action in order to understand a historical political action. But actually this condition has been provided for in the very fact that historical knowledge deals with thought, and thought is not confined to the individual existence, since it has a universal meaning. Furthermore the fact that history deals with thoughts makes it a priori understandable for a historian. The condition formulated as to the ability of the historian to rethink the investigated thoughts sounds like a condition stated for a philologist to be able to read the script of the text he is dealing with.

There is a clear epistemological advantage implied in this shift towards thought. There is no room for a sheer ascertaining of thoughts, as if they were meaningless facts. Since we move in the realm of meaning, the ascertaining of the fact of thought is "eo ipso" an understanding of it. "To discover that thought is already to

tion which contains the activity of judgment; from this he moves further to the "Baconian understanding of history", viz. challenging the given circumstances by putting questions to them. The difference of this from assertion is stressed in the following passage: "The questioning activity, as I called it, was not an activity of achieving a comprehension of something; it was not preliminary to the act of knowing, it was one half, the other half being answering the question of an act which in its totality was knowing".¹

(4)

The Baconian approach to history points to the purposive nature of history, while the purposive nature of the historical action makes the questioning activity possible, that is to say, altogether meaningful. Thus there is in Collingwood's mature system a double contraction of the realm of thought. History proper, in Collingwood's view, becomes history of *thought*. Thought is not understood as just content or meaning. Thought receives from the outset a connotation which is intended to make it suitable for the historical context: thought is *purpose*, either purpose as the driving force of an action or purpose as the end the action is aiming at. Thought is understood as intentionality towards the future and as moving towards it. The purpose of historical understanding is to discover from the results the action which created that result. "Political theory is the history of political thought: not 'political theory', but the thought which occupies the mind of a man engaged in political work: the formation of a policy, the planning of means to execute, it, the attempts to carry it into effect, the discovery that others are hostile to it".² This example taken from the field of political history is certainly a clue to Collingwood's entire system of historical knowledge: Collingwood could place history in the realm of purposive activities since in the late phase of his development he did not take into account the objective circumstances in which the purposive activity takes place, for instance, the geographical data essential for purposive planning of an action, or the stamina and endurance of a people or a society which is called upon to act, etc. Collingwood—and this is the main criticism of his view with reference to his contraction of history to purposive activities—placed the activity, as it were, in a vacuum; he understood it as having meaning only when related from the outset to meaningful activity. The only meaningful activity which he took into account was that of sponsoring an action with a purpose in view. But in history there are meanings assigned to given facts through what may roughly be called in Toynbee's terminology responses to circumstances: an

¹ *Autobiography*, 22.² *idem*, 75.

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connote both the aspect of motive and that of results. Since the historical concern has been clearly placed in the human realm, the historical fact which was in the first place the ultimate datum ceases to be ultimate. It necessarily points to its background within the human realm, to motives, thoughts and purposes expressing themselves in acts. This new view which we may call, for sake of convenience, the *anthropological* view of history. There emerges now the new conception which explicitly does not identify events with historical objects: "I mean more than he [sc. S. Alexander] does by the word 'historicity'. For him to say that the world is 'a world of events' is to say 'the world and everything in it is historical. For me, the two things are not at all the same.'"

This shift to the human realm carries with it a new understanding of the individuality of the historical object. There is no longer attribution of individuality to a neutral object; individuality has now a *human* meaning. It means a human being whose deeds are understood in terms of historical method. History in its shift from events to thoughts studies individuals. Individuality ceases to be a mark of the given object on the one hand or else a conceptual device on the other, and is held to reside in the very nature of the specific object of the research. Yet this confinement of individuality to the human sphere is the source of a new problem in Collingwood's system. Since the historical individual expresses himself in thoughts which in turn lead to results, individuality cannot be "monadic." Because individuality is the vehicle of a thought which because was actually theirs, is potentially everyone's.² Here we have pointed out that this new change undermines the clear connection history with individuality, which was so much stressed in the former view. The individual nature of the historical object is a fact itself. But there is no essential connection between the object of history *qua* thought or purpose and the individual who personally was the bearer of the thought. The connection between the real object of history *qua* actions rooted in thoughts, and the human individuals in whom these actions actually did occur is accidental. Indeed, Collingwood comes back here to the Hegelian conception of the "cunning of Reason", and views individuals as embodiments and agents of the Reason of history. Individuals cease to be considered as ultimate self-sufficient entities.

A further significant change occurred in the shift from knowledge based on the sole ascertaining of facts to a knowledge based on questioning. In Collingwood's approach to history there is an increasing share of activity "a *partie subject*"; from an assertion which indicates the sole acceptance of the fact he moved to perception.

¹ *idem*, 303.² *The Idea of History*, edited by T. M. Knox, Oxford, 1945, p. 210 note.

with the change in the whole systematic approach. *Speculum Mentis* is a kind of Phenomenology of Mind, a study in the progressive manifestations of Mind. History is one of the forms of Mind: it is Mind as it manifests itself in factuality. The later phases of Collingwood's philosophy were at least more modest—or to put it in other words—not phenomenological, but epistemological. History is no longer understood as a manifestation of Mind, but as a form of knowledge. Philosophy of history is mainly a theory of historical knowledge and not a theory of the status of history in the progressive manifestations of Mind. Therefore the problem of totality arises within the scope of historical consciousness and not within the scope of historical facts. From this point of view the article of 1925 is at least an anticipation of the new approach as it was to be formulated in the mature system.

(3)

In the course of time Collingwood's view of the nature of history changed still more. There is in the first place an assumption which might be considered trivial when detached from the earlier view, or from the far-reaching conclusion derived from it in the mature view: history is "knowledge of the world of human affairs".¹ The neutral object of history as fact becomes now a specific object, within the human realm.

What is the background of this new understanding of the nature of history? It seems as if Collingwood himself gives us a clue to the hidden motives which led him towards this change. In the first place, the deeper understanding of the nature of fact accomplishes the first change: "facts is a name for what history is about: *facta*, *gesta*, things done, *πραγματῶν* deeds".² Here Collingwood uses still the first meaning of the term "facts" which indicates their givenness. But "facts has also a secondary sense, *πραγματῶν* 'things made'. A making is a deed, a thing made is the result of a deed. To know about deeds is to know about their results."³ "The historical method involves studying both deeds and their results in this case, both mental activities and their results, for example concepts".⁴ There is here a kind of regress carried out from facts *qua* results to the process creating them. Historical method is interested both in the results and in their background. In dealing with historical facts *qua* results, Collingwood performs a reduction from facts to motives. History does not deal with facts, as events; it deals with events as actions, and the term action is intended to

¹ *An Autobiography*, Penguin Books, 79.
² *The New Leviathan*, Oxford, 1942, p. 61.
³ *idem*, p. 61.
⁴ *idem*, p. 61.

1 "The Nature and Aims", etc., 164. 2 idem, 165.

weakness of history in its unrealizable pretension to be concrete a Philosophy of History", but the context of the criticism is now different. The relation between history and philosophy is no longer that of a formulation of a program and the fulfilment of it. History is "object-centred" thinking, it "asks questions only about its own object, not about the way in which it comes to know that object".¹ The fact that the historian is not included in the setting of his thought is an outcome of the very trend of historical thought. This trend may be stated in the following way: historical thought is a *perceptive* thought but not a *reflective* one. "... he [i.e. the historian] is always the spectator of a life in which he does not participate: he sees the world of fact as it were across a gulf which, as an historian, he cannot bridge."² Here again this shift in Collingwood's understanding of history becomes clear: history is finite not only because its subject-matter is partial and, as partial, can never be definite. It is finite because the subject or the knower remains on a plane different from that of his object. The finitude of history lies in the very duality of subject and object. To put it in other words: within the system of *Speculum Mentis* factuality was regarded as an advantage of history as against the hypothetical nature of science, which is based on a chain of suppositions. The problem of the alienation between subject and object was hinted at but was only a secondary feature rooted in the incompleteness of history. In terms of assertion on the part of the knower there was no room to point to the gulf between the knower and his object. Once the active nature of the subject has been brought to the fore the whole perspective changed: in perception considered as judgment, or act of thought, the knower is separated from his object. Against the totality of facts, objectively considered, a new totality is hinted at, comprising both subject and object. In both works the main concept in Collingwood's understanding of history is that of totality. In *Speculum Mentis* history had a realistic feature of totality. In its claim: a totality of facts placed in an all-embracing context of facts. In the paper of 1925 the new aspect of history comes to the fore: history as an activity of thought. Totality here is understood as containing both the subject and his object. The relation between history and philosophy in *Speculum Mentis* is one of a program and its fulfilment, while the relation between history and philosophy in the paper of 1925 is one between naïve thought which is object centred, and reflective thought. Reflective thought is understood in terms of Hegel's conception of self-consciousness as an identity of subject and object. The change in the meaning of totality might perhaps be tied up with the change in the meaning of totality.

ascertained in its givenness and the meaning of the fact which places the fact in a context. Here he assumes only one legitimate context—that of totality. To be sure, the historical fact, even when placed in the total context, does not lose its individuality; it might be for this reason that Collingwood stressed in this stage of his doctrine the trait of individuality in the nature of the historical object more than the trait of factuality.

The cognitive act which characterized history in *Speculum Mentis* was assertion. In the paper of 1925 Collingwood writes of the act of perception. Perception as Collingwood understands it now is an activity on the part of the knowing subject. He stresses the aspect of activity in perception by putting to the fore the *judgment* implied in perception: "in all perceptions we are making a judgment, trying to answer the question what it is that we perceive, and all history is simply a more intense and sustained attempt to answer the same question".¹ Collingwood criticizes the dichotomy of sensation and thought, and tries to show that sensation itself involves an act of thought.² If sensation implies thought then perception also implies thought in its shaped form as judgment. The aspect of judgment is brought to the fore in perception through a very important notion, which is to occupy a central position in Collingwood's later system. Even perception, he argues, is an act of answering a question. The x is not sensed as such. Perception interprets the x and determines its nature and meaning and this determination is certainly an activity. "History is perception raised to its highest power, just as art is imagination raised to its highest power." Thus from two points of view the former conception of history undergoes a far-reaching criticism. From the point of view of the object, factuality ceases to be understood in a naïve way as something merely given. From the point of view of the subject historical knowledge is no longer just assertion; it is perception and as such a manifestation of a cognitive activity. These two angles of criticism are interrelated: since the fact is not given in a way created, through the act of perception. The object of history is not defined as independent of the knowledge of it: "The historian's data consist of what he is able to perceive".⁴

The criticism of the shortcomings of historical thought as outlined in the system of *Speculum Mentis* was based on the assumption that historical thought does not establish the total context. One of the expressions of the partiality of the historical context was the fact that the historian himself was left outside the context of his thought. The gulf between object and subject was an indication of the inherent

¹ "The Nature and Aims", etc., 168.
² See: "Sensation and Thought", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, London, 1923.
³ "The Nature and Aims", etc., 167.
⁴ *idem*, 170.

Aristotelian Society XXV, London, 1924-1925.

³ *idem*, 153.

² "The Nature and Aims of a Philosophy of History," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1958.

¹ The status of time in Collingwood's system has to be dealt with separately. See the present author's: *Between Past and Present*, the Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1958.

The conception of history as outlined in *Speculum Mentis* underwent various fundamental changes. Between the earlier conception and the later there is an intermediate one which is expounded in a paper of 1925. In this paper Collingwood emphasized not so much the *factuality* of history as the *individuality* of historical events; yet this might be considered as a change in terminology only. But this change has certainly some basis in Collingwood's explicit criticism of history, since he tries now to show that history is in the end an unachievable task: "the alleged facts upon which it builds its inductions are actually never secure enough to bear the weight that is put on them".² Collingwood criticized history in *Speculum Mentis* as being pretentious, as attempting to reach totality which is beyond its power. There was no question as to facts, and therefore Descartes' "cogito" as an isolated fact or a statement of a fact was not put in doubt. To be sure, no fact could be understood unless placed in the context of totality, and this context was thought to be set by philosophy and not by history. The question could be raised in the context of *Speculum Mentis* whether a fact can be considered as being a fact when isolated from its context, or whether we may still assume the existence of the fact and stress the importance of the context only for the understanding of its full meaning. The realistic trend involved in history would refer to the independent *existence* of the given fact while a full *understanding* of the fact would necessarily overstep the scope of the fact as such. Unless I am mistaken, the paper of 1925 marks the emergence of his understanding of the relation between the two aspects of history. Facts are no longer considered as confined to themselves apart from their being understood: "... inductive study is itself based on ascertained facts, but these facts in their turn can never at any given moment finally be ascertained, for instance the discovery of this Roman villa may bring into question doctrines hitherto generally accepted as to the provenance and date of some kinds of pottery".³ Here Collingwood explicitly accepts the standard of "the truth as the whole" as the inner standard of history too. Yet this standard eventually shows the finitude of historical knowledge. Collingwood does not distinguish any more between the fact as such which is

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without dealing with time. This is like Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark.¹

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nothing else than the totality of existence; and this is also the object of philosophy. History a parte subjecti—the activity of the historian—is investigation of all that has happened and is happening; and this is philosophy too. History and Philosophy are therefore the same thing”.¹ This emphasis on the identity of the two realms certainly does not reappear in *Speculum Mentis*. But we may perhaps see the difference in the attitudes between *Religion and Philosophy* (1916) and *Speculum Mentis* (1923) as a difference in point of view only and not as a fundamental one: the claim of history is to be philosophy. But this claim does not succeed because of the immanent limitation of history as the knowledge of given facts. *Religion and Philosophy* stresses the identity of history and philosophy in terms of the *program*, while *Speculum Mentis* stresses the difference between the two realms in terms of the *realization* of the common program. In both works the intermediary between history and philosophy is the striving towards concreteness, which in turn implies totality. The connection of history with the aspect of totality and concreteness did not leave room for the dimension of time. On the contrary: since concrete totality is self-contained, the problem had to be raised whether or not time is included in the all-embracing totality. According to Collingwood history does not deal with data in time, but with data as such. Hence the problem of the relation between data and time has not been raised. But the time aspect appears in *Speculum Mentis* indirectly, though it does not fit organically into the entire conception as outlined in this book. The time aspect appears in connection with the problem of novelty in history on the one hand and of permanence on the other. “It is process in which method or regularity does not exclude novelty; for every phase while it grows out of the preceding phase, sums it up in the immediacy of its own being and thereby sums up implicitly the whole of the previous history. Every such summation is a new act, and history consists of this perpetual summation of itself.”² Here at once the aspect of process comes to the fore, although this aspect had not been stressed when the nature of history had been considered in terms of its status in the chain of manifestations of Mind. It goes without saying that there is no sense in considering the aspect of novelty and summation unless we presuppose the background of time. But the relation of history to time remains a riddle in Collingwood’s system in all its phases and is one of the paradoxes of his entire conception. Collingwood aims to consider history *sub specie aeternitatis* and thus expel time from history. Collingwood was so eager to stress the identity of history with philosophy that he tried to abstract history from its real milieu and to deal with history

² *Speculum Mentis*, 56.

¹ *Religion and Philosophy*, 51.

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put forward in the mature stage of Collingwood's system, that of *questioning against assertion*. With this new dichotomy a new understanding of history emerges.

This clinging to the given facts is the first point to be stressed in terms of the limitations of history as a form of Mind. The very possibility that history may lead to a dogmatic attitude indicates the weakness of history. Dogmatism is rooted in the assertion of something as ultimate though really it is provisional only. Historical knowledge assumes that what is asserted as a fact is a real fact; it does not recognize its own immanent limitations. It considers its own facts to be recognized as given and hence as the real facts. But these facts cannot be real since they are set in a partial context only. Facts included in an all-embracing context, Collingwood therefore argued, are facts known by philosophy and not by history. The aim of history is to know the facts but it does not reach this goal since the context of history is always incomplete. If we do not know the complete context, we do not even know the single fact, according to the Hegelian maxim that the truth is the whole. "If history exists, its object is an infinite whole which is unknowable and renders all its parts unknowable" . . . "we must claim access to the fact as it really was. This fact . . . is inaccessible. History as a form of knowledge cannot exist."¹ Historical knowledge thus condemns the knowing subject to a passive position of sheer assertion. In the last resort there is no meaningful room within the historical domain, as the domain of an assertion of facts, for the status of the knowing subject. If, however, the subject is eliminated there is no justification of the claim of historical knowledge to be a knowledge of the concrete. There is only one legitimate meaning of the notion of concreteness, that of totality. But totality is outside the scope of historical knowledge. Totality as the all embracing context is a philosophical concept and not an historical one. Thus history is only on the threshold of philosophy, since it intends to reach concreteness but does not reach it. Philosophy requires the victory of history over science since it presupposes the establishment of the striving towards concreteness. But philosophy ultimately overcomes history, just as an objective arrived at overcomes the sheer strife for and the formulation of it. History ends with its own breakdown, but this is a positive, that is to say, a dialectical breakdown, since out of the debris of history philosophy emerges.

In an earlier book, Collingwood had formulated the relation between history and philosophy as one of identity which became later on a "Leitmotif" of Collingwood's system: "history a part of object—the reality which historical research seeks to know—is"

¹ *Speculum Mentis*, 234, 238.

² *idem*, 246.

tion of fact. (2) Thus a chain of suppositions ultimately leads to presupposes history, while the realm of history properly is the explicit manifestation of the implicit presupposition. In this period of his development, Collingwood tried to overcome the duality of science and history through a dialectical device: he made the two realms stages in the manifestation of Mind, giving each of them its relative justification. This dialectical justification of the various stages of development of Mind was possible on the basis of the underlying assumption, that is to say that the difference between the stages is one of *modality* of assertions and not one of *material* content or ontological realm. "The abstract cannot rest upon the more abstract, but only on the concrete",¹ and history is the first acknowledgement

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ments to assertions indicates that he does not do justice to historical reasoning: every historical inference is hypothetical, being from given data to their causes. As a passage from data to their causes it is hypothetical and there is no room here for mere assertion of causes. It is clear in terms of the history of ideas that Collingwood wanted to step across the boundaries of historical knowledge as outlined by Bradley, but he did not succeed in doing it.

This consideration of history as related to facts on the one hand, and to the assertive act on the other leads Collingwood to a paradoxical historical conclusion. Philosophy of History in its manifestation in Vico was explicitly anti-Cartesian. Descartes has been blamed for being abstract; hence philosophical prominence has been given to history as a concrete creation. But Collingwood, although deeply rooted in the Viconian tradition, considers the main achievement of Descartes to be precisely in the discovery of history. "Descartes, in his *cogito ergo sum*, laid down that historical fact was the absolute meaning of knowledge."¹ Only because Collingwood gives history a generic meaning as a knowledge of ultimate irreducible facts can he identify historicity with the objective of Descartes. "Cogito ergo sum" in his view expresses a fact; hence the nature of the statement of Descartes is a historical one. Here Collingwood's tendency becomes clearly apparent: history deals with facts; hence where one finds an attitude of *hypothèses non fingo* there one finds history. Indirectly Collingwood meets here the criticism of the Cartesian tradition as expressed in Vico. As a matter of fact Descartes—this is Collingwood's view—does not assume a self-sustained abstract knowledge. "Descartes meant what he said, and what he said was that the concrete historical fact, the fact of my actual present awareness, was the root of science. . . . Science presupposes history and can never go behind history: that is the discovery of which Descartes' formula is the deepest and the most fruitful expression."² Vico, on this view, did not realize the concrete, historical-factual basis of the Cartesian abstraction.

The structure of the Cartesian system is an example of the nature of the dependence of science upon history and a further means to clarify the nature of history. If history employs assertions and is categorical, science employs suppositions and is hypothetical. Collingwood tried to show that each supposition presupposes at least one assertion, the assertion that there is supposition here. In other words science as a texture of suppositions presupposes history as a body of assertions. We may sum up the logic of Collingwood's conception of the relation between science and history in these two points: (1) there is no possibility of an infinite regression of suppositions. The end of the chain of suppositions implies an asser-

¹ *Speculum Mentis*, 199.² *idem*, 202.

added through this feature, since "matter of fact" and "individuality" might be considered as synonymous. Collingwood does not determine the meaning of "individuality", at this point, e.g. whether or not the historical fact occurs only once. One may be permitted to wonder whether this would be the meaning he attached to individuality, since this meaning carries with it from the outset the aspect of time, which is not the aspect stressed by Collingwood in the first place. Individuality connotes matter of fact, that is to say, the impossibility of a deduction of the fact from a hypothesis or from a systematic setting. Once we assume deducibility, the deduced element ceases to be individual and becomes a variable in a set or in a manifold of replaceable elements. A fact is bound to be individual, since we are bound to accept it as it is, because it is given.

The relationship between individuality and historical knowledge has been extensively discussed in modern philosophy, and Collingwood himself participated in this discussion. The purpose of this discussion was to point to the nature of the historical method and its conceptual apparatus. Collingwood does not consider individuality to be a feature of this apparatus, since he considers it as the nature of the object itself. He assumes that the nature of the object itself guides historical knowledge in employing conceptual ways and means to square with the object.

The cognitive attitude adequate to the object as fact is *assertion*. Assertion suggests the acceptance of the object as it is, and because it is. An assertion is a categorical statement, the admission that something exists as concrete and given. Historical knowledge is assertive, and in this capacity it is opposed to scientific knowledge, which is hypothetical. In a way Collingwood arrives here at a paradoxical conclusion: historical knowledge, being related at its objective pole to facts and at its subjective pole to assertion, must be a naïve knowledge, a receptive one. This conclusion may be considered as an indication of Collingwood's form of idealism in his early period. Constructions, as manifested in science, are according to Collingwood a lower stage in the development of the forms of mind and reality than assertions of the given concreteness. Once we reach the stage of concreteness there is no legitimate room for constructions. Constructions indicate the gap between the knowing subject and the known object and therefore they are bound to remain abstract. Once we reach a meaningful reality we have but to recognize it as such, that is to say, to assert it. It goes without saying that this systematic presupposition of Collingwood's view blocked the way towards an analytic understanding of the nature of historical knowledge. The very fact that Collingwood eliminates hypothetical statements from history and confines historical state-

¹ *Religion and Philosophy*, London, 1916, 49.
² *Speculum Mentis*, Oxford, 1923, 211.
³ *idem*, 217.

historical object *qua* fact, viz. its individuality. Nothing new is there is one further characteristic feature of the nature of the outcome of the nature of facts and not an independent factor.

The aspect of time is certainly secondary on this view. It is an historian's business is with fact; and there are not future facts",³ in determining the relation between history and the past: "the nature of a fact is a sufficient guide, according to Collingwood, relationship between this knowledge and time in its dimensions, knowledge deals with the past is not derived from any particular it is considered as the essence of history. Even the fact that historical with the facts of human life, etc. It is just attachment to fact that a branch of knowledge dealing with a fact in *time*, nor as dealing necessarily a given object, namely fact. History is not defined as the nature of history by stating that historical knowledge has is fact as such."² The obvious tendency of this approach is to define "History is that which actually exists."¹ "The object of history problem in the first period of his development.

the object. Let us therefore consider how he approached this ignore the problem of knowledge and its relation to the nature of meant to be, a kind of "Phenomenology of Mind", he could hardly from the outset in a *Speculum Mentis*, which is, and perhaps was object. But since consideration of the nature of history was included to define the nature of history through the nature of the historical In the first steps he made as a systematic thinker, he attempted mentioned above, although he did not sharply distinguish them, dance with these distinctions. He dealt with the two aspects of history sided development it underwent, can hardly be classified in accordance with the view of the nature of history, in spite of the many. Collingwood's method as one employing individual concepts.

there is the prevailing tendency to put forward the nature of the the attempt to define it as process. Within the "subjective" aspect distinguish between the attempt to define the object as man and with the object. Within the "objective" aspect of history one may history as the object dealt with and history as the way of dealing THERE is a common distinction between two aspects of history:

(1)

NATHAN ROTENSTREICH

COLLINGWOOD'S VIEWS ON THE NATURE OF HISTORY

FROM FACTS TO THOUGHTS

AN "ORTHODOX" USE OF THE TERM "BEAUTIFUL"

I suggest that it occurs as often as not when discussion concerns the merits of works within a clearly-understood tradition or artistic kind, as in my own recent experience when nothing but late Byzantine or meta-Byzantine murals came into the reckoning. It is always possible for someone to raise the question whether what is beautiful in the scholastic sense is also beautiful in the other, but as soon as he does so the safe territory where artistic questions can be settled is abandoned for one in which philosophical disputes take first place. For "beauty", in the scholastic sense, can always be defined, but in the individualistic sense is notoriously intractable. If it seems paradoxical to suggest that what is beautiful in any sense may not be beautiful in some other, this is perhaps because in practice the two kinds of ascription, of "beauty" intended in the one sense and of "beauty" intended in the other, would coincide so often. For someone to report that a work of art is beautiful, while intending the scholastic sense, may be a genuine record of aesthetic enjoyment: it must not be thought that the individualistic is the only sincere sense of "beautiful". This latter sense, which I have called "individualistic" for want of a better adjective, is itself, of course, relative. Although in expressing it we speak often enough as if a thing were either beautiful or not, in its own right, or once for all, this is the sense which is made good, finally, by the authority of the individual judgment. It is questionable whether the scholastic sense could ever be preserved in the expression of aesthetic defiance, but there is no such question about the individualistic sense. In this function, of course, the individualistic seems to presuppose the existence of the scholastic, in a way indicated previously: but this relationship is of rhetorical importance mainly. It is in its ability to generate philosophical puzzles that the individualistic sense of "beautiful" must be contrasted most sharply with the scholastic. The former, but not the latter, poses the question whether beauty is subjective, and the correlative question whether beauty is a genuine attribute.

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The main conclusions which I am inclined to draw from these reflections is that there are two outstanding senses of the term "beautiful", and correspondingly, of "beauty". There is a primarily individualistic sense and there is what I should like to call a primarily scholastic sense. It is the individualistic sense which is expressed, for example, in the Concise Oxford Dictionary definition of the term, and the scholastic which I have been trying to indicate in this article. Abstract philosophical disputes about beauty tend to ignore the scholastic sense, which nevertheless seems to be fairly common.

no rule or is in every sense a prototype.

nothing in it is ineffable, in the sense that its object conforms to colouring and patterning of lessons learnt, of a wisdom absorbed: been considering, experience reflects language: it is, if you like, the in the sea. But in the type of artistic appreciation which I have just as there does in conversations about the weather or the fish between parrot-talk and intelligent discussion about works of art, precept, everything is had by rote. There remains a distinction (in the circumstances which we are considering) all is the result of colouring from them. It is not that in so-called aesthetic experience bottom the ability to use certain language can be seen to take some experience hypocritical, the paradox that aesthetic experience is at emphasize again that these facts do not make a claim to aesthetic to describe it much as other people describe it. Although I must to meet beauty where one knows it will lie. One must be prepared of a hidden stream on a water-diviner's twig. Instead, one prepares the consciousness of a perceiving subject. It is not like the effect in these circumstances, is not the intrusion of an environment into we are not in a position to call it identity. The experience of beauty, "beautiful" and experiencing beauty is very close indeed—though them. The relationship between knowing how to use the term the definition of "beauty", but at any rate it cannot extend beyond question. His actual satisfaction may fall short of the limits set by aesthetic satisfaction to be obtained within the artistic "kind" in comparatively well established: so therefore is the range of possible can be comparatively well defined: the range of the beautiful is sees what he or she is looking for. "Beauty", in the circumstances, is as I have described it. To a large extent, it seems, such a person experience of a person whose use of "beautiful" and cognate terms remarks on the subject how the use of aesthetic language and aesthetic satisfaction or the lack of it are related within the I hope it can be made clearer now than in my previous cryptic lie at the basis of one's enjoyment.

one is looking at, and be able to report quite correctly what features one may miss a regrettable amount, but one may still enjoy what may be real. If one never looks beyond what has been pointed out

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must lie in that use of the term which is characteristic of the authorities themselves. Surely their use of it cannot but be one-dimensional?

I do not think that this consequence follows. Even archontic usage may involve a reference beyond immediate circumstances of time and place to a tradition or to a present consensus; but the reference, if made explicit, would be couched in terms of the first person plural and not the third person. It would be from this difference of standpoint that the archontic use of "beautiful" derived its subtly different nuance, not from the lack of a dimension which was possessed by the more common use.

"Beauty" in the present usage is an essentially conservative word. This usage, however, is actually presupposed by what one might call the default use of the term. In a setting of muck and squalor one may suddenly perceive beauty, and report one's experience almost as an unwilling discovery, having to force the attention of others to it if one wishes to communicate it. The paradox in this situation is either linguistic or circumstantial, according to description. It is linguistic in that it forces on one's hearers a sense of "beauty" which, far from implying recognized canons of taste, appears at odds with them: often it is felt to be an offence against good taste to draw attention to beauty in settings where one's primary, impulsive judgments are morally or politically adverse: indeed, what is called "good taste" is regarded as necessary to aesthetic taste. Or, the paradox is circumstantial in that the circumstances suggest no aesthetic precedent: they are aesthetically unfamiliar or even, as some might say, inappropriate. In such circumstances, then, a usage of "beautiful" is default: it gets its piquancy from the fact that the application of "beautiful" usually is so restricted by the conservative aura with which the term is surrounded.

It deserves to be emphasized that the conservative use of "beautiful" is far from being merely hypocritical. True, the hallmark of authority to which I have referred is not just necessary for an intelligible use of the term, but is actually sufficient. There might certainly be times when no kind of satisfaction other than that to be got from the fulfilling of convention would be expressed by ascribing beauty to something. Admittedly: but then there are times when we all do use "beautiful" mechanically, for various reasons. That is not what matters: the interesting question is whether "beautiful", in our present sense, can ever function as a genuine record of aesthetic experience. Clearly, I think, it can. Authority is not always bad or perverse. Taste, though it has been educated, is not thus from being an "inverted-commas" use of a certain kind. (Cf. Hare, *op. cit.*, pp. 124-5, 149.)

Another example would be the English eighteenth-century cult of the picturesque, guided by "principles of picturesque beauty" which authors did not hesitate to lay down.

² In general, my "orthodox" use of "beautiful" resembles that "informative" use of "good" which has been sketched by Hare in *The Language of Morals*, pp. 145-8, although I have not developed my account with Hare's use in mind. "Beautiful", in the context which I have described, has both a descriptive and an evaluative meaning. The former is understood to the extent that the standards to which the speaker is referring are known. The danger that these standards may become completely ossified is present, of course; but in the immediate context the use of "beautiful" is not yet an extreme descriptive one in Hare's sense, and still less is it ironical.

standards is then an important part of its meaning. "Taste", of course, can be interpreted in several ways. Those who hold that only what is morally fitting can be the subject of art would use the term "beautiful" with a quite definite reference to authority, often an external authority, and they would interpret in very special terms that taste which the beautiful must express.

In a culturally sceptical society, by contrast, there is a strong tendency to cry "anathema" to any suggestion that the beautiful should be regarded in this social light. It is felt that aesthetic experience must be left so far as possible to be the history of an inviolate aesthetic conscience. Aesthetic judgments, so far as possible, must be undetermined, save by the individual's immediate experience which is to be allowed to take his personality by surprise. The attitude to beauty which I have been discussing, however, is every bit as real as this one. In another type of society aesthetic taste simply is more orthodox or collective: but to say this is to say, *inter alia*, that a good reason for an approbatory aesthetic judgment is the quotation of standard criteria and if necessary the quotation of them as standard. To enter into the mind of a society which is artistically collective, in certain fields at any rate, is what I am trying to do by labelling the point about my guide's use of "beautiful". I should like to add here, though the point will not be elaborated, that "beautiful", having the sense which I have ascribed to it, may occur quite frequently in educated usage in any society. If we consider any period in the history of art which is closed, and which also is fairly well known (an outstanding example being the "classical" period of Greek sculpture), we find a tendency, in any society, for even educated aesthetic judgment about it to be collective rather than individual.¹ To that extent, I think, the reference to standards is part of the meaning of various ascriptions of beauty commonly made.²

If, however, such usages of "beautiful" are always, in a way, deferential, is there not still a reason for thinking them secondary, derivative and of minor interest?—because the primary interest

the reasons, these were such as could have expressed a quite independent judgment on the subject. Perhaps if I had raised further questions, the reference to authority would have been made in the end, say in selecting certain features of a painting as being more significant aesthetically than others: but even at that there would have been no tension between authority and my guide's private judgment. Consequently my claim to detect a peculiar usage of "beautiful" has to rest rather on the immediate confidence which was characteristic of it than on what was said, in any particular instance, in support of it. Yet at the same time it did seem to me to be relevant to notice the way in which supporting reasons were given. About them, too, there was no lack of firmness. It is not that they were text-book reasons, but rather that they had the ring of a "collective" judgment from which they drew their authority. It is in this sense that the reference to authority was implicit in them. The spirit, rather than the matter, of an answer to a question about a work of art here determined in what sense that work of art was being judged "beautiful".

So much for the facts. Is there a good reason, then, for allowing that in the usage described the reference to authority has become part of the meaning of the term "beautiful"? That is to say, if one were to explain why one considered a certain painting to be beautiful, would it be appropriate in the least if one did point out that a certain characteristic which the painting possessed was regarded conventionally as pertaining to goodness in that kind? I suggest that in certain circumstances it would not be inappropriate. In the present context, "beautiful" is a relative term, in that it refers to something beautiful *in suo genere*, a beautiful example, let us say, of meta-Byzantine art of the seventeenth century. To point out in these circumstances that certain characteristics of the work of art are valued conventionally is appropriate if, and only if, the person addressed is willing to be persuaded in his aesthetic judgments. Provided that he behaves as if aesthetic satisfaction is a possible result of exhortation and instruction, rather than an immediate inspiration, reference to authority by his instructors is not misplaced. So far as one allows that taste is not innate, but is to be formed (an admission which does not come easily to romanticists), instruction by reference to authority is a perfectly natural way of forming it. The opinions of authority here are the register of what is socially prized. Whether that authority is autocratic or democratic is not in question at present, but in either case authority, in a sense, can be the keeper of the public taste in matters of art. It seems to me, then, that the term "beautiful" can here have a social reference: by which I mean that there are occasions when it involves a special stress on this notion of taste, and that the reference to social

Someone less assured than my guide might have said, not that such and such a painting was beautiful, but that it was "generally reckoned to be good", or something similar. For him, this would not have been part of the meaning of the word "beautiful". Now it might be supposed that my companion's intentions were not essentially different. Although her opinions were obviously guided by some external, authoritative standard, although conformity to this standard determined which paintings she would bring to my notice, nevertheless, it might be suggested, conformity to it was not necessarily part of what she meant by "beautiful". Alternatively she may really have been using "beautiful" in two senses, of which one was primary: that is to say, "beautiful" in the sense which have thought to attribute to her (let us call it sense (2)) was equivalent to "beautiful" in a primary sense (call it sense (1)) and "certified as such". That primary sense could express either certain straightforward qualities of the painting, independent of certification, or on a more subjective interpretation) the capacity of the painting to please, still without any reference to authority or to any general standard. The term would be used in this primary sense on an occasion when my companion, on being asked why she considered such-and-such a picture to be beautiful, replied by reference to the painting's qualities or to the pleasure she got from it, simply. Surely, it would be asked, she did sometimes answer that kind of question in this natural way?

Strictly speaking, these suggestions are of psychological rather than philosophical interest. In a way it does not matter whether my guide intended to use "beautiful" in sense (2) or in sense (1), provided that sense (2), as well as sense (1), is intelligible. That sense (2) is a possible usage is indicated sufficiently by two facts that I did indeed interpret in terms of it what my guide was saying and that this apparent sense can be explained without self-contradiction or absurdity. Nevertheless the whole matter would be of greater interest if the suggested sense of "beautiful" were indeed what my companion intended, and especially if that usage were characteristic of a fairly general point of view about works of art. From that standpoint sense (2), and not sense (1), would be "primary".

I am prepared to suggest that both of these conditions are satisfied though of course there is no way of proving this. Indeed, the question is not wholly factual, for, given the facts, we have to determine what it is to be "part of the meaning of" a certain expression. The facts, in outline, are as I have stated them: a decisiveness in selection and a lack of hesitation in praising the works selected. Admittedly the appeal to authority was not made explicit on examination. On the few occasions when I asked my guide for what particular reasons she declared something "beautiful", or when she volunteered

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she meant to indicate a special aesthetic category which might be distinguished from those of the sublime or the graceful, for example. It was technical, if at all, only in the sense that it served to mark out quite clearly certain paintings from others and that in doing so it could be defined up to a point. Her usage was even "popular" in having the sense to which a recent writer on aesthetics alludes when he remarks that "popular language, . . . impatient of fine distinctions, usually terms all artistic works 'beautiful' to denote their essential qualities of taste and fitness—*τὸ καλόν*." Yet what made my guide's usage worth study, and what gave it at least an element of technicality, was precisely this implicit reference to taste, to the satisfaction of a recognized standard of some kind. It is this feature that I wish to examine in the present article.

Our differing usages of the term "beautiful" seemed to me to be attributable to the presence in my guide's usage of some objective basis which was absent from mine. Expressively, but loosely, one could say perhaps that the difference was between an Orthodox and a Protestant temperament in matters of art, in that to some extent my guide seemed to be more inclined to fall in line with what a recognized authority told her to be "good" or "beautiful" than I was, and to dismiss some things as being merely quaint which I was not prepared to dismiss. I do not mean that my guide was uneducated or specially submissive in matters of judgment. She was neither. But she seemed to me, in an interesting way, to be in the grip of language. Our differences, I felt, could be described in two ways, each of which was valid, but the second of which was more fundamental than the first. We differed in our capacities for aesthetic satisfaction, and we differed in our usage of "beautiful" and cognate terms. It seemed to me that "beautiful," in my guide's usage, was a term with a check, a brake on it, such that in accepting certain restrictions upon the possibility of its employment, she was accepting, *ipso facto*, certain restrictions upon the possibility of aesthetic satisfaction. To vary the metaphor, her usage had a dimension which mine did not. What she considered beautiful required, as well as certain criteria which perhaps I could have admitted, a kind of sanction by authority, an *imprimatur*. This I took to be the special "objective" element in her usage. It could function, clearly, as a control over any subjective elements in her understanding of "beautiful", in that it made an unhesitating and obviously consistent application of the term possible. What was "beautiful" had to bear a guarantee, not its own but that of well-qualified opinion.

P. A. Michells: *An Aesthetic Approach to Byzantine Art* (London, 1955), p. 8. This book is notable for the author's insistence on a technical use of "beautiful" and "sublime" as basic categorical terms in aesthetics.

The word "beautiful" plays a surprisingly unimportant part in the language of sophisticated artistic appreciation; I mean in the informed criticism and comparison of specific works of art. Though in ordinary conversation it can be used naturally and easily, it does not serve readily as a technical term in expert writing or discussion. To become a technical term of this kind it would have to be definable and definable in terms which commanded sufficient agreement but attempts to define "beauty" and "beautiful" may well have become restrained by the popularity of philosophical discussion about the significance of these words. No philosophical question is discussed more commonly or from more firmly held opposite positions than the question whether beauty is "objective" or not. Discussion of this and related topics, however, not being the monopoly of professed philosophers but being familiar amongst artists and art critics themselves, tends to remove all shadow of technicality from the crucial terms discussed. Other terms come to serve for the "objective" features of works of art, and others again for the impressions which works of art may make upon us: "beauty" and "beautiful" tend to fall away between these two classes.

To someone brought up amidst sceptical discussion of the meaning of "beautiful", therefore, it may come as a shock to hear the word used confidently, selectively, as a standard term of appraisal. Not long ago I was examining the numerous tiny churches, medieval and post-medieval, still to be found more or less intact in the derelict hill-town of Paliachora in Aegina, and had the opportunity of seeing the various wall-paintings which they contain, ranging in date from the thirteenth to the eighteenth century. I did this in company with an intelligent and interested guide, who picked her way from one painting to another (she knew the whole assemblage well), selecting one here, one there as "beautiful", and being disinclined to linger over any to which she would not readily apply that term. For my part I was prepared quite often to agree—once having ventured on the use of the term—that those paintings which she pronounced "beautiful" were indeed beautiful. Sometimes I should have applied the term where she did not (even while making allowance for a distinction between the beautiful and the quaint) and sometimes I should not have applied it where she did. In general, her usage seemed to me sufficiently distinct from my own to be worth some reflection. It was not technical, of course, in the sense that by "beautiful"

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G. P. HENDERSON

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thus unacceptable to him. But although it can be used to point up MacCallum's questionable association of painting and mock-world-dependent arts, it must not in its turn be overworked. From the fact that we have found painting capable to a degree—I should say to quite a modest degree—of doing the sort of thing absolute music can do, we cannot conclude that this is what painting does best. *Prima facie*, painting's power to represent, a power that music shares only to the most minute extent, is still a significant part of its total potentiality as an art form: repudiating it need not be a virtue.

IV

This is not the sort of study in which momentous conclusions are kept back to the end. Its aim has been not to settle the question of non-objective art or the meta-question, Can aesthetics be normative? It has been, rather, to provide some raw-material for the study of those questions, by way of an analysis of two significant theories. It is time to add that neither *Imitation and Design* nor *Painting and Reality* is concerned exclusively with the non-representational problem. I have singled out that one thread and left un-discussed a rich variety of other themes that they treat. The above analyses, therefore, are in no sense studies of those books in the round. The analysis has not always been friendly; and yet even if both theories seem in some respects less rigorously argued than their authors imply, that does not mean they are failures. For—as a minimal interpretation—they can be seen as providing their readers with imaginatively impressive reorganizations of their subject-matter, and fruitful (though not compulsive) ways of viewing recent art-history. To alternate in thought among different, even clashing, aesthetic concepts—"expression", "creation" and the like, can be to enjoy fresh vistas of the nature of art. No one of those vistas may be uniquely authoritative; but neither need they be mutually exclusive—any more than to see a landscape through the eyes of Constable precludes enjoying a similar scene through the eyes of Cézanne. The analogy is of course most inexact: but the end of an article is, mercifully, not the place to ask just *how* inexact, or *why*.

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analogy, an analogy that is sympathetic to the non-objectivist and We said in criticism of MacCallum that he neglected this possible the universe of audible qualities" (275).

just as modern musicians have been and still are the explorers of painters have been the explorers of this universe of visible qualities, natingly be compared is, to Gilson, the art of music. "Modern means "non-objective". The art to which painting can most illum-road to abstract art" (this in a context where "abstract" clearly "Painters who remarked that their art didn't talk were entering the different way. Painting is strongly contrasted with the "talking arts". Gilson, we are not surprised to find, groups the arts in quite a the less willing one is to have painters relinquish reference to nature, of "mock worlds". The more seriously one takes that rapprochement, those arts (literature, drama) which make their effects with the help (4) We saw how MacCallum tended to see painting in the light of

of all value. this sense abstract or not. The concept, used thus, would be benefit not they correspond, there is no way of telling if any painting is in "reality present in the mind of the painter" and check whether or logical objection. Since no critic can *compare* a painting with the the apologetics of non-objective art. But it is open to a decisive (b) than to (a). That is one reason why it does not add anything to both imitational and non-objective paintings, and thus nearer to the mind of the painter" (259 n.). This is again compatible with is "the resemblance of the painting to the internal reality present in Bazaine, but logically distinguishable from version (b). Abstraction Gilson accepts yet a third definition, also derived from Jean pleasures cannot by any means be called "easy".

mutual accommodation of plastic and imitational demands; and its but there is also the van Eyck line of achievement, the harmonious imitational art" (259). *Mere* imitation certainly ought to be shunned that the twentieth-century painter must shun the "easy pleasures of reference in the interests of plastic beauty. It will not do now to say less inevitable and necessary appears the elimination of objective become the metaphors (road, purification, logical term), that is, the the *compatibility* of representation and abstraction, the less persuasive eliminated. But the more emphasis one puts upon (b), which allows the imitation of natural appearances, until finally all imitation is the painter is seen as making progressively greater "sacrifices" to It is only definition (a) that spurs one on "the road to Mondrian". makes good sense to speak of him as a thoroughly abstract painter. Following Jean Bazaine, Gilson cites Jan van Eyck as a striking example of a painter who harmonized both elements: so that it element, provided it does not clash with the painterly concerns.

To estimate Gilson's argument about non-objective art is made particularly difficult because of ambiguities in the very notion of "abstracting". (a) It is to abandon reference to nature; to paint further away from visual appearances, and introduced to a new world of qualitative realities" (277). (b) It is to paint only plastically interesting forms, all else being "abstracted" away. But in this case the forms *may* be natural forms; there may be a representational

complexity. For it may be that worthlessness comes not with purity but with but far from perfect in the sense of "aesthetically worth-while", — of abstractions may be perfect in the sense of "completely realized"

pursue a line of development to its extreme position. The "nudity" logical conclusion. It is not always "logical", in art especially, to phors—the one road, the purification-process, the movement to two apples on a dish. But this does not vindicate the Gilson meta-even whether its subject was a momentous Rape of the Sabines or tational painting was historically and geographically accurate, or sideration. In one sense it mattered little whether or not a represen-persuasive metaphors carry him past alternatives that need con-gest that Gilson's interpretation is not the only possible one. His

I mention those losses, not to disparage abstraction, but to sug-retain one or other of these elements; but many sacrifice them all. an enhanced vision of familiar nature. Some non-objective painters ture, the possibility of imaginary *tactile* exploration, and delight at out the painting. There is also the representation of space, light, tex-interest arises from the ambivalence of this double function through-the receding plane of a house in Provence. Part of its aesthetic be at once a two-dimensional painted, patterned surface, and, say, of a very *general* kind. For example: the same area of pigment might their plastic values are quite unrelated to representational functions scenes, personages, etc., that they represent: it does not follow that aesthetic value of the great masters is, in fact, independent of the The argument here does not seem very rigorous. Suppose that the logical term the recognition that plastic values are primary.

Alongside these metaphors of the journey and the purification-process, Gilson speaks of abstraction as carrying to its inevitable element in its perfect nudity?" (255). Why not non-objective art? Why not (it had to be asked sooner or later) "present this plastic alone matter, he claims, painters were well embarked on this journey. had never been of real aesthetic importance, and that plastic values realized that even with the great masters representational "subject" completely purified art of Piet Mondrian" (254). Having once (3) Now, Gilson does wish to represent recent history as a pur-

Gilson esteems the painter who takes on a hard and taxing project: there is, for instance, a quasi-ascetic nobility about renouncing the easy way of imitating nature's own charms. But this argument can be applied to the present issue, and with a different conclusion. For the hardest, and possibly the most richly worthwhile, goal might be just such a simultaneous realization of representational, expressive and creative ideals. But if so, we should be led away from, not towards—as Gilson hopes—a sympathetic acceptance of non-objective painting as the culmination of a long process of fruitful development in the recent history of art. The movement from Cézanne or Gauguin to Kandinsky would look less like the last limb of a great pilgrimage than like a wandering off-course.

what it does with the forms of nature. Everything depends on the nature of the temperament, and on itself. "Every thing depends on the nature of the temperament" does not suffice to make them beautiful. Seen through a temperament, they may be expressive (in the way MacCallum described, or in some other way); also creative, in that nothing quite like them has been seen before. Giving Gilson his due, that they reveal "nature they may be expressive (in the way MacCallum described, or in nature's hints, more or less radically as need be. At the same time, not slavishly *reproduce* natural forms, but transform or transfigure Some paintings, for instance, although basically representational, do several different achievements, perhaps simultaneously realized. achievement, whether in the modes of discovery or creation, but in supreme aesthetic worth in painting might consist not in any *single* Most crucially, he has in this context glossed over the fact that the Gilson, surely, has *not* given us an exhaustive set of alternatives. "judged with reference to an already given reality" (206).

"found" at all: it must be made, created, and is thus not to be of pre-existing forms. Beauty in painting, therefore, cannot be that is to say, realism (203). Realism, however, is the mere copying open for the painter . . . —the imitation of concrete individuals, Platonic Idea nor an Aristotelian species, only one way still remains well on the way to arid conventionalism. (c) "If reality is neither a our task the extraction and representation of the *average type*, we are the species does not exist save in this or that individual. If we make view (*Republic* X). (b) In the Aristotelian species? But, to Aristotle, Ideas? But Plato himself supplied his own decisive criticism of this representation of Ideal Beauty—conceived in terms of Platonic Assume first that it is *found*. Where, then, does it lie? (a) In the He divides the alternatives, as he sees them, in the following way. (2) Is beauty in painting "found", Gilson asks, or is it "created"?

themselves. In particular, appeal to alleged aesthetic implications of the doctrine of divine creation can lead to such widely divergent judgments about art, that it must be deemed quite inconclusive.

that does not trouble the "discovery" or "expression" alternatives. The instability arises from the curious difficulty of making sheer creativity seem worthwhile or self-justificatory. There is always the *innuendo*—with non-utilitarian creation—of the gratuitous, the pointless, arbitrary and quixotic. Discovery-theories, on the other hand, settle down quite comfortably in the respectable company of the sciences and communication-skills. They are seen and accepted as part of our total attempt to understand and cope with our environment and ourselves. But the creation of the wholly new cannot be conceptually domesticated nearly so easily. The paradoxical result is that creation-theories frequently tend to lean back and become parasitic upon the concepts and arguments of discovery-theories. For example: it is natural for the creation-theorist to speak of the "demands" of a medium or of a germinal form, to speak of inspirational "control". And having used those phrases, or some of the many similar ones, he is tempted to take them as indicating that there must be a pre-existent somewhat to which the created object itself will finally correspond, or ought to correspond. If nothing in the phenomenal world will perform this role, then it will have to be something in an intelligible world. . . . Now Gilson.

There are several ways in which Gilson's language tries to soften the "gratuitous, pointless, therefore unimportant" suggestions of creation-language. The painter, he says, creates objects which are not, but *ought to be* in nature. There is "a whole order of beings whose production is the responsibility of man himself" (182). "Nature is a sort of immanent art" (136). The painter is "one of the creative forces of nature" (117). These statements have the function of providing smooth rails between the productiveness of nature and the creativity of the artist. They are a particularly valuable aid to the justification of those most pointless-seeming paintings of all, the abstracts. That the painter is *not* creating pointlessly is the implication of those "oughts"—objects expressly to delight the eye are not, but ought to be, seen in nature. The painter's job is thus to remedy what he alone is competent to remedy. He is part of, and yet, by reason of his consciousness, *above*, the single continuing process of evolution, a fragment of which he is privileged to complete. Abstract art is justified *ipso facto*, for there is no point in the duplication of what previous, pre-painterly phases of the process have produced—whether landscapes or human forms.

Gilson's conception of the relationship between the painter and nature is determined by considerations of more than one logical kind. It hangs upon (i) an evolutionary metaphysical theory of an immanently purposive nature, a theory deriving in part from (ii) his own form of Scholastic metaphysics and theology, and partly from (iii) his claim that scientific theories of a non-purposive, naturalistic

included) seems often to suffer under a sense of instability or vertigo, It is interesting to note that creation-stressing aesthetics (Gilson's presentation makes really clear.

value-judgment—a fact which neither MacCallum's nor Gilson's must in the end, again, be a matter for irreducible and undervied of logic, which it cannot be. The assessment of relative priorities or other of these poles—and exhibits this discrimination as a verdict theories that give exclusive or near-exclusive importance to one Philosophy of art at once oversteps its bounds if it devises new creation, a source of unique pleasure, in its own right, not only as a pair of enchanting spectacles, but as an individual light, the painting itself, as a framed, designful entity, may count mainly valued for its capacity to make us see the familiar in a new self-transparent state; and even if a landscape painting were pri- cation of that state, the creation of a new, ordered, more nearly each successful expression of a state of consciousness is a modifi- covey and creation are not mutually exclusive: on the contrary, for the most part describe as Gilson so ably does in his book. Dis- experience, or in several of these simultaneously. Creation I should scape, the textures of fabrics; or in the laying bare of human inner features of the external world, *chiaroscuro*, the modelling of a land- invention or creation. Discovery may consist in the revelation of within the polarity of (a) discovery and communication, and (b) painting. I suggest that painting can fruitfully be seen as working creation) are both equally indispensable to an adequate account of claim that MacCallum's and Gilson's main concepts (expression, Let us take stock so far. I do not think it is being lazily eclectic to

through its existence?" but, "Does it give a unique delight to the eye? Is the world richer this painting successfully symbolize a certain human feeling-state?" armed with Gilson's appraisal-concepts will tend to ask, not "Does

istic emphasis does so too. The spectator who approaches a painting mines his attitude to abstraction; among other factors, his hedon- It is clearly not *only* the creation-emphasis in Gilson that deter- and of the construction of wholly new objects on the other.

the communication of human feelings and values on the one hand, judgment in this case over the relative importance in paintings of pole. One may again suspect that a difference of practical aesthetic sudden poverty of resources, when dealing with the non-objective to delight the eye is faced with no parallel embarrassment, no avoid-ness. . . . In contrast, Gilson's language of creating objects "This smooth ovoid form successfully expresses . . . smoothness and trivial. All one might be able to say of an abstract sculpture is that fill out the "X expresses a,b,c," formula; but it may become quite

I am quite sure, however, that it will *not* do. It is doubtful for a start whether this identification helps us in the least to sift beautiful from ugly paintings, by way of distinguishing the "being" of the beautiful from the "non-being" of the ugly. But even granting that a metaphysical theory could not be expected to be an aid to practical criticism, still, difficulties enough remain, difficulties closely parallel to those raised by the *privatio* theory of evil. We are, notably, left with the problems of the ontological status of ugliness and evil, and of the logical relation between the use of "existence" and "being" within the theory, and the same words in ordinary language. These problems, again, can here only be indicated, not unravelled. Starting once more from *MacCallum's* end, we can bring out in yet another way how his expression-stress and Gilson's creation-stress bear them off in different directions over the abstraction issue. The expression theory, in MacCallum's version, leads one most naturally to expect that statements of the form "X expresses a, b, c. . . , where X is a painting, will be meaningful and non-trivial, even if sometimes incomplete. For example: "This still life expresses lush overripe abundance, tired, heavy and jaded". Now, with those non-objective paintings and sculptures which make no attempt to express human life-emotions, one can always verbally

set, the language of "creation", will do very well. I am quite sure, however, that it will *not* do. It is doubtful for a start whether this identification helps us in the least to sift beautiful from ugly paintings, by way of distinguishing the "being" of the beautiful from the "non-being" of the ugly. But even granting that a metaphysical theory could not be expected to be an aid to practical criticism, still, difficulties enough remain, difficulties closely parallel to those raised by the *privatio* theory of evil. We are, notably, left with the problems of the ontological status of ugliness and evil, and of the logical relation between the use of "existence" and "being" within the theory, and the same words in ordinary language. These problems, again, can here only be indicated, not unravelled. Starting once more from *MacCallum's* end, we can bring out in yet another way how his expression-stress and Gilson's creation-stress bear them off in different directions over the abstraction issue. The expression theory, in MacCallum's version, leads one most naturally to expect that statements of the form "X expresses a, b, c. . . , where X is a painting, will be meaningful and non-trivial, even if sometimes incomplete. For example: "This still life expresses lush overripe abundance, tired, heavy and jaded". Now, with those non-objective paintings and sculptures which make no attempt to express human life-emotions, one can always verbally

artist-as-creator language, which for moral and theological reasons are muted in MacCallum, are allowed much freer play in Gilson. Although he has more than one job for the word "abstract", it cannot be denied that when he says "abstraction is creation" (258), he is preparing his reader to accord the greatest hospitality and sense of significance to non-objective art, when it later falls to be discussed. More explicitly: *every* truly creative painter (representational or not) "abstracts" from visual appearances, concentrates on non-imitational but plastic values. The non-objective painter differs only in that he admits no "copying" of natural forms whatever. Gilson, of course, is far too sane a writer to suggest that representational paintings as a class must rate lower aesthetically than twentieth-century abstracts or near-abstracts. Nonetheless, he is implying that the abstracts are at long last seriously reckoning with the mode of creativity that most properly and distinctively belongs to painting. Here is painting finally leaving hold of the banisters and "going it alone".

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The imitative artist, *qua* imitative, is certainly creative to a degree: a Dürer drawing is the creation of a "minor world". But the trend of Gilson's writing throughout this book suggests that the further away a painter gets from copying nature's appearances, the more radically creative he is. Those more daring implications of the

when it is possible to fill it with beings" (153). The real artist is he who feels restless when a clean sheet of paper or canvas is put before him—as if it were a "shame to allow nothingness others. He is the man who is filled with the urge to make new beings. burdened with human emotion that he seeks to communicate to consciousness. To Gilson, the painter is not in the first place someone is on constructing, not on transmitting feelings or other states of thing"; to add "a reality to reality" (277). The primary stress to reality. What really matters is to turn out, not an image, but a beings, which, precisely because they are but its images, add nothing There is no point whatever in "adding to reality images of natural leads Gilson into a much more friendly attitude to abstraction. It is already obvious how this stress on creativity, not expression, paintings are objects created expressly to give delight to the beholder. equal in importance to the expression theory in MacCallum, that (1) The first claimant for discussion is Gilson's central thesis,

the divine prerogative . . . of making things to be" (294). religious: it is *legitimately* "to imitate in a finite and analogical way, creation *ex nihilo*. On the contrary, all creative art is fundamentally great deal more "for art to actualize" (280). This is not hybriatic selection, as it were, of possible beings, and that there remains a painter acknowledge that, in creating nature, God actualized only a visual deception of imitational painting; and only here does the "purified" and abstract art. Only here do we leave behind all the we enter a road that carries us inevitably and logically to a fully ever. The moment we see representation as a subordinate element, the end become a readiness to eliminate all objective reference what-as the progressive realization that this readiness for sacrifice must in but its truly plastic values. Gilson sees the history of recent painting during its appearance (130). It is to abstract from the subject all one's subject is to be prepared to "make sacrifices" (Delacroix); to value, design, form, colour, texture and the rest. To be creative towards Imitation, therefore, must rank far below distinctively plastic seen at all.

made. He creates what, but for his effort, would never have been than it is. Beauty is, emphatically, not found by the painter, but the case, art would be a good deal less scarce and hard to produce "nature seen through a temperament". For if either of these were

The painter's particular creative task is to search out the "formal vocation" of the matter he manipulates, and to realize in it those "germinal forms", hints and anticipations of new shapes and patterns, that comprise his inspiration. He cannot be merely a passive mirror of what already exists in nature; nor are his paintings

Gilson considers paintings first and foremost as physical objects. A work of musical art is never completely existent at any one moment; but a painting is a tangible reality. To create one is to enrich the world with an object of a kind that nature itself (or God, ultimately) does not produce—an object formed expressly to delight the eye. In Gilson's neo-Thomist view, to impart form is to impart being. "Form is the active energy that, in its effort to fulfill the obscure yearning of matter, quickens it from within and gives rise to fully constituted beings" (112). The painter's particular creative task is to search out the "formal

III

them too high: it simply is.
To say this is to come closer to Gillson's language than MacCallum's; and to Gillson we shall now turn.

to nature's forms or sounds, need not be at all hybriatic. Secondly, the abstractionist does not have to be contemptuous of the physical. He can see his productions not as imaging forth "spiritual", non-material realities or experiences, but as primarily adding new interesting, exciting physical objects to nature. He may rejoice in their very materiality. Certainly the claims of the non-objectivist manifeste quoted by MacCallum ("non-objective painting . . . reflects the austerity of the beyond", e.g.) are wild and fantastic. But the movement is not wedded to any single interpretation. To moderate those claims is perfectly possible, and so to give non-objective painting a less pretentious but quite significant place among the arts of design. The heart of the trouble is that MacCallum is tempted to identify the legitimacy of the mode of painting with some of the theoretical claims made on its behalf. The actual painting on the wall makes no claims and cannot therefore pitch them too high: it simply is.

expressive as some representational paintings, we surely would not be over-estimating our creative powers in recognizing this to be a fact. As in the parallel case of musical expressiveness, to admit the thing as possible would be to make no more than a realistic assessment. And the making of such paintings need not be described as creation *ex nihilo* any more than musical composition need be so described. In each case the artist works with indispensably *given* materials—pigments applied by the human hand or, say, the auditory possibilities of bow upon string—and to speak of creating works of art with the aid of these materials, but without reference to nature's forms or sounds, need not be at all hyphistic.

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(3) Lastly, a few comments on the numerous *moral and theological* arguments that MacCallum employs. To cut out reference to nature from paintings, he believes, is to cut oneself off from the inexhaustible symbolic riches of a God-made world. Nature's abundant provision of symbols is described in quasi-theological terms as so many "acts of grace" (45). Man as a created being ought to rely upon these humbly as nourishment for his imagination, and not ape the Creator *ex nihilo*, as the non-objective painter does. The true religious attitude is not contempt for the earthly, the physical, the forms of nature, but acceptance of them as proper and necessary to our mode of being. To acknowledge this is to be realistic about our status; whereas the abstractionist is blasphemously *unrealistic* and hypocritical. His claims that, for instance, his paintings have a "spiritual life which gets hold of all who live with them",¹ are pitched far too high. Where representation ceases and the artist engages simply in a "matching of energies" with nature, he comes to see himself arrogantly as a creator in a super-human sense, "even a creator of possible worlds alternative to this actual one" (22): and that is to manifest Promethean pride.

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another person (or oneself with practice) may well succeed in reading out all such interpretations; or at least may come to discount them as irrelevant intrusions. Thus, although MacCallum may have shown that the designless pole is untenanted and therefore not a candidate for the optimal zone, he has not shown that this is true also of the pure abstractionist pole.

(c) The third alternative is the compromise. According to it, the optimal area is the middle of the scale. A painting is not "first of all a likeness" nor "first of all a design"; "it is 'first of all' both a likeness and a design" (30). MacCallum rejects this alternative for the following reasons. (i) It is fence-sitting and mediocre; reminiscent of the confusion of statistical with ideal norms. In each case mechanical or quasi-mathematical devices are being used to settle issues that they are not competent to settle. (ii) It is logically objectionable to speak of a painting as "first of all both" likeness and design. (iii) It is abstractionism is likened to uninterrupted inhalation and imitationism to uninterrupted exhalation, the compromise position is like holding one's breath—a feat not possible for any length of time.

Now some criticisms of these three "reasons". (i) Although statistical and ideal norms often fail to coincide (they seldom coincide where beauty is concerned) one cannot generalize and deny that they ever do. (Ideal chair-dimensions must be closely geared to the average size of human beings.) Each case needs a separate investigation. (ii) One is not compelled to describe position (c) as "first of all both likeness and design". This is needlessly paradoxical. Instead, why not use metaphors of balance between the elements, or poise, or of "doing equal justice to the demands of imitation and of design"? (iii) The breathing metaphor is woefully question-begging. To start with, it usefully enough expresses the alternation in the history of painting between "naturalistic and formalizing phases" (30). But it cannot properly be harnessed to the criticism of the compromise answer or any other answer to the optimal zone problem. For, *whatever* point in the hyperbola were selected as optimal, the metaphor would equally surely rule it out, as involving the holding of one's breath. Significantly, MacCallum does not attempt to describe his own final choice of position in terms of the metaphor. Indeed, its main implications are actually hostile to his thesis: for it suggests, embarrassingly, that he is mistaken in thinking that there exists a problem to be solved. Could not the history of art be seen equally plausibly, not as the search for an optimal zone on the scale from imitation to design, but as the free exploration of one zone after another, no single zone being *uniquely* satisfactory, but each having different aesthetic possibilities and being rewarding in different ways? Why not see this, if we want a metaphor, as a rhythm of healthy breathing?

AESTHETICS AND ABSTRACT PAINTING

It becomes clear at this point that however far the whole argument leans towards the *a priori*, empirical experience—in the form of art-appreciation—can still be held as a crucial factor. One is unlikely to acquiesce in the general trend of MacCallum's theorizing, his individual brand of the expression-theory, his grouping of painting with the mock-world-dependent arts and in his consequent rejection of non-objectivism, unless one also shares his evident disappointment with actual specimens of non-objective painting. If we found that such a painting led us into the sharing of a richly articulated and worthwhile experience, then none of us would look around for theoretical stones to throw, any more than on hearing a satisfying piece of absolute music. The issue, then, is in part an empirical one. When MacCallum states that the "imagination requires a sort of nourishment of natural forms if it is to retain its aesthetic energy" (45), he is making an empirically confirmable or falsifiable claim. But I think we are also involved in a perhaps underrivable fundamental value-judgment—the judgment that those art-works are of greatest value which mediate states of feeling related to those experienced in extra-aesthetic situations. Philosophy cannot protest if the "purist" makes the alternative judgment that such references and evocations are, although sometimes unavoidable, subordinate to what he would call the *distinctively* aesthetic experiences, delight in formal structure for its own sake and not as a conductor of the life-emotions, delight in the contemplation of the utterly new, the formed stones of *Arp*, the designs of *Kandinsky*.¹

(2) In *Imitation and Design* the decision about the placing of the optimal zone for painting is first made after a brief review and rejection of three alternatives, two extremes and a compromise. (a) The *abstractionist* denies that any painting can be devoid of design; and to him design is the primary element. (b) The *representationalist* denies that objective reference can be eliminated, and gives the primacy to the imitational pole.

Now, before going further, it must be said that MacCallum's arguments against the self-sufficiency of either extreme position are neither logically parallel nor equally convincing. It is true that design logically cannot be absent from any painting: the design may not be interesting or coherent, but where there are lines, areas, colours, there must be pattern of a sort. But if we claim that objective reference "cannot" be eliminated, we are using the word in quite a different sense—not a logical but a psychological sense; "I cannot help but see those shapes as a canon", for instance. But a comprehensive analysis of MacCallum's approach would have to consider at this point his account of the concept of truth in relation to art. I hope to treat this topic (here excised for reasons of space) in a book of aesthetic studies.

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comes to act like a lens—not of clear glass—through which art and criticism are organized in a distinctive (and far from trivial) manner. MacCallum's version of the expression theory is quite obviously discriminatory in this way. It claims not only that the function of art is the expression of human emotions, but suggests that in most cases these emotions are closely related to real-life, *extra-aesthetic* experiences. They are in fact these same experiences in search of an expressive vehicle. Inasmuch, therefore, as abstract painting is frequently indifferent to ordinary life emotions, and seeks to elicit unprecedented feeling-responses to unprecedented visual phenomena, it will fail to rank, in MacCallum's rather restricted usage, as "fully expressive".

To make out a case against that verdict would require a criticism of expression theories in general, which article-space will not permit. John Hospers has done this as well as anyone in "The Concept of Artistic Expression" (*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1954-5). At the same time, it is plain that expression theories as such are not *necessarily* hostile to abstract painting. What gives MacCallum's version its hostility is, first, that bias towards taking expression as the communication of human life-emotions and as relying, therefore, on the indication of some imaginary human situation to give it precision and dramatic force. It is only this cramping thought-model that makes MacCallum speak of an abstraction as an "abortive gesture", incomplete until the quasi-objective reference has been provided.

Secondly: this bias is aided by an implicit and unargued assumption that because poetry and drama are dependent upon the creation of such imaginary situations, "mock worlds", the same is also true of painting—that it cannot fulfil itself without similar constructions. "It is the same marriage of expressive pattern and likeness to nature which in the art of speech gives us poetic symbols, and in graphic art pictorial symbols" (93 f.). But if MacCallum's expression theory is challengeable, much more so is this analogy between the arts. We could with at least no less plausibility press a different analogy, not with poetry and drama, but with absolute music. Is a fugue-subject "abortive" until words are set to it? Or if a phrase gains poignancy from an echo of the voice-tunes of weeping or of gloating, does that mean it is incompletely expressive until these references are made quite explicit, and dramatized? If not, if music can be complete without the least attempt at constructing mock worlds through programmes, then why not painting too? This is not, of course, to show that it *can*: it is only to show that MacCallum's grouping of the arts—inospitable to abstraction—is not the only one open to us, and that another, equally plausible, grouping would bear very different implications.

(1) Consider first the expression theory of painting which underlies the whole treatment. Recent opponents of monolithic philosophies of art have pointed out that definitions like "art is expression" are plausible and unfalsifiable only because they give to their key concepts a breadth of meaning that renders them ultimately trivial and uninformative. This is, however, only half the truth. Despite their wide metaphysical redefinitions, such terms in their actual use almost invariably retain a discriminatory power, if only because ordinary-language senses and implications keep returning uninvited, even within the exposition of the theory itself. The theory

Let us now try to sort out in slightly more detail the logical structure of this argument and to take some first steps towards assessing it.

power of natural forms (43).
Let us now try to sort out in slightly more detail the logical structure of this argument and to take some first steps towards assessing it.

But why retain representation at all? It is retained as an indispensable aid to expression: for natural objects and persons carry associations that "intensity, specify, and sharpen the expression of feeling" (34). Objects are now seen as playing a symbolic and evocative role. Abstract design, MacCallum claims, is "abortively sketched gesture"; incomplete without reference to nature; no more than a record of the "mere fact of feeling" but lacking the evocative power of natural forms (43).

at the formal extreme.
optimal point will lie off-centre, in the formal direction, although not primary and positive pole; representation the negative pole. The design-element must clearly be the most effective painting the extreme poles of imitation and design the most effective painting We are now in a position to determine where, roughly, between as fitting. . . . But such a cue is only a starting-point. . . . (27).
the painter as a cue; in his mood, grave or gay. . . . [it] is recognized mood and feeling. "Some [natural] shape or configuration . . . serves formed in the interest of the artist's successful expression of his he puts by far the most weight upon distortions of appearances perceived in the interest of the artist's successful expression of his however, MacCallum holds a version of the expression theory of art, of nature's appearances, but of its sheer productive energy. Because, of the scale his activity consists in the rivaling and matching, not jumping intermediary points, we find that at the non-objective end further away from the imitation of any given visual appearances. Imitation of the ideal or essence may carry the painter a good deal or, more to the point aesthetically, in the light of an *ideal* norm. nature's "deformities" in the light of a statistical norm (Reynolds); ing of elements in nature's appearances; or as the correction of been accounted for, by some theorists, as the selecting and discard-not the chance expression but the fullness of character. Departures from slavish imitation are already under way. These departures have

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Reid MacCallum in his *Imitation and Design*,¹ and the other by Etienne Gilson in *Painting and Reality*.² Each in part is concerned with the representation-abstraction spectrum, and each discussion leads to a cautious but confident claim that the most worthwhile painting is likely to occur today when a painter chooses to work at a certain point or in a certain zone of that scale. Gilson concedes that philosophy ought not to legislate to the practising painter, and yet his "ontology" of painting, his judgments about recent trends in the history of art, lead him quite firmly to the view that modern painting has culminated and fulfilled itself in the most completely non-objective works. MacCallum, on the other hand, concludes that painting merely impoverishes itself if it eliminates all reference to nature. So here we have two aestheticians, arguing not over issues which are indisputably philosophical problems (like the ontological status of art-works, or the meaning of "truth" in art criticism), but over something that would seem, on the face of it, to be uniquely the painter's concern, not the philosopher's at all. Yet their arguments are, for the most part, conducted in the language of theoretical aesthetics.

We shall confront those arguments with two questions: (i)—our chief concern—By what procedures are their conclusions reached? and (ii) What can be said about their validity?

II

The art of painting, MacCallum claims, "seems to undergo a pull in two directions at once, one toward, one away from the object (or from nature)" (p. 4). The scale between slavish imitation and complete abstraction is best represented by a hyperbolic curve. This curve approaches, without ever attaining, the extremes of perfect imitation at the one pole, and entire absence of reference to the forms of nature, that is, pure design, at the other. In the case of imitation, even the photograph selects among nature's appearances; design and pattern are always present, in however small a degree. In the case of "abstracts", whatever the artist intends, we shall still see in his paintings the hints of natural objects, circles as balloons, points as stars, and so on. But there remains a wide zone in which a painter may choose to represent nature as nearly photographically as he can, or to remake it to suit his aesthetic ends.

If he is painting a portrait, a painter will certainly not emulate the snapshot camera, freezing the (often awkward, unrevealing) expression his subject wears at any one moment. He attempts to portray not the instant but the widest possible stretch of his sitter's life:

¹ Edited by William Blissett, University of Toronto Press, 1953.
² Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958.

As a contribution to that task, this essay makes a logical analysis of two philosophical discussions of painting, one by the late Professor "Can aesthetics be in any legitimate way normative? And if so how?" so can we eventually throw light on the still more general question, theories that their logical procedures can come to be evaluated; only board. In other words, it is only by detailed analyses of individual ways in which they reach normative judgments are logically above as philosophy of art. And on the other hand, by no means all the them *en masse*—as one *can* perhaps invalidate criticism masquerading stand and assess. No formula can be invoked by which to eliminate These last theories are the most complex and elusive to understand and alter one's responses to actual aesthetic objects. creatively—all these can be indirectly evaluative, can subtly aesthetic experience and what peripheral, their account of artistic into which they fit the art-forms, their notion of what is central to practical implications of a general kind. The conceptual scaffolding while clearly differentiating aesthetics from art criticism, still carry these extreme positions lies a great diversity of theories which, fallacies, to reach particular aesthetic value-judgments. Between and as able, without the committing of naturalistic or any other group, see their study as far more intimately related to art criticism, of works of art. But other aestheticians, perhaps a more numerous the clarification of talk about works of art and about the fashioning of language may confine the legitimate task of aesthetics to attempt to arrive at "first-order", practical judgments. A philosopher of language may confine the legitimate task of aesthetics to into those that maintain an analytic neutrality and those that AESTHETIC theories, like theories of morals, are roughly divisible

I

RONALD W. HEPBURN

TWO VIEWS


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